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ABSTRACT 
After Polarity: World Political Systems, Polar Structural  
Transitions, and Nonpolarity 
 
By 
Nerses Kopalyan 
Dr. Jonathan Strand, Examination Committee Chair 
University of Nevada Las Vegas 
 
 The research question poses: what are the polar structurations of a system after 
unipolar transitions, and should a system transition into a nonpolar structure, how can this 
phenomenon be explained? In the study of polarity, two deficiencies are diagnosed that 
can potentially not only fill a serious gap, but also strengthen the theoretical, conceptual, 
and systemic tools utilized within the field. The first gap is the absence of any developed 
treatments of nonpolarity. Categorical taxonomy primarily revolves around uni-, bi-, tri-, 
or multi- polar structures. The field lacks a coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity, 
thus limiting the development of a robust theoretical model that can enrich the study of 
polar structures and world powers. The second deficiency is the shortage of systematized 
studies of structural transformations, especially the outcome of polar structural transitions 
after unipolarity. The objective of this research is to conceptualize, test, and analyze the 
power configurations and post transitional patters within world political systems. The 
intent is to observe what power configuration unipolar systems transition into, gauge 
probabilistic outcomes, and if the ensuing power configuration is defined by nonpolarity, 
address whether a discernible pattern may be ascertained vis-à-vis unipolarity giving way 
to nonpolarity. Finally, the research attempts to consider the following puzzle: what will 
the global political order look like after American unipolarity?  
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CHAPTER 1 
 TOPIC AND RESEARCH QUESTION: AN INTRODUCTION… 
 Robert Jervis (2009) writes, “Academic analyses are influenced both by events in 
the world and by scholars’ political outlooks and preferences.” There are developing 
phenomena that will come to shape and influence the global political realm, yet because 
these “things are not happening,” they remain puzzles that are “ignored.” So he poses the 
question: “Who until the end of the cold war would have written an article on unipolarity 
or encouraged a graduate student to work on this topic?” (p. 189). Similarly, one could 
ask: “Who until the end of American unipolarity will write a scholarly work on 
nonpolarity or encouraged a graduate student to work on this topic?”  
 Such rhetorical questions concerning the choice for topics and subject matters for 
research within the field of international relations (IR) presuppose two extremely 
important developments with respect to the very nature of research and inquiry: 1) the 
extent to which the study of a subject matter must be justified in order to even consider 
undertaking research; and 2) the meta-theoretical considerations that define and 
legitimate the very method and nature of inquiry. Methodology and paradigmatic 
legitimation, then, have become the structural basis, the scientificity, that is, the 
justification, for commencing scholarly research.  The extent to which International 
Relations, as a social science discipline, is itself considered a science brings about more 
questions than answers: is it a continuing attempt to attain scientific credentials for its 
knowledge-accumulation, or a stubborn march toward scientificitness that is, itself, 
controversial? The broad and intense debate of what science is, and whether IR should or 
can be a science, has consumed the discipline in gauging such questions as: what is the 
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nature of theory and concept; what is the nature of inquiry; what is the nature of 
knowledge-accumulation; what is the nature of explanation; what is the nature of 
causation; so on and so forth (Bull 1969; Kaplan 1969; Reynolds 1973; Waltz 1979; 
Ogley 1981; Ferguson and Mansbach 1988; Nicholson 1996; Wendt 1999). 
 The legitimation for research and inquiry, then, has required IR to justify this very 
legitimation by relying on philosophy of science. Namely, since it is the scope of its 
scientificity that legitimates mainstream IR scholarship, adherence to the logic and 
method of science, itself, must address the concerns of what is science and scientific 
inquiry in relation to the social science of international relations. Philosophy of science as 
legitimation (Wight 2002), then, has offered a robust and powerful framework in 
addressing the two concerns posed above: the nature of undertaking specific topical 
research and the meta-theoretical justification for undertaking such research. 
Concomitantly, for the research project at hand, in the relationship between the normative 
and the empirical, the structural and the historical, the conceptual and the analytical, and 
more importantly, between the theoretical and the factual, the following serves an 
axiomatic premise: facts are what matter and theory is simply a better way of collecting 
them (Gunnell 1975).     
Topic and Research Question 
 Historically, the power configurations of world political systems, structurally, 
have been defined by four formations: multipolarity, tripolarity, bipolarity, and 
unipolarity. The concept of nonpolarity, however, has never been addressed as a possible 
or a potential structural formulation in the nomenclature of world/global political 
systems. The reason for this may be as followed. Since considerations of hegemony and 
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polarity are generally undertaken by proponents of (neo)realism, or world-systems/world 
system scholars who also rely on the traditional taxonomy of polarity, nonpolarity would 
create both paradigmatic and conceptual-analytical complications, since the absence of 
poles indicates absence of hegemon(s), which either negates positional and structural 
considerations inherent to the above specified paradigmatic approaches, or marginalizes 
considerations of the balance of power thesis which also necessitates the presence of 
polar structures. Concomitantly, paradigmatic approaches that account for system-wide 
hegemons, along with scholarly attention to forms of polarity, are not and will not be able 
to address and explain the structure of a nonpolar system.  
 Since the discipline lacks a coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity, which, in 
turn, thoroughly limits the development of a robust theoretical model that can contribute 
to the study of polar structures and world political systems, the general intent of this 
project is to address this puzzle of nonpolarity. The second deficiency in the discipline is 
the dearth of scholarly attention to a systematized consideration of structural 
transformations, including the structural transition of the system after unipolarity. 
Specifically, the field lacks any research that addresses observable and systematized 
patterns of transitions between modalities of polar structures (unipolarity specifically) 
within world political systems. As such, no probabilistic assumptions may be presented to 
gauge the power configurations of a system after unipolar structural transition. The 
research presented here is primarily concerned with assessing the structural outcomes of 
systems after a unipolar period. In sum, an important puzzle remains to be addressed in 
the study of polarity, the structures of system-wide power configurations, and the 
subsequent outcome within the system after structural (unipolar) transitions. 
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Specific Research Question: What is the polar structuration (power 
configurations) of a system after unipolar transitions? Concomitantly, should a 
system transition into a nonpolar structure, how can this phenomenon be 
explained and accounted for? 
 A practical question, consistent with the justificatory and legitimation discourse 
presented above, may be asked with respect to this project: does polarity matter? The 
answer to this is three-fold. First, polarity matters when attempting to formulate, analyze, 
and gauge the short-term policies of powerful actors within a world/global political 
system. For example, after the Cold War, the policy of the United States, as the single 
system-wide hegemon within the existing unipolar structure, was whether to utilize 
American preponderance and preserve the unipolar epoch, or to engage in revisionist 
behavior and transition the system into a multipolar structure—such as, for example, the 
attempt by the U.S. during the bipolar Cold War structure to position China as a third 
pole and balance it against the USSR. The underlying arguments were based upon the 
nature and outcome of the different power configurations of the system: if unipolarity is 
unstable, then the U.S. should formulate policies that allow other actors to become 
system-wide hegemons in order to form a multipolar system, which may be more stable. 
If, however, unipolar structures are stable (and relatively peaceful), then U.S. dominance 
should be preserved as the only system-wide hegemon. This indicates several highly 
distinct and diverse policy stratagems: concentration of power, utilization of resources, 
diplomatic endeavors, international obligations, and all other modes of state behavior. 
Simply put, policies change in accordance to whether the system is bipolar (a primary 
concentration of resources against a single opposing pole), multipolar (a balance of 
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resources against or with several poles), unipolar (selective concentration of resources 
contingent on outcome), or nonpolar (diffusion of power and dispersion of resources 
against or with numerically high actors, where balancing is untenable). Policy 
formulation, then, becomes heavily contingent upon the power configurations of the 
system.   
 Secondly, polarity matters because it shapes the policies of other states within the 
system that are regional/sub-system hegemons, or potentially rising powers with 
ambitions of being system-wide hegemons. For example, European actors such as United 
Kingdom, France and Germany, or Asian states such as China, South Korea, and Japan, 
would have to articulate policy that is either consistent with U.S. unipolarity, or 
hypothetical China-U.S. bipolarity, or a multipolar configuration with the U.S. and few 
other actors. So if the system was bipolar (China-US), would Europe continue 
bandwagoning (policy in unipolar structure), engage in polarization (join US as policy in 
a bipolar structure), attempt to be revisionist (seeking multipolarity), or remain non-
aligned? The polar structuration of the system plays a crucial role in answering such 
questions. 
 Thirdly, polarity matters because it allows for the formulation of long-term, grand 
strategies, which may be of profound importance to the future peace and stability of the 
global system. If system-wide hegemon(s) seeks to preserve or alter/revise given polar 
structures, what would be the consequence for the rest of the countries involved in the 
system? If states are able to gauge what the potential consequences are to their interests 
based on the power configuration that the system might take, how does this affect their 
positioning and policy formulations? For example, if China is anticipating a bipolar 
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structure, then its policy would necessitate massive concentration of resources against the 
opposing pole; but if it is anticipating a multipolar structure, its policies and behavior 
would have to be multidimensional; while if it is preparing for a nonpolar system, then its 
preparations and strategic endeavors will once again have to be vastly different. Since the 
structure of the system is the environment within which a state functions, the conditions 
(modality) of this environment (polar structure) is fundamental to the security, economic 
health, and positional status of states. Simply put, even when considering practical, 
mainstream concerns—not to mention academic theory-building and hypothesis testing—
polarity matters.     
Literature Review 
 The extant literature on polarity within the international/global system finds 
extensive concentration on four modes of polarity—unipolarity, bipolarity, tripolarity, 
and multipolarity—along with the analytical utilization of the balance-of-power concept. 
Kaplan’s (1958) formulation of equilibrium and stability within the system is a classic 
and a comprehensive conceptualization of balance-of-power theory, based upon the 
works of Liska (1957) and Gulick (1955), and consistent with the traditional realism of 
Morgenthau (1993), and the research of Claude (1962), and Wolfers (1962). These 
authors consider relations between powerful states as primarily defined by delicate power 
balancing in order to sustain the status quo, that is, equilibrium. In his power transition 
theory, Organski (1958) focuses on the specific modes of wars and international conflicts 
that are produced between declining hegemons and rising challengers, but still relying, 
very much like Carr (1951), on status quo satisfaction as crucial for the stability of the 
system. Treatments of systems stability is also undertaken by Waltz (1964) and 
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Rosecrance (1966), addressing the characteristics and dynamics of different polar 
systems, and how given attributes of polarity affect the stability (gauged by war-
proneness) and longevity of the system’s structure. Deutsch and Singer (1964) 
demonstrate that “interaction opportunities” and dispersion of resources decrease the 
probability of conflict as the number of poles increase in the system. As such, 
multipolarity is deemed more stable and peaceful than bipolarity. Wallerstein’s (1974) 
world-systems approach interjects an important economics dynamic into gauging the 
global system as a three-tiered structure accounting for the interactions between states 
within a hierarchy of material power.  
 Neoliberalism partakes in the discourse by addressing the role of the world 
economy, and how the distribution of economic power and the rules governing 
international economic institutions have been vital to the process of international political 
change with respect to inter-superpower relations (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 
1984). Modelski (1978) offered a cyclical explanation of power transition, a process 
which includes counterhegemonic coalitions, arms buildup, hegemonic war, and system 
renewal. Waltz’s (1979) structural realism provides a systemic treatment of polar 
positioning, where the behavior of powerful states is constrained and shaped by the 
system, thus viewing the multipolar balance-of power structure as the most volatile and 
recurring in history, since states constantly counterbalance against other powers and 
position themselves accordingly. Rapkin et al (1979) contribute to the debate by 
elucidating the conceptual, definitional, and measurement problems related to the 
concepts of polarity and polarization, introducing empirical tests that gauge polarization, 
or the formulation of poles, as being developed in degrees (high, moderate, or low 
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polarization). Gilpin’s (1981) work on change in the international system concentrates on 
revisionist rising power(s) balancing and challenging the system-wide hegemon(s) when 
the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Once this challenge is materialized, the 
equilibrium in the international system is disturbed, with the resulting change in the 
system reflecting the new distribution of power and a resolution to the disequilibrium. In 
sum, the post-WWII/Cold War era approached research on polarity either through 
multipolar vs. bipolar models, conceptual and measurement controversies, or specific 
development of systems analysis to account for an international system that has two or 
more poles. 
 The end of the Cold War brought about the expansive debate over unipolarity, 
with the debate revolving around modes of counterbalancing (Levy 2003) against the 
unipole, ranging from traditional considerations (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993, 2006; 
Waltz 2000) to soft-balancing (Pape 2005; Paul 2005;  Ikenberry 2002; Layne 2006), to 
scholarly disputes over durability/stability (Wohlforth 1999; Waltz 1993; Wohlforth and 
Brooks 2008), peacefulness (Kupchan 1998; Ikenberry 2011a; Monteiro 2012), and 
structural coherence (Jervis 2006, 2009) of the new unipolar system (Krauthammer 1991; 
Ikenberry et al 2011). Layne (1993) contends that the current unipolar system is defined 
by American preponderance, where rising powers, instead of engaging in revisionist 
behavior, are persuaded to bandwagon (Schweller 1994). These states, however, engage 
in “leash-slipping,” where they do not fear the superpower and build their own 
capabilities to conduct their own policies (Layne 2006). Such modes of counterbalancing, 
along with the differential resource growth of rising power(s) will inevitably give way to 
a multipolar structure. Nye (2002), Walt (2005) and Ikenberry (2011a) contend that the 
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preponderance of the unipole is not temporary, that contingent on its international 
obligations, alliances, and institutional arrangements, system-wide hegemonic status may 
be preserved. Wohlforth (1999) joins the critique against neorealism’s assumption that 
the unipole engages in “unconstrained” activities (Mastanduno 1997), or that unipolarity 
is either temporary, unstable, or prone to return to multipolarity (Waltz 1997; 
Mastanduno and Kapstein 1999), arguing that the lack of counterbalancing, continued 
international cooperation, and absence of any foreseeable hegemonic rivalry suggests the 
continued preservation of the unipolar system. The overarching debate, then, has been 
over skepticism toward the stability of unipolarity (Posen and Ross 1997), along with the 
contention that a return to multipolarity is inevitable; only to be countered by claims that 
the unipolar structure generates fewer incentives for hegemonic status competition, 
conflict, and instability (Wohlforth 2011).      
 Finnemore (2011) holds that the strength of the unipolar system is not only 
dependent on material capabilities, but also on the social system that the unipole 
constructs, where its values and hegemonic status are legitimated. This is somewhat 
similar to treatment of the contemporary unipolar system as being cosmopolitanized 
(Held 1996; Cabrera 2004; Appiah 2007), legalistic (Goldstein et al 2001), 
constitutionalist, and defined by liberal values (Ikenberry 2011a), where the system-wide 
hegemon engages in strategic restraint as opposed to overt aggression (2001). Schweller 
and Pu (2011) disagree with these assessments, contending that the unipolar system will 
soon transform into a modified multipolar structure, where it will not be defined by 
traditional balancing, but rather by shirking. Jervis (2009) portrays the unipolar system as 
stable, but not necessarily peaceful (only hegemonic war is absent), indicating that 
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outcomes are generated not so much by systemic determinants, but by the (revisionist) 
behavior and values generated by the unipole.  Walt (2011) emphasizes the utilization of 
loose alliances by the unipole to reinforce the system, where balance-of-threat replaces 
balance-of-power, and the systemic constraint upon the unipole becomes limited. Posen 
(2011) argues that the unipolar system, due to an “undisciplined” unipole and diffusion of 
power, is waning, and multipolarity will become the subsequent global structure. Legro 
(2011) sums up the debate by holding that the very concept of polarity has been 
“overvalued,” that polarity, itself, is a product of state choice, and while it has some 
relevance, it is not the “kingmaker of causation” (344). 
 With the body of research demonstrating a great deal of focus on unipolarity, and 
multipolarity as the inevitable structural transition, the extant literature displays a dearth 
of work on nonpolarity. Haass (2008) is the first to initiate a discussion on nonpolarity, 
contending that the post-unipolar system will not revert to multipolarity, as most claim, 
but rather to a nonpolar structure, where power will not be concentrated amongst several 
system-wide hegemons, but diffused throughout the globe, which may include dozens of 
centers of power. Schweller and Pu (2011) touch upon nonpolarity as a possible outcome, 
but prefer multipolarity and shirking. Wilkinson (1987, 1999b) includes nonpolarity as 
one of possible structures in his taxonomy, yet refrains from conceptualizing a systemic 
framework (2004). Utilizing the concept of entropy, Schweller (2010) contends that the 
random and indeterminate nature of the current unipolar system will come to be defined 
by the system’s process, as opposed to its structure, relying more on specific unit-level 
characteristics as opposed to structural determinants. Due to the absence of constraint on 
the unipole, the global system will witness increased randomness and disorder. As the 
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system attains maximum entropy, power capabilities will be diffused into a multipolar 
structure, but one where none of the actors will have any incentive to alter their 
condition. Schweller’s conclusion, then, is a modification of multipolarity as a diffused, 
disordered (non-hierarchic) structure, yet not one which can be classified as nonpolar.     
 
Composition of this Work  
 The main objectives of this project may be deemed to be three-fold. First, to 
engage in knowledge-accumulation by undertaking original research through a 
systematized consideration of structural transformations, especially during unipolar and 
post-unipolar periods. Second, to discover new findings by observing probabilistic 
outcomes vis-à-vis the power configurations of a system, and assessing how this can 
contribute to practical policy formulation or have policy implications. And third, to 
contribute to the discipline by introducing an original conceptualization of nonpolarity, 
which, in turn, may contribute to the development of a robust theoretical model that can 
enrich the political and scientific study of polar structures and world/global political 
system(s). 
 As the body of literature suggests scholarly attention on the subject matter at hand 
remains extremely limited, and the discipline remains absent of the tools necessary to 
address possible anomalies and puzzles should the existing unipolar epoch come to an 
end. The originality of this project has both academic implications as well as practical 
implications. Academically, studies of polarity and power-relations will be introduced to 
findings that have never been undertaken, thus presenting new data and knowledge-
accumulation for the discipline. Practically, considerations of long-term and short-term 
state policy may be more coherently formulated by hinging such policies upon 
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probabilistic assessments and possible predictions based on historic evidence and 
statistical findings. 
 The composition of this project will begin with an introduction to the underlying 
logic for undertaking this research, explaining and elucidating the main research 
question, the relevance of this research to the field of study concerned, and how the 
anticipated findings will contribute to future debate and research. An extensive literature 
review is also incorporated within the relevant themes being addressed in their respective 
chapter, thus providing exposure of how this project fits within the larger picture. 
 Chapter 2 provides explanations, clarifications, and in-depth analyses of the 
overarching conceptual models that will be utilized in this work. Definitional 
considerations of polarity, hegemony, system-wide and sub-system hegemonic actors, 
and unipolarity are addressed. This is supplemented by a comprehensive treatment of 
how each conceptual framework fits into the general argument, and how it further 
strengthens the overarching theoretical model. This chapter also includes a discussion on 
nonpolarity, defining, explaining, and elaborating on the conceptual models that are being 
proposed.  
 Chapter 3 discusses the methodological design of this project, how it fuses 
qualitative, semi-quantitative (descriptive statistics), and analytical methods in testing 
and gauging the coherence of this research project. Historic systems analysis, political 
history, selective process-tracing, and the operationalization of the case studies through 
descriptive and semi-quantitative analysis will be addressed. This introduces the reader to 
the original categorization of world political systems, explaining what qualifies and 
constitutes a world system in this work. Furthermore, it explains how potential 
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controversial or non-obvious observations utilized for specific cases will be resolved in 
order to refute competing hypotheses, while providing explanatory and conceptual clarity 
to the interpretations presented. This chapter will then proceed to demonstrate the multi-
tiered data gathering process. 
 Chapter 4 will begin the data collection portion of the research by addressing the 
cases through historic system’s analysis and the historiographical method of 
macropolitical history. This chapter will cover the Far Eastern World Political System. 
The power configurations of each polar epoch, within this world political system, will be 
categorized and assessed, contributing to the collection of data on unipolar and post-
unipolar periods. Extensive descriptive statistics will be provided after the conclusion of 
the case studies for each world political system. This will include bars, charts, diagrams, 
and other visual tools. The data will then be analyzed, assessing trends, probabilistic 
patterns, non-obvious facts, and possible new findings.  
 Similar to the same organizational and structural approach of the previous 
chapter, Chapter 5 continues the collection of data on polar structures by undertaking a 
case study of the Near East-Middle Eastern World Political System. Chapter 6 further 
continues the data collection process by covering the Indic World Political System. This 
is followed by the Mediterranean World Political System in Chapter 7 and the Global 
Political System in Chapter 8. The Middle East-Near Eastern System and the 
Mediterranean System follow each other to allow for the observation of a system’s 
absorption, separation, and re-formulation within a specific geographic region, yet during 
different and continuous historic periods. Similar to the methodological treatment of 
other world political systems, the Middle East-Near Eastern System and the 
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Mediterranean System will be studied through historic system’s analysis and the 
historiographical method of political history, along with selective utilization of process 
tracing. Extensive descriptive statistics will be provided for each world political system, 
allowing for the analysis of trends, patterns, and probabilistic considerations.  
 Chapter 8 concludes the case studies of world political systems by addressing the 
European System from the 1500’s and how its expansion provides for the formation of 
the Global Political System. These systems are synthesized in this chapter to allow for the 
observation of absorption and continuity, since it was the expansion of the European 
powers that gave way to a globalizing world. The formulation of the European System 
during the early Middle Ages, as the historical and systemic consequence for the 
establishment of a Global Political System, is not addressed in this work, but rather, the 
European System of the 1500’s is incorporated in the Global Political System. Consistent 
with the methodological framework of this project, historic system’s analysis and 
political history (and process tracing) is utilized, along with descriptive statistics and 
analysis of the data. 
 Chapter 9 concludes this work by displaying all the findings of this research 
project, specifically the number of unipolar structures that were observed in all the world 
political systems, the subsequent structure that the system took after transition, and the 
extent to which nonpolar systems are found. The aggregate descriptive statistics are also 
displayed, demonstrating the probabilistic outcomes, and the relationship between 
unipolar structures and the power configuration that the system subsequently formulates. 
This chapter also offers guidance for future research on the topic, addressessing the 
concepts of interaction opportunities, dispersion of resources, and entropy to 
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systematically observe how the nonpolar systems functions, what the specific structural 
attributes are, and how well will the applied concepts hold when faced with the empirical 
facts from the historical evidence. This chapter will then conclude by probabilistically 
suggesting what the post-US unipolar system might look like, what the attributes and 
characteristics of the system may be, and what policy implications this may have for the 
United States as it prepares for a world after polarity. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 BETWEEN THE CONCEPTUAL AND THE METHODOLOGICAL: THE 
OVERARCHING ARGUMENT 
 
 As the literature review in the previous chapter suggests, the vast body of research 
on structural, systemic, and even reductionist (intra-polar) studies of polarity, hegemony, 
superpowers/world powers, or any other conceptualization of system-wide dominant 
actors, primarily revolves around four distinct modes of analysis. The first mode of 
analysis relies on the tenets of neorealism, addressing state behavior in relation to the 
system and how the structure of the system shapes and predicts behavior, thus attributing 
structural consequences to the very characteristics of the structure. Examples of this 
mode of analysis include considerations of how states behave in bipolar, multipolar, or 
unipolar structures in relation to positioning, balancing, and distribution of resources 
(material capabilities). The second mode of analysis, contemporary in nature, addresses 
the post-Cold War unipolar structure, either suggesting the coherence and durability of 
this system, or its inevitable instability and decay. It includes much attention on strategies 
of resistance or insulation with respect to the unipole’s overwhelming power, alliances 
and alignments, and the use of international institutions. The third mode of analysis re-
conceptualizes the Global Political System as evolved and distinct from the previous 
systems, thus deeming American unipolarity as liberal, constitutionalist, and therefore, 
consistent with peace and longevity. The fourth mode of analysis is primarily 
reductionist, addressing not so much inter-polar and structural considerations, but rather 
the internal dynamics and characteristics of the given system-wide hegemon. This 
approach is broadly incorporated into systemic, cyclical, and transitional treatments of 
the structure and modalities of polarity. In sum, the majority of scholarly treatments of 
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polarity, hegemony, or world power(s)—this project uses the term system-wide 
hegemon—are primarily concerned with either the behavior of actors within a structure, 
the attributes of the system under different structures, and more recently, the nature, 
scope, and structuration of unipolarity.  
Concomitantly, two deficiencies are diagnosed within the study of this field that 
can potentially not only fill a serious gap, but also strengthen the theoretical, conceptual, 
and systemic analytical tools utilized in the study of polar structures. The first gap in 
scholarly research is the absence of any developed treatments of nonpolarity as a 
structural mode within a system. Categorical taxonomy primarily revolves around the 
obvious structures of uni-, bi-, tri-, or multi- polar considerations. The field lacks a 
coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity, which thoroughly limits the development of a 
robust theoretical model that can enrich the study of polar structures and world political 
systems. The second deficiency is the shortage of scholarly attention to a systematized 
consideration of structural transformations, especially the outcome of what the structure 
of the system transitions into after unipolarity. Specifically, previous studies have not 
examined patterns of transitions between modalities of polar structures (unipolarity 
specifically) within world/global political systems. As such, no probabilistic assumptions 
can be presented that gauges the power configurations of a system after unipolar 
structural transition. Some research, for example, explains why great powers rise and fall, 
how the structure shapes and restrains this process, how stable, peaceful, or durable a 
given polar structure is, and what the characteristics, dynamics, and attributes are of 
given structural systems. There is no research, however, that observes and attempts to 
explain historical patterns in such structural transitions, what the likely structural 
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outcome may be after a unipolar period, or the number of unipolar periods that all the 
world political systems in history have formed and what the consequent systemic 
structure has transitioned into after the unipolar period.  
Lacking any research on the above-posed questions, there is a serious gap in 
evaluating and determining transitional patterns and probabilistic outcomes. Related to 
this is the absence of a theoretical framework that explains, assesses, and methodically 
conceptualizes the structure of nonpolarity. As such, there are no conceptualizations of 
any periods within world political systems that have had nonpolar epochs. Furthermore, 
one cannot assess after which structural mode of polarity the nonpolar system forms, and 
what the characteristics and dynamics are of a nonpolar structure. While the research 
question here is primarily concerned with what the Global Political System looks like 
after a unipolar period, the scholarly realm, however, remains analytically inept and 
limited should the systemic consequences be of nonpolarity. To this end, important 
puzzles remain to be addressed in the study of polarity, the structures of system-wide 
power configurations, and the subsequent outcome within the system after structural 
(unipolar) transitions. In short, what happens to international systems after polarity? 
Research Design 
 The research interest of this dissertation is to conceptualize, test, and analyze the 
power configurations or systemic political structures of the given world political systems, 
specifically selecting moments within such systems where unipolarity was formed and 
the subsequent power configurations and systemic structures that were formulated after 
the end of the unipolar period. The objective is to observe what power configuration the 
end of the unipolar system transitioned into—unipolarity, bipolarity,  tripolarity, 
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multipolarity, or nonpolarity—and if the ensuing political power constellation is defined 
by nonpolarity, whether a discernible pattern may be ascertained through the observed 
historic epochs where unipolarity gave way to nonpolarity.   
Case Selections 
 The criteria for case selections will be two-fold, as the discussion below will 
provide further elaboration on the methodological approach. First, the over-arching case 
study will be a specific world political system within a given historic epoch (the period 
from the system’s inception to its end). Since the intent is to include all world political 
systems throughout history for which data exists, the selection of these overarching case 
studies will be expansive and robust, mitigating concerns of selection bias. Second, 
within the overarching case studies, the primary concentration will be on historic 
epochs/periods within world political systems where the power configurations of the 
system were defined by unipolarity. In this sense, case selection will be determined by 
the unipolar structuration of the given world political system. Epochs during which the 
system is defined by bipolarity, tripolarity, or multipolarity will also be included, but with 
limited attention with respect to in-depth analysis, since the objective is to observe the 
consequences and the developments within world political systems at the end of the 
unipolar structure. Fundamentally, since this project is concerned with finding patterns of 
polar structures after the end of unipolar periods, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar systems 
will be considered only to the extent to which such factors contribute to the scope and 
interest of the research question at hand.  
 This criteria-orientation for case selection naturally brings forth the ubiquitous 
meta-theoretical concern of the agent-structure problematique. To alleviate the 
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problematique, a three-tiered explanatory framework is proposed. First, the 
conceptualization of system is designated to the given world/global political system 
under consideration. In this sense, the explanatory framework presupposes the system as 
being any of the given world/global political systems being studied. Second, the structure 
remains the given configuration that takes place within the system, that is, its power 
constellation/polar configuration. The formulation of the set power configurations 
constitutes the structure within the system under consideration. Third, the agent, then, 
within the proposed framework, is the political unit/actor under consideration, that is, the 
system-wide (rising sub-system) hegemon(s) whose behavior gives way to the 
formulation of the structure itself. The agent-structure problematique, then, is addressed 
through the power configuration (structure) of the political system which, as stated, is 
shaped and formed by system-wide hegemon(s) (agent). Contributing to this explanatory 
framework is the infusion of temporal and chronological observations through the notion 
of polar epochs. Polar periods, in this context, are the power constellations (structure) of 
the system during a given time-period in the history of the given world/global political 
system. To this end, the two-tiered criteria for case selection relies on the proposed 
explanatory framework to account for the system (the world/global political system as the 
over-arching case study), the power constellations/configurations as the structure (case 
study within the system), the system-wide, or rising sub-system, hegemon(s) as the agent, 
and the polar epochs/periods as the chronological historic phases where the agent 
shapes/alters/defines the structure within the given system.   
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Methodology 
 A four-tiered methodological approach is utilized in this project. Each method 
will lexically follow the other, for the coherence and tenability of the second approach is 
based on the first, and the operationalization of the third approach is based on the first 
and second methods.  
 Historic political systems analysis  
 Political history method within-cases  
 Descriptive statistical analysis of polarity structuration, formation of unipolar 
systems, and subsequent nonpolar structures. 
 Probabilistic calculations of the findings. 
Historical Systems Analysis. 
 Loosely noting the works of Wilkinson (1987,1995, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2004), 
with attention to Chase-Dunn et al (2000), Cioffi-Revilla and Landman (1999), and 
Thompson (2002), along with much appreciation for Wallerstein (1989, 1992) and Frank 
and Gills (1996), historic systems analysis will be utilized to provide criteria and 
analytical space in categorizing world political systems and the historic epochs that the 
system goes through, with specific concentration on the unipolar epoch and the 
subsequent structure of the given world political system during and after unipolarity. 
While these authors use comparative-historical systems analysis, which is consistent with 
both world system and world-systems approach, the approach presented in this project 
refrains from basing its research project on such foundations. Namely, the unit of analysis 
is the structure of the system, third level imagery. The approach, however, does not 
follow the systemic approach of either world system or world-systems analysis. The 
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criterion of what constitutes a system fundamentally differs, as does the categorization of 
world political systems and historic epochs. This is why this project uses the term world 
political system(s). This given approach, however, does draw insights from their 
concentration on historical case studies and the presence of distinct historic systems 
(although it offers distinct categorizations as this project will demonstrate). 
 Paradigmatically, “world-systems,” “world system,” and “world political 
systems” are conceptual terms that categorize spatial-territorial dimensions of human 
history within specified and criteria-oriented designation of geo-political, geo-economic, 
and civilizational structurations. The “world system” approach, for example, conceives 
the entire history of socio-economic interactions between politico-economic units as a 
single world system, and as such, it conceptualizes a single world system in the history of 
humanity. By virtue of concentrating on economic interaction, trade, and accumulation, 
regardless of magnitude or the existence of political attributes, categorization of a system, 
as a world system, is confined into a single, continuous world system throughout the 
history of organized human activity. Within this paradigmatic approach, there are no 
world systems (that is, several world systems in history), or world-systems, but rather, a 
single world system throughout the entire history of organized human economic activity 
(Gills and Frank 1996; Frank and Gills 1996).  
 Operationally, this world system approach is limited and incompatible with the 
conceptual framework of this project for three reasons. First, by virtue of gauging 
criteria-orientation on material and economic attributes (primarily trade), thus 
minimalizing the political, treatments of power configurations become fundamentally 
marginalized. Second, by presupposing a singular world system, analytical space for 
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categorizing geo-political and civilizational developments of non-connected parts of the 
world remains inapplicable. Third, by virtue of the first two limitations, it becomes 
impossible to analyze the formulation of world political systems and the power 
constellations of such systems, since analytical reductionism becomes confined to a 
single world system and its inchoate, yet marginally connected, economic activities. 
Contrary to this uni-dimensional approach, the research at hand conceptualizes different 
world political systems contingent on the spatial-territorial dimensions of the geo-
political and inter/intra-civilizational structures of each system. Furthermore, to offer 
more robustness to the criteria at hand, mere economic/trade connectedness between 
systems is expanded by analysis of the absorption of one system by another, thus 
providing a more coherent and inclusive model for system’s analysis. The notion of a 
single world system, however, is not rejected. The counter-argument presented here is 
that a single world system, termed as the Global Political System, came into being after 
all the world political systems interacted and became absorbed into a single Global 
Political System. Not, as the world system approach holds, that a single world/global 
system existed from the very outset. In this sense, the world system approach 
presupposes a single Global Political System throughout human history, while this work 
rejects that assessment, contending that multitude of world political systems existed 
throughout history, and a single Global Political System came into being only when all 
the world political systems were continuously absorbed into a single global structure.    
 The world-systems approach, on the other hand, is distinct from the world system 
approach, and while its designation criteria is somewhat similar to the world political 
systems approach presented here, the criteria-orientation and analytical categorization of 
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what constitutes a world-system sharply differs from world political systems. The 
distinction between the world system and world-systems approach is articulated by 
Wallerstein (1996):  
 They speak of a “world system.” I speak of “world-system.” I use a    
 hyphen; they do not. I use the plural; they do not. They use the singular 
 because, for them, there is and has been one world system through all 
 of historic time and space. For me there have been very many world- 
 systems…My “world system” is not a system “in the world” or “of a 
 world.” It is a system “that is a world.” Hence the hyphen, since “world”  
 is not an attribute of the system. Rather the two words together constitute  
 a single concept. Frank and Gill’s system is a world system in an  
 attributive sense, in that it has been tending over time to cover the  
 whole world. They cannot conceive of multiple “world systems”  
 coexisting on the planet (294-295).     
 
 The categorical stipulation of several systems having existed in the world as 
opposed to a single continuous system remains a consistent theme between world-systems 
and world political systems. The distinction between these two approaches, however, is 
four-fold. First, world-systems theorists, when speaking of world-systems, are in essence 
speaking of world economic systems. The criteria-orientation of what constitutes a 
system is fundamentally hinged on the economic structure (division of labor, etc.) of the 
formulated system at hand. Second, consistent with the Marxist tradition, world-systems 
reduces treatments of system’s analysis to an economic genesis, and as such, the 
conceptualization of the system presupposes the political as an extension of the 
economical, as opposed to vice versa. Third, designation of what constitutes a system is 
framed within the framework of material trans-civilizational exchanges, where division 
of labor incorporates peoples and societies into the world-system. This ignores the 
political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-
wide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the given system. 
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Namely, competition is over economic power, not political power. Fourthly, whereas the 
world political systems approach presupposes the fusion of political and economic 
attributes as a singular power framework that accounts for the hegemonic actor(s)’ 
rationale for dominance, the world-systems approach gauges structural hierarchy within a 
center-periphery complex. This latter approach, also consistent with the world system 
approach, presupposes economic hierarchy over political hierarchy, as opposed to 
conceiving a dialectical synthesis between the two: attainment of power (and not just a 
myopic consideration of economic power). In sum, great distinction lies in the economic-
sociological approach of world-systems analysis, where analytical depth is provided 
toward conceptualizing the division of labor at the systemic level, as opposed to power 
configurations in relation to political hierarchies. As such, whereas a system, within 
world-systems analysis, refers to a socioeconomic system; this project, categorically, 
considers the political, or macro-political, structures of a system, and thus defines a 
system within the context of political and system-wide hegemonic dynamics within a 
synthesized conceptualization of power.    
 Until the 1600’s, a coherent conceptualization of a single world/global system 
does not exist, for interaction between civilizations, world political systems, and different 
system-wide hegemons was either rare or almost non-existent. For example, the 
Mediterranean World Political System, historically, does not define the known world, it 
is not the only world/global system, and as such, structural treatments of the 
consequences of a system after unipolarity cannot be limited to Eurocentric historicism. 
Specifically, prior to the formulation of a Global Political System, where all the powerful 
countries of the world had knowledge and political, diplomatic, economic, and even 
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military interaction with one another, world political systems existed with its set of 
civilizations, political actors, and power configurations. This system delimited their 
conceptualization of the world (this was their political world); as the Mediterranean 
civilizations conceptualized Europe, and then the Near East-Middle Eastern System, after 
its absorption, to be their known world (Chapter 5). The objective is to categorize world 
political systems that were isolated or had limited interaction with other world political 
systems, where each system had its own specific inter-civilizational interactions, system 
of independent political entities (states, kingships, empires, etc.), and power 
configurations, where which given political entities within the system served as units 
seeking to restructure the existing system by positioning themselves as system-wide 
hegemons.  
 As an example, the Middle East-Near Eastern World Political System may be 
considered, with its historic epoch from 2600-300 B.C. This world political system did 
not define the known world, yet it was a coherent world political system in and of itself, 
separate from, for example, the Indic World Political System in South Asia, or the rising 
Mediterranean World Political System of the Greece-Balkan-Asia Minor region. Historic 
systems analysis allows for the categorization of different world political systems during 
different historic epochs, separately observing and diagnosing the structural transitions 
and modes of polarity for each given world political system. Thus, during this historic 
epoch, the Mediterranean System was in its infantile stages of forming a world political 
system of independent political actors and structural power configurations, while the 
Middle East-Near Eastern System already had system-wide hegemons in the forms of 
Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Hittites, etc., with its system’s structure shifting from 
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multipolarity, to bipolarity, to unipolarity, and as analysis will demonstrate, to 
nonpolarity. Thus, to limit the analytical scope to the Mediterranean World Political 
System, for example, as the only world system, would be inherently myopic and 
historically blind, while to view the Middle Eastern-Near Eastern System as the only 
world/global system for this given historic epoch (ignoring, for example, Indic and Far 
Eastern world systems) is equally problematic. To this end, a concerted effort will be 
made to analyze all the world political systems for which historic data exist, categorizing 
each system within the historic epochs that it existed, and observing the formulation of 
poles as structural political configurations within each system, with specific 
concentration on the periods of unipolarity and the structural consequences for the system 
after the end of unipolarity. In this sense, since formulations of polarity are structural 
developments within a system, to coherently gauge what the consequences are for a given 
system after the end of unipolarity, research cannot be limited to a single world political 
system, but must rather consider the entire historical context. The analytical scope, 
however, will revert to a systems analysis that encompasses the entire globe after the 
1500’s, where the different world political systems had come to interact with one another, 
thus creating a single Global Political System.     
 A system primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra civilizational 
relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between political 
units/entities/actors within the region that the given world political system encompasses. 
This fundamentally presupposes a group of political units/entities/actors having relations 
that are, to a strong degree, permanent or continuous with one another. Spatial-
territorially, a system covers a specific geographical area, but to specify set regional and 
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territorial boundaries in absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political 
system will obscure the reality of the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be 
flexible, with political entities at the periphery at times being incorporated in the system, 
and at times being absent from the system. System’s classification, then, does not 
specifically rely on establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering the 
political contacts, interactions, and power configurations of system-wide hegemons that 
function within the region that the given system encompasses. The following example 
will provide more clarity.  
 The Indic System World Political System primarily refers to the political 
interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide 
hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region of the Indian 
subcontinent, or the region of South Asia. Its regional boundaries tend to be flexible, as 
political entities on the periphery or external to the system may encroach into the system, 
thus creating temporary contact (political contact as it pertains to power relations) 
between world political systems. For example, Afghanistan tends to be on the periphery, 
yet it is part of the Indic System, while Persia, bordered on the periphery, is considered to 
be part of the Middle East-Near Eastern System. In cases where the Persian Empire 
encroaches into the Indic System and becomes a system-wide hegemonic actor, it is then 
considered to be part of the power configurations of the system. As such, from time to 
time, encroachment by external actors into the system is anticipated. Yet this remains 
ephemeral and does not indicate the absorption of one system into another. The case of 
Alexander the Great’s conquest of Bactria (modern Afghanistan and Pakistan) is a case in 
point. This was a temporary infringement by the Macedonians, and did not lead to the 
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incorporation of the Indic System into any other world political system. As such, for the 
sake of historical accuracy, the infringement of powers outside of the system into the 
system will be taken into consideration. But this will be treated in two ways: either the 
system is conquered and absorbed into another system, thus ending the given system 
(such as Britain’s colonization of India and the absorption of the Indic System into the 
Global Political System), or outside power(s) become absorbed into the given world 
political system and remain part of it as one of its poles (Mughal system-wide hegemonic 
status and its absorption into the Indic System). To this end, systems analysis utilized in 
this project considers the temporal, spatial, and conceptual formulation of what 
constitutes a system, fundamentally relying on macro-political developments, power 
configurations, and the structural transition that the system undergoes.    
The Methodology of Political History and Selective Utilization of Process-Tracing 
 Political history is a historiographical method that refers to the study of political 
events based on narrative, critical analysis, evaluation, and empirical examination of 
historic facts, developments, and outcomes. The objective is to articulate an objective and 
logically-consistent narrative that accounts for and explains historical developments and 
outcomes of specific political phenomena in given historic periods (Elton 1967, 1970; 
Pocock 2005; Fielding 2007). The specific concentration of this historiographical 
approach is on the political dimensions of history (Trevelyan 1978), for political history, 
among other things, is the study of the organization and operation of power (Burke 1985). 
Since the purpose of this project is to observe centers of power, system-wide hegemons 
within given world political systems, the historiographical method of political history will 
serve as a method in describing, explaining, and accounting for the modes of polar 
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structures within given systems. As such, for the purpose of this project, specific attention 
will be applied to macro-political developments and outcomes. In this sense, the political 
historic approach will be elevated to third level imagery. This approach is consistent with 
the qualitative method of “thick analysis:” interpretive and descriptive work that places 
great reliance on detailed knowledge of cases (Collier et al 2010). Concomitantly, the 
scope of this project anticipates a large-N, since perhaps hundreds of observations will be 
formulated based on qualitative/narrative analysis. This is consistent with the works of 
Tilly (1993) and Collier (1999).   
 Process-tracing will be utilized as a supplemental approach for specific periods 
within given world political systems where controversial or alternative explanatory 
hypotheses exist. Process-tracing is “the examination of diagnostic pieces of evidence, 
commonly evaluated in a specific temporal sequence, with the goal of supporting or 
overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses” (Collier et al 2010, 201). Process tracing 
inherently analyzes trajectories of change and causation where the phenomena observed 
at each step in this trajectory are adequately described and accounted for (Collier 2011). 
Since many of the historic epochs and the power configurations within the given world 
political systems will not present non-obvious, controversial, or alternative hypothesis or 
interpretations, process-tracing will not by utilized as a supplemental approach to the 
political history method. Only during cases where such concerns of controversy are 
present will process-tracing be implemented to account for the formulation of unipolarity 
(or nonpolarity): relying on causal-inferences (Bennett 2010) and sequences (Mahoney 
2010) within the tracing process to account for the subsequent outcome of the world 
political system’s structure upon the end of the unipolar epoch.  
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 Thus, for example, the selected historic epoch and world political system is the 4
th
 
century B.C. Mediterranean World Political System, where the historiographical method 
of political history, elevated to the macro level, will be utilized to account for the 
formulation of Macedonia as a system-wide hegemon, explaining the systemic structure, 
inter-subsystem and system-wide hegemonic conflict, and the ultimate positioning of 
Macedonia as a superpower. This will, in turn, lead to consideration of the bipolar system 
dominated by Macedonia and the Persian Empire, after which Macedonia, through a 
series of wars, establishes itself as the system-wide hegemon, hence altering the systemic 
structure into a unipolar system. Subsequently, the systemic consequences of 
Macedonia’s decline as the system-wide hegemon and the transition from the end of 
unipolarity to the new power configurations of the system presents controversy and 
competing hypotheses. To gauge the tenability and robustness of the process-tracing 
method being implemented, counterfactuals (King et al 1994) will be utilized to test the 
conclusions and assumptions reached in the case study. Continuing with the above-
example, does process-tracing and counterfactual analysis reject Macedonian status as 
system-wide hegemon, or does the political history analysis hold against counterfactuals? 
Namely, does the contention, that the post-Macedonian unipolar system gave way to 
nonpolarity, hold, or do competing assessments deem the post-unipolar system as 
multipolar? Essentially, was the Wars of the Diadochi a case of inter-hegemonic conflict, 
or, as the nonpolar interpretation suggests, that neither of the units in the conflict were 
system-wide hegemons? Simply put, in cases where controversy and competing 
hypotheses/explanations are present, the analytical and causal inferences presented 
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through process-tracing will be tested against counterfactuals to gauge the tenability and 
explanatory strength of the conclusions reached in the analysis. 
Semi-Quantitative Descriptive Analysis and Probabilistic Assessments 
 Semi-quantitative methods will be utilized, along with the qualitative tools 
specified above, in attempting to observe the formulation of potential structural patterns 
in world political systems vis-à-vis unipolar systems and the subsequent structure of the 
system after unipolarity. The structural power configurations of world political systems 
will be employed to generate feasible modalities of coding. Since the objective is to 
observe unipolar periods in world political systems (overarching unit of analysis), each 
unipolar period will serve as the unit of analysis during this phase of the research design. 
The initial intent, then, will be to observe the number of unipolar periods that each world 
political system has had throughout its existence. Thus, for example, if observing the 
Mediterranean World Political System, with its historic epoch lasting from 2300 BC – 
400 AD, it may tentatively be suggested that there were approximately 3-5 periods where 
the structure of the system was unipolar (examples: Mycenae, Macedonia, Rome). This, 
of course, would already be determined and substantiated through the second 
methodological approach. This same data gathering method will be utilized for each 
world political system within the dataset. The underlying aim is to collect the number of 
unipolar periods for each system, and then aggregate this into the total number of 
unipolar periods in the history of the world.  
 Data will be collected on the subsequent polar structures following unipolar 
periods. Thus, after having data on the total number of unipolar periods in history, the 
dataset will also have data on the different modes of polarity that were formulated after 
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the unipolar structure. This will, finally, allow for the coding of the data and the 
observation of patterns and structural developments with respect to post-unipolar 
transitions. 
Sample Coding for Modes of Polarity: 
 Unipolar structure: single system-wide hegemon/superpower  
 Bipolar: two system-wide hegemons/superpowers 
 Tripolar: three system-wide hegemons/superpowers  
 Multipolar: four to six system-wide hegemons 
 Nonpolar: no system-wide hegemon, constellation of sub-system hegemons (more 
than seven actors in the system)
1
 
 
 In relation to the methodological approach and research design presented above, 
the analytical operationalization of the data will allow this research to answer some 
important questions that can potentially solve the puzzle being addressed.  
1. After each unipolar period, what power configuration did the structure of the 
system take?  
2. Did the system become bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or nonpolar?  
3. Which polar structure has numerical advantage of becoming formed after 
uniplority?  
4. What are the probabilistic relations between each possible mode of polarity after 
unipolar periods?  
5. Can consistent patterns be observed that produce non-obvious facts and 
observations into the historic process of polar structuration after unipolarity? 
6. Based on the potential quantified results, can it be predicted, even 
probabilistically, what the post-unipolar American global system will look like? 
7. Consistent with the standards of philosophy of science, can this project generate 
knowledge-accumulation, and can the produced knowledge be adequately 
evaluated through hypothesis-corroboration? 
 
Data Collection 
 Historical systems analysis will provide the conceptual, theoretical, and analytical 
basis of categorizing and qualifying what constitutes a world political system, the spatial-
territorial location of the system, and the historical period within which the system 
                                                          
1
 For a thorough discussion on the attributes of nonpolarity, especially on the numerical considerations of 
poles, see pp. 45-49. 
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endured. Concomitantly, the process of compiling the various world political systems 
throughout human history has led to the designation of five systems. Since world political 
systems ceased to exist after the 1800s, where a single Global Political System 
encompassed all the world political systems, this project is interested in categorizing the 
time period that a given system existed in, whether it was absorbed into a neighboring 
system, or whether it was thoroughly conquered and ceased to exist. The categorization 
of world/global political systems and the time periods that measure their existence are 
provided in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1  LIST OF WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
World Political System Beginning 
Year 
Ending 
Year 
Historical 
Event/Reason 
Middle East-Near Eastern 
System 
2600 BC 300 BC Roman Expansion, 
Absorption  into 
Mediterranean System 
Mediterranean System 2000 BC 400 AD Collapse of Roman 
Empire 
Far Eastern System 1000 BC 1850 AD European/American 
Intrusion, Absorption 
into Global System 
Indic System 500 BC 1800 AD British Colonialism, 
Absorption  into Global 
System 
Global System 1500 AD Present  
 
 Upon formulating a dataset based on world political systems, the intent will be to 
compile data on the number of unipolar structures each system formed. The number of 
unipolar periods for each world political system will be combined with the number of 
unipolar periods for all of the systems in the dataset. This will provide, based on the 
criteria set forth, the total number of unipolar periods in the history of the world. The 
primary objective is to gather data on the total number of unipolar periods, which will 
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then be utilized to observe what a system transitions into after each unipolar structure. 
Namely, for each unipolar period, further data will be compiled on the subsequent 
structure of the world political system. The objective is to collect data on post-unipolar 
periods. This will provide information as to whether the post-unipolar periods transition 
into bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or nonpolar structures. As such, data will be gathered for 
different modalities of polarity following unipolar periods.    
Selection of Sources 
 The accumulation of the data for the polar configurations fundamentally rely on 
the historic evidence, culled from the vast body of historical research undertaken by 
scholars that have established mainstream consensus in relation to the substance and 
accuracy of the information provided. Scholarly consensus, then, remains the criteria for 
selecting historical works as sources when formulating evidence in support of data 
compilation. Since the attainment of historical evidence can never be absolute or 
presuppose unquestioned certainty, the overarching assumption concedes that some 
degree of bias is inevitable when relying on secondary sources for histiographical 
research. This bias remains an inherent truism even when accessing primary sources: 
historic documents defy objectiveness, for they must, by their very existence, support 
some culture, society, leader, or power structure. To this end, the approach at hand 
remains vigilant in gauging historic developments at the macropolitical level, and thus 
refraining from making controversial or unsubstantiated claims based on secondary 
interpretations as sufficient evidence. What constitutes historic knowledge, then, is 
qualified by virtue of the existing evidence in support of general claims, as opposed to 
minute or specific claims that remain outside the data collection scope of this project.    
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CHAPTER 3  
BETWEEN THE CONCEPTUAL AND THE ANALYTICAL: DEFINING AND 
EXPLAININT THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
“We give different labels to the same structural phenomena because we lack a 
consensus on how the structural phenomena should be conceptualized” (Rapkin et al 
1979, 262). As such, some definitional and conceptual clarifications will be necessary to 
both alleviate confusion and bypass much scholarly controversy over given concepts and 
assumptions. This will include some specific considerations of paradigm-building and 
theory development to formulate robust, logically consistent, and analytically coherent 
conceptual models. First, however, it must be noted that the vast literature on polarity 
demonstrates not only lack of consensus on how to define, measure and operationalize 
polarity, but also contradictory findings (Singer 1981), along with different research 
designs and different attempts at measuring the independent and dependent variables and 
quantifying modes of polarity (Vasquez 1987). For example, different scholars utilize 
different criteria to define and conceptualize hegemony (Wilkinson 1999b), hegemon 
(Gilpin 1981), polarity (Waltz 1979), unipolarity (Layne 1993; Ikenberry, Mastanduno, 
and Wohlforth 2011; Jervis 2009), polarization (Rapkin et al 1979; Bueno de Mesquita 
1978), and the distribution of power as distinct from polarization (Wayman 1985).  
 The problem of measurement is further compounded by the use of vastly 
different variables, criteria, and even proxies. Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 
(2011) argue, for example, definitional treatments of polarity (specifically unipolarity) 
must be based on distribution and concentration of material resources. They separate 
hegemony and empire from unipolarity because their conceptualization of unipolarity is 
primarily reduced to the distribution of material capabilities. Wilkinson (1999b) argues 
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that a dominant state may be a unipole, but this need not suggest that hegemony is 
present, thus formulating the concept of unipolarity without hegemony. Gilpin (1981) 
utilizes hegemony within the context of a dominant state in the international system, thus 
referring to powerful states, or poles, as hegemonic actors. Waltz’s (1979) 
conceptualization of polarity fundamentally relies on distribution of resources, yet it also 
discusses sheer dominance, might, competence, and even population size. Rapkin et al 
(1979) provide distinct analytical models to polarity and polarization: the former is the 
system’s distribution of power (the number of roughly equal major actors in the system), 
while the latter is the tendency of actors to cluster around the most powerful states in the 
system. Wallace (1973) provides no distinction between polarity and polarization, 
measuring and operationalizing the concepts as a single phenomenon. Bueno de Mesquita 
(1978) looks at entire blocs or clusters (for example, NATO as a single pole) and finds a 
relationship between increased polarization and war, and decreased polarization and 
absence of war. This is supplemented by his analysis of increasing number of poles in the 
system contributing to uncertainty and instability. Wayman (1985) measures polarity 
based on both distribution of power and polarization, showing that wars in multipolar 
structures are at a much higher magnitude than in bipolar structures. This, however, 
creates controversy with respect to Rapkin et al’s warning of not conflating polarity with 
polarization.  Ikenberry (2011b) relies on distributive considerations of resources to 
define polarity, but introduces the concept of “hubs,” similar to clusters and to Rapkin et 
al’s notion of polarization, to account for the organizational and functional capabilities of 
the given pole(s). Posen (2011) illuminates the conceptual limitations of operationalizing 
polarity: what constitutes resource, capability, power, or modes of distribution? 
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Furthermore, how is dominance gauged, when measurements are not always consistent 
with the reality of power relations between states? Buzon (2004) offers the best 
explanation of the vagueness and flexibility of polarity:  
Polarity can be used to move forward into realist assumption about          
conflict of interest, balance of power, and war, but it can just as easily  
fit with international political economy concerns with leadership and  
the provision of collective goods, Gramscian ones about hegemony,  
globalist ones about a dominant core, world system ones about world  
empires and world economies, and English school ones about great  
power management and international society. (32) 
 
 To avoid controversy, and not fall into the measurement trap,
2
 this project’s 
conceptualization of hegemony, hegemonic states, and modes of polarity will rely on the 
concept of system-wide hegemon, which will hopefully avoid criticisms of having narrow 
or arbitrary criteria. By providing a broad and inclusive definition of these concepts, the 
depth and scope of the analysis will be far more extensive, as opposed to providing a 
minimalist definition for the sake of theory conformity. Furthermore, measuring polarity 
is necessary if engaging in intra-polar research, such as polarization, durability, stability, 
conflict severity, and so on. The objective of this work, however, is to merely diagnose 
and observe what the power configurations of the system are, as opposed to disqualifying 
analytical depth by virtue of measurement criteria that remains inapplicable when 
formulating the nomenclature for polarity. For example, of the various measures utilized 
by different scholars (with different and contradictory results), one may hypothetically 
apply one of the more parsimonious formulas. GDP and military spending is the simplest 
formula used to measure resource/capability, and as such, the concentration of power 
                                                          
2
 The term measurement trap is utilized to sum up the extensive debate and lack of consensus on how to 
measure polarity, or the attributes of polarity, and how this problem creates inconclusive and controversial 
results, thus illustrating the limitation, or the trap, of utilizing measurements that create more questions as 
opposed to offering answers to the puzzle at hand.    
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within a system, hence qualifying status of being a pole based on the operationalization 
and quantification of such measurements. The distribution of capabilities/resources, as 
measured through the criteria of concentration, determines the mode of polarity that the 
system takes (Mansfield 1993). In this overly simplified example, power configuration is 
categorized and defined by measured and quantifiable variables. The problem with this 
approach, however, is quite obvious: it is not consistent with the reality of the power 
configurations of the given world political system. Three historical examples can 
demonstrate this point.  
 When considering the power configurations of the Mediterranean System leading 
up to and during the Peloponnesian War, from approximately 460 BC to 400 BC, the 
operationalization of the above-mentioned measurements would suggest a unipolar 
system. Based on GDP and military spending (while specific data does not exist, there’s 
overwhelming historical evidence on Athenian wealth in relation to Sparta), Athens 
would measure much higher than Sparta, thus demonstrating a unipolar concentration of 
power. Athens at this point was an empire, with new silver mines, extensive trade and 
commerce, developed colonies, and military spending (especially on its navy) that was 
unmatched within the Greek world. Sparta, on the other hand, lacked coherent trade or 
commerce, had an underdeveloped monetary system, and was relatively, and 
fundamentally, a poor society. Based on quantified measurements of capability and 
resource distribution, Sparta would not qualify as a pole. The reality, however, is quite 
different. Not only was the power configuration of the system bipolar, but Sparta ended 
up defeating the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War. Even if other variables are 
included in the measurement of polarity (population size, innovation, technology, etc.), 
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Athens will still demonstrate numerical superiority in magnitude. This creates an 
anomaly, a misrepresentation of reality. 
 The case of the Global Political System in the eighteenth century is also quite 
telling, demonstrating that crude determinism based on measurements of economics, 
GDP and military spending create a severe disconnect from the reality of macropolitical 
developments. The United Provinces, for example, were the richest and one of the more 
developed political units in the system, while Russia was one of the poorest and least 
developed. However, the Dutch failed to attain system-wide status, which the measured 
indicators would suggest otherwise, considering Dutch capabilities. Russia, on the other 
hand, which measured indicators would reject as a power, rose to system-wide presence. 
This aporia present within the measurement trap creates more analytical problems than 
solutions, thus limiting the capacity for knowledge-accumulation and the probability of 
attaining non-obvious facts in order to solve the given puzzle at hand.      
 A very similar problem presents itself when attempting to categorize the structure 
of polarity during the Cold War. Based on concentration of power/resource/capability 
measured and defined by GDP and military spending, the distribution of resources, and as 
such, relative capability between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, or if viewed through the 
lens of polarization, NATO countries and the Warsaw pact, would be so disproportionate, 
that the power configuration of the global system will have to be defined as unipolar. 
This, however, was not the political reality of the Cold War. To deny the presence of a 
bipolar structure based on given criteria and measurements is fundamentally problematic. 
For these reasons, this project refrains from utilizing different modes of measurements 
for polarity when categorizing and defining the power configuration of given systems. 
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Reliance is rather placed on the conceptualization of system-wide hegemon(s) as a more 
applicable analytical tool when operationalizing polarity and gauging polar structures. As 
Vasquez (1987) so accurately articulates, “the classification of periods as unipolar, 
bipolar, and multipolar is based on historical judgment rather than on precise and 
replicable measures” (131).     
System-Wide Hegemon and Polarity 
 To bypass the exhausting debate in the international relations literature on 
hegemony (Higgot 1991), the concept of hegemon, in this work, is conceptualized in two-
tiers: sub-system hegemon and system-wide hegemon. The former is generally a regional 
actor, while the latter is a world/global actor. A system-wide hegemon is generally a 
“superpower,” or a dominant actor within the system, for the scope of its political, 
economic, and military power surpasses sub-systemic structures and positions itself at the 
system-wide level. Sub-system hegemons maintain status and power in relations to their 
neighbors, but lack the scope and capability to influence, dominate, and coerce actors at a 
system-wide level. Given regions/sub-systems may have more than one hegemon, and 
regional inter-hegemonic behavior does not presuppose conflict, tension, or competition. 
To this end, hegemon is defined as a dominant actor in relation to other actors, and this is 
further qualified as a powerful actor within a sub-system setting, or a powerful, dominant, 
hegemonic actor at the system-wide level. Concomitantly, a sub-system hegemon cannot 
be a pole, for it does not have the structural positioning at the system-wide level, and as 
such, pole structuration is only undertaken by system-wide hegemons.
3
 Sub-system 
                                                          
3
 While some literature exists on sub-system polarity (Ross 1999), this concept is disqualified as 
problematic and analytically conflicting. 
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hegemons, however, as secondary states, may position themselves as aligned to a given 
pole, or if capable, maintain status of non-alignment. 
 Traditionally, hegemony is primarily conceptualized within the confines of 
political and military power, rather than economic power. Concomitantly, systemic 
treatment of hegemonic actors has either been transitional or successive (Gilpin 1981; 
Kennedy 1987; Modelski 1987; Toynbee 1946; and Wight 1978). As such, robust 
understanding of great powers seeking status within given systems has required scholarly 
attention on hierarchies of power, the endeavor to attain such power, and the positioning 
of given actors within the hierarchy itself.  These structural considerations, however, 
remain analytically limited in their explanatory capacity as long as the rationale for state 
behavior is presented in a uni-dimensional fashion. In this sense, hegemony cannot only 
be about military power, especially naval power (Modelski and Thompson 1988), or 
economic processes (Wallerstein 1974, 1980; Frank 1978), or ideational norms (Cox 
1981, 1983; Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 2011). An overarching treatment of a power-
framework that cogently synthesizes all these attributes remains the more preferable 
criteria of analyzing hegemony. Namely, since economic, ideological, military, and 
political considerations always intertwine and interact, the mere act of separating, or 
suggesting that one variable is a preferable unit of analysis, or a preferable explanatory 
variable, obfuscates the empirical reality of hegemonic actors. Kennedy’s (1987) work on 
the interdependent relationship between military power, political power, and economic 
power in the rise and fall of great powers excels in demonstrating this point.      
 Concurrently, system-wide dominance, whether this dominance is economic, 
military, political, ideational, territorial, or, realistically, an orchestrated fusion of all 
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these variables, is, in essence, the rational drive of every rising sub-system actor seeking 
system-wide hegemonic status. Similarly, preservation of system-wide hegemonic status 
remains the rationale for the continued safeguarding of the existing power configurations 
of the system. Thematically, then, the underlying framework that clusters all these 
variable into a singular explanatory variable is the notion of power, that is, the system-
wide hegemon’s capacity to control and dominate the system by virtue of exercising, or 
seeking to exercise, military, territorial, economic, political, and ideational 
preponderance. Consequently, configurations of power, that is, the hegemonic actor’s 
drive for power as a mechanism of survival in the system, remain the most important 
variable in gauging the rationale of system-wide hegemonic dominance.  
It is crucial to specify the difference between hegemon and hegemony. For a 
hegemon to establish hegemony, it must not only be relationally the most powerful actor 
within the given system, but must also dominate, either through direct control or sphere 
of influence, a preponderance of the system. In defining these concepts, then, hegemon is 
understood as a dominant actor in relation to other actors in a system, while hegemony is 
the complete dominance of the system itself. A system-wide hegemon may have 
hegemony over an entire sub-system (such as Soviet dominance of the East 
European/Eurasian region), which distinguishes it from a sub-system hegemon, but in 
order for there to be hegemony, the system-wide hegemon must dominate the 
macropolitical system itself. Thus, Brazil may be deemed a sub-system hegemon, but it 
has not established hegemony through South America (for if it did, it would potentially 
rise to the level of system-wide hegemon). Similarly, the United States is a system-wide 
hegemon, but it has not established global hegemony. Neither hegemon, in their 
44 
 
respective levels, have established dominance over the system or subsystem in which 
they engage in. As such, the concept of system-wide hegemony will generally not be 
utilized in the proposed theoretical model, since it is conceded that in the existing Global 
Political System, the concept is not applicable; while in previous systems, qualifying 
system-wide, world hegemony is controversial and problematic.  
The concept of sub-system hegemon will be utilized in the analysis to 
demonstrate two things: how powerful regional actors differ from the system-wide power 
actors, and to serve as a mechanism in the historiographical analysis of accounting how a 
state becomes a system-wide hegemon. Specifically, in order for an actor to become a 
system-wide hegemon, it must not only be, initially, a sub-system hegemon, but must 
also establish some form of hegemony over the given sub-system.
4
 While this is not an 
absolute prerequisite for system-wide hegemonic status, it does provide an important 
analytical demarcation between the regional and system-wide spheres. Hegemonic 
dominance of a sub-system elevates an actor from a sub-system, regional hegemon, to a 
system-wide, world/global hegemon.  In addition, in order for a sub-system hegemon to 
qualify as a system-wide hegemon, it must be able to counter-balance or display relative 
strength in relation to other system-wide hegemon(s). In this context, China, for example, 
while at this current stage a sub-system hegemon, might potentially usurp Japan and 
establish sub-system hegemony. However, unless it is able to counter-balance, or 
challenge, the other system-wide hegemon(s) (in this case there is only the unipolar 
U.S.), it cannot be qualified as a system-wide hegemon, and remains a sub-system power 
                                                          
4
 Macedonian hegemony of the Greek sub-system, within the wider Mediterranean World Political System, 
is an example. 
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until it is able to elevate itself in relation to the other system-wide hegemon in the global 
structure.  
With respect to this analytical and conceptual approach, in order to avoid the 
same problems that Rapkin et al (1979) address, this project will use the concept of 
system-wide hegemon interchangeably with the term pole or polarity when referring to 
structure(s) (poles) within the system which the system-wide hegemon(s) forms. 
However, when this process is formulated through the alignment of members, the term 
polarization will be used. Within this context, there can be multitude of powerful 
hegemonic states that position themselves structurally as poles within the system, yet 
polarization does not take place. Specifically, then, pole formulation may take two forms: 
through the system-wide hegemon(s) positioning as a pole within the system, or through 
polarization, where secondary states position themselves within a pole led by a given 
system-wide hegemon. Measuring the magnitudes of polarity (high to low) is bypassed, 
since gauging the degree of polarization is secondary and outside of the scope of this 
project. Degrees of polarization are not vital to the conceptualization of the structure of 
the world/global political system. The primary concern is with systemic observations of 
inter-polar relations and structural outcomes, as opposed to intra-polar variables and 
characteristics. Thus, for example, if there is a bipolar system, two assumptions are made: 
one, that two poles are structured within the system by two system-wide hegemons, and 
two, given the context, polarization either occurred or did not contingent on the 
formulation of a bloc with aligned members. As such, the level to which the aligned 
members are polarized is not relevant to the analysis. The same holds for a multipolar 
system: the intent is to substantiate whether more than three poles have been structured in 
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the system, and whether the poles are polarized through bloc formation and member 
alignment, or polarization did not take place and a system-wide hegemon singularly 
occupies the pole. To this end, measurement of polarization, as an intra-polar unit of 
analysis, is outside the explanatory and conceptual purpose of this model.  
 It is suggested that polarization is one method of pole formulation within the 
system, while the positioning of the system-wide hegemon(s) is the other. A pole, then, is 
defined as a structure within a given world/global political system, where a system-wide 
hegemon, via polarization, is the center of a coalition (secondary actors within this 
system are obliged to position/align themselves in relation to a given pole/bloc), or absent 
polarization, is the singular actor, that is, it is the pole itself. Variables such as 
distribution of resources, relative power capabilities, counter-balancing, positioning, 
norms, and other system-wide factors are presupposed as being inherent to the analysis of 
polarity. This consideration, however, stops short of measuring these variables, for as the 
above-discussion of the problems of measurement trap demonstrate, any attempt to 
provide consistent measurements to all such variables either become arbitrary, or 
inconsistent with the reality of the political system.  Namely, to limit polarity as being 
only defined and measured by distribution of material capability is to limit the scope and 
depth of the concept with respect to systems analysis (not to mention the fact that 
quantifiable data, prior to 1815, is very scarce). A broader, more inclusive definition of 
polarity, such as the conceptualization of a system-wide hegemon, is more robust and 
analytically applicable to the proposed systematized analysis of world political systems 
throughout history.   
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The overarching analysis assumes conflict behavior as concentrated between the 
poles and cooperative behavior as concentrated within the poles. States with the 
capability to abstain from having to position themselves with a given pole remain non-
aligned. This process of alignment is deemed to be the polarization process, where a 
system-wide hegemon orchestrates a coalition in opposition to the polarization 
undertaken by another system-wide hegemon. Polarity, then, is a reference to these 
formed coalitions (poles), while polarization is a reference to the alignment process. 
Since poles tend to be defined in relation to the system-wide hegemon that dominates it, 
it is preferable to use the terms interchangeably. Thus, in the Cold War, both the US and 
the Soviet Union were poles as well as system-wide hegemons. Regardless of 
polarization, both system-wide hegemons will still have been positioned, structured, and 
categorized as poles.   
The concept of polarization is somewhat disregarded when observing the unipolar 
structure, for in this system, polarization is a moot point, since no opposing poles exist, 
and the polarization process, if it had taken place, occurred either during a previous 
bipolar or multipolar system. In this case, the remaining unipole sustains its status, and 
the aligned members either leave the bloc (since the system-wide hegemon’s position in 
the pole does not necessitate the positioning of secondary states), or they bandwagon. 
Within this context, alignment or coalition characteristics within a unipolar system serve 
marginal analytical relevance: opposing polarization is absent. To this end, because the 
intent is not to study the polarization process, but rather after polarization has taken place 
and the pole(s) is formed (thus functioning at the macro, systemic level), the givenness of 
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the pole is taken as it exists. Analyzing and gauging the internal process of polarization is 
outside the scope of this study.
5
   
 With respect to unipolarity, it is defined as a structure in which one state's/actor’s 
capabilities are unmatched and too great to be challenged or counterbalanced, thus 
preserving the system-wide dominance of the given hegemon. Capabilities include all 
resources that reinforce and preserve the given actor’s power and structural position: 
economic, military, technological, geopolitical, ideational, and institutional. To avoid 
controversy over growth differential, measurement of resources, quantification of 
capabilities, assessments of relative strength, or other measurement criteria that may be 
deemed subjective,
6
 it is preferable to assess whether observable and verifiable patterns 
exist with respect to potential/possible rising poles within the system, and how the 
determination of the systemic structure, that is, the mode of polarity, is defined in relation 
to the challenges and balancing acts undertaken by such revisionist actors. In this sense, 
the unmatched capabilities of a given state do not suffice to qualify the system as 
unipolar, since system-wide hegemonic status has not been attained. Qualification for 
unipolarity must be verified by the absence of challenges and counter-balancing against 
the system-wide hegemon. As the previous examples demonstrate, if gauged primarily on 
relative capability, U.S. capability was far superior, perhaps even unmatched, by the 
Soviets in the mid-1980’s. Yet to classify this period as unipolar simply based on the 
                                                          
5
 The rationale for excluding analysis of polarization is two-fold. First, cases of polarization do not present 
much affect upon a system-wide hegemon, since a system-wide hegemon dominates a given pole, and the 
aligning members remain reliant upon the dominant actor within the pole. Second, since the objective of 
this project is to observe the power configurations of world political systems, the intra-polar characteristics 
are not relevant to the analysis at hand. Namely, the intent is to observe the polar structure and the system-
wide hegemon that dominates the pole. How the pole is formed, and which secondary states are part of that 
given pole offer no analytical depth or substantive value to the research process at hand. 
6
 For example, traditional calculation of state capability utilized GDP and military spending, only to be 
modified by the addition or subtraction of other variables, ranging from population size to technological 
advancement, thus creating much controversy over how to measure polar characteristics (Posen 2011). 
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differential in capabilities undermines characteristics within the system. The fact that the 
Soviet Union, at the systemic level, was able to challenge and counter-balance the United 
States (even if inferior in absolute capability), demonstrates structural positioning within 
the global system that is consistent with bipolarity. To this end, in a unipolar system, 
aside from dominance in capabilities, a given pole must have no challengers or counter-
balancers at the structural systemic level: “A unipolar system is one in which a 
counterbalance is impossible. When a counterbalance becomes possible, the system is not 
unipolar” (Wohlforth 1999, 29).  
Nonpolarity: As Analytical Tool and Conceptual Model 
 The lack of a well-developed conceptual model for a nonpolar system in the 
literature necessitates the formulation of a robust framework that can be consistently 
applied when assessing the world/global political system in the absence of polar 
structures. The intent of such a model is not to suggest or predict how states behave in a 
nonpolar system, or what the characteristics of the system are in relation to the multitude 
of actors interacting in the global structure. The objective, rather, is to explain what the 
structural attributes of a nonpolar system are, as opposed to the causal consequences of 
the system upon state behavior (these are possible issues for future research). For this 
reason, the conceptual model for nonpolarity that is presented here primarily explains 
what a nonpolar system looks like, what its structural characteristics are, and how it 
differs from the other forms of polarity. Since the objective of this project is to observe 
nonpolar periods in world political systems throughout history, the intention is to 
construct an identifiable structure that can be classified as nonpolar. To this end, the task 
at hand is to articulate what a nonpolar system is, how a system may be identified as 
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being such, what its attributes are, and how it can be differentiated, for categorical and 
analytical purposes, from the other modes of polar structures.  
Nonpolarity vs. Multipolarity 
 The attributes of a nonpolar system may be best expressed by contrasting how it 
differs from a multipolar structure. Whereas unipolar, bipolar, and tripolar systems have 
system-wide hegemons in accordance to a numerically described structure, multipolar 
systems have up to 6 system-wide hegemons (Concert of Europe presented the most 
number of poles that a multipolar system has, which fluctuated between 5 to 6 actors), as 
polarization and alliances shrink the number of poles, while the breakdown of alliances 
increases the poles. A multipolar structure has never witnessed more than 6 system-wide 
hegemons, for the increased number of so many poles make balancing, counter-
balancing, and considerations of distribution and concentration of capabilities both 
incoherent and substantively meaningless. With such diffusion of power, it becomes 
analytically problematic to classify and gauge how 10 system-wide hegemons, for 
example, counter-balance and position within a system. Furthermore, the increased 
number of actors conflates system-wide and sub-system variables, since the systemic 
structure ends up having a constellation of various mid-level world powers. The 
multitude of such powers, numerically, are so high that it will be unintelligible to assume 
a multipolar system, and the dynamics of this numerically high world/global political 
system of various mid-level, sub-system hegemonic powers will make the concept of 
balance of power untenable.  
 Since one of the most important attributes that defines nonpolarity is the diffusion 
of power, this analytical framework is consistent with considerations of concentrations of 
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power: the extent to which power is concentrated or diffused. This exercise will further 
demonstrate the difference between multipolarity and nonpolarity. Using Ray and 
Singer’s (1973) index (the same concentration of power formula utilized by the 
Correlates of War), Mansfield (1993) calculates power concentration in relation to the 
number of poles/great powers in the system: 
 
S represents the proportion of power possessed by an actor (system-wide hegemon); Sit is 
the proportion of the aggregate capabilities/power controlled by actor i in year/time t; Nt 
is the number of actors in year/time t; and Concentrationt is a continuous index that takes 
on values ranging from 1 to 0 (111). Interpreting Mansfield’s analysis, the closer the 
value of concentration is to 1, the more concentrated power is within the system. This 
presupposes concentration, or absolute concentration, within a single system-wide 
hegemon. The closer the value of concentration is to 0 the more evenly divided, diffused 
power is among all of the actors in the world/global political system. Values between 
.275 and .4 indicates a bipolar system, between .4 to .5 a unipolar system, and between .2 
to .275 a multipolar system (113). The logical continuation of the formula is to 
presuppose that as actors increase in the system, the more diffused, or less concentrated 
power becomes. This is quite obvious, because if an actor presents such disparity in 
power, then it will not be in the system as a system-wide hegemon. Simply put, those in 
the system have some concentration of power, and as the number of actors increase in a 
system, so does the diffusion of power. With multipolarity ranging from .2 to .275, it may 
be inferred that nonpolarity would range from .05 to .175. In the same way a value of 1 is 
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unrealistic with respect to unipolarity (no state can possess all the resources in the 
world/system), a 0, similarly, is deemed unrealistic when gauging the value of 
nonpolarity (there cannot be an absolute diffusion of equal power to such a high number 
of actors in the system). As Mansfield’s hypothetical example demonstrates, 
concentration or diffusion of power in the system does not surpass 5 actors. To suppose a 
system of 9 actors, for example, the concentration value will be exceedingly low and 
consistent with our considerations of nonpolarity.       
 In this sense, it is one thing to observe the balancing behavior of 5 actors, measure 
each actor’s capabilities, gauge relative distribution of resources and power 
concentration, consider hierarchy and structural positioning, and thus provide a coherent 
analysis of a numerically-high multipolar system. These same analytical considerations, 
however, fail to provide accountability and explanatory strength when the number of 
actors may range in the dozens.  
Continuing with the example, one may consider possible sub-system hegemons 
within the Global Political System: Israel, Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle 
East; Japan, China and South Korea in the Far East; India and Pakistan in South Asia; 
Australia (possibly Indonesia) in Oceana; Russia and Turkey in Eurasia; Germany, 
France and United Kingdom in Europe; Brazil (possibly Argentina or Chile) in Latin 
America; Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa in Africa; U.S. and Canada in North America. 
It becomes completely untenable to conceptualize and assess such a system with the 
traditional tools utilized when observing multipolar structures. With power diffusion 
among some 19 states (power distribution is obviously not equal, yet at the same time, its 
level of concentration is much lower than in other modes of polarity), a new conceptual 
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model is necessary to account for such a system. It is analytically futile to attempt to 
classify such a system as multipolar: the concentration value will be extremely low, 
perhaps less than .1, while any considerations of balancing and counter-balancing will 
provide neither explanatory powers nor knowledge-accumulation. The nonpolar system, 
then, is defined as a structure that lacks system-wide hegemons, where more than seven 
actors possess and exercise various kinds of power, as the diffusion of power creates 
different centers of power with a constellation of mid-level, sub-system hegemons. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE FAR EASTERN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM 
  The Far Eastern Sysem primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra 
civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between 
political units/entities/actors within the wider region of the Far East. Territorially, the Far 
Eastern World Political System includes the global region historically occupied by China, 
Tibet, Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, and Japan, thus 
combining, for the sake of analytical coherence and historical continuity, the sub-regions 
of East Asia and Southeast Asia into a single Far Eastern System. However, similar to 
other world political systems, to specifically set regional and territorial boundaries in 
absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political system obscures the reality of 
the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at 
the periphery at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from 
the system.
7
 System’s classification of the Far Eastern World Political System, then, does 
not specifically rely on establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering 
                                                          
7
 For example, actors in the periphery that are part of the Far Eastern System at times exited the system by 
way of seeking conquests to the north or west, whether by infringing on the Indic System or the Near East-
Middle Eastern System. The examples of the Huns in Europe, the Hunas and other Chinese infringements 
in the Indic System, and the conquest of the Mongols into Eurasia are cases in point. The steppes of Central 
Asia, which include the current countries of Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Turkmenistan remain at the extreme periphery of the system, and have primarily served as pathways 
toward western expansion by given actors from the Far Eastern System. Concomitantly, in cases where 
actors from either the periphery or other world political systems encroach unto the Far Eastern World 
Political System, this infringement will be noted when the given actor becomes a system-wide hegemonic 
actor, and is thus considered to be part of the power configurations of the system. As such, similar to other 
world political system covered in this work, it is anticipated, from time to time, the encroachment of 
external actors into the system. Yet this remains ephemeral and does not indicate the absorption of one 
system into another. As such, for the sake of historical accuracy, the infringement of powers outside of the 
system into the system will be taken into consideration. But this will be treated in two ways: either the 
system is conquered and absorbed into another system, thus ending the given system (such as Britain’s 
colonization of China, along with the colonizing presence of other European powers in the Far East 
System, thus leading to this system’s absorption into the Global Political System), or outside power(s) 
become absorbed into the system and remain part of it as one of the given poles (such as the Turkish 
Kaghanate). 
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the political interactions and power configurations of system-wide hegemons that 
function within the region of the Far East.    
 The chronological treatment of the system’s political history will begin analysis 
of polar periods from approximately 1000 BC. Archeological evidence and scholarly 
consensus holds the various regional centers in the Yellow River basin and its expansion 
and fusion with the proto-civilizations in the Yangtze River valley, from 3000 BC to 
2000 BC (Gernet 1968, 46-48; Pearson 1983, 119-124), as the foundational period of 
what would become the Far Eastern System. From 2000 BC to 1000 BC, three dynasties, 
the Hsia, Shang, and Chou (Zhou in pinyin), dominated the Far Eastern System, with 
Chou beginning its system-wide hegemonic preponderance from approximately 1000 BC 
(Loewe and Shaughnessy 1999, 11-130).
8
 The problem with including the periods before 
1000 BC as data points for polar epochs is three-fold. First, the line between legend and 
historical facts are rather blurry when gauging system’s configuration during the Hsia 
dynasty, as the Hsia period has not been fully dated by historians (Chang 1983, 511-515; 
Murphy 1996, 33; Penkala 1966, 8-10). Second, the historical evidence for the Shang 
period is equally problematic, as it is unclear whether it followed the Hsia era, succeeded 
the Hsia, or existed as a separate political unit during Hsia presence (Chang 1980, 350-
354; Keightley 1983, 537-541; Hsu and Linduff 1988, 19-22). Third, while the historical 
                                                          
8
 Pinyin is the official phonetic system in transcribing Chinese characters in China, Taiwan and Singapore. 
In 1982 it became the international standard for foreign publications. Prior to 1982, the primary 
Romanization system was the Wade-Giles transliteration system, being the most common system of 
transcription among English speakers. As such, much of the historical scholarly work done on the Far East 
in the 20
th
 century, especially on China, used the Wade-Giles transliteration system. The Wade-Giles 
system and pinyin are used interchangeably in many English language publications. To avoid any 
confusions, this author has selected to use the Wade-Giles system for two main reasons. First, since many 
historical and scholarly works that are utilized in this project use the Wade-Giles system, it remains outside 
of this scholarly endeavor to undertake the task of adapting the pinyin system. Second, since the two modes 
of transliteration are used interchangeably in the English-speaking world, relying on the traditional system 
is both preferable and easier for the task at hand. 
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evidence substantiates Chou unipolarity after 1000 BC, Chou’s rise prior to this period, 
and its attainment of system-wide hegemonic status prior to 1000 BC remains 
controversial (Ebrey 1996, 22-31; Blunden and Elvin 1983, 54-57; Huang 1988, 12-19; 
Hsu and Linduff 1988, 41-47). For these reasons, the historical data necessitates the 
beginning point of coding power configurations in the Far Eastern System to begin from 
1000 BC. 
1000 BC – 780 BC Unipolar Structure  
 Chou attained system-wide hegemonic status throughout much of the Yellow 
River basin (Shaughnessy 1999, 307-313), initially subjugating the vast number of tribal 
statelets (Eberhard 1967, 21-24), establishing strongholds in the south in the Han and 
Huai valleys, and forming defensive barriers to the north against nomadic incursions 
(Hsue and Linduff 1988, 129-137). For over 160 years Chou unipolarity remained rather 
stable, only to be internally disturbed by a coup in 841 BC, followed by nomadic 
incursions by the Jung in the north. Its preoccupation with the Jung weakened Chou’s 
control over its southern vassals, with the Jung finally managing to conquer the Chou 
capital in 771 BC and end the unipolar period (Shaughnessy 1999, 342-351; Hsue and 
Linduff 1988, 258-268). The unipolar structure during this period was primarily sustained 
by two factors: absence of any challenges in the system by rising sub-system hegemons, 
and Chou’s ability to sustain vassalage of peripheral states. Internal decay, coupled with 
external incursions (Hirth 1969, 155-170), however, brought about a transformation of 
the power configurations of the Far Eastern System by the end of the 8
th
 century BC. 
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Map 4.1 
 
780 BC – 680 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 The post-Chou period gave way to intense disintegration (Huang 1988, 17), with 
vast number of small political units, ranging in the hundreds (Hsu 1999, 547-562; 
Blunden and Elvin1983, 61-62; Maspero 1978, 170-173), restructuring the system into a 
nonpolar power constellation. During this nonpolar period, however, approximately 
eleven sub-system hegemons, many of them former Chou vassals, began the process of 
consolidating regional power: Chi ( Ji or Zhi in pinyin), Ch’en, Cheng (Zheng in pinyin), 
Ch’i (Qi in pinyin), Chou, Chu, Lu, Sung (Song in pinyin), Ts’ai (Cai in pinyin), Ts’ao 
(Cao in pinyin), and Wey (Wei in pinyin) (Chang 1980, 348-355; Hsu 1999, 547-548). 
The consolidation process and the attempt at attaining system-wide hegemonic status 
further contributed to the diffusion of power in the system during this period, as Ch’u in 
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the southern Yangtze basin counter-balanced the ambitions of the northern sub-system 
actors, primarily Chang and Chou, while Ch’i and Sung undertook irredentist policies of 
expansion, only to witness Lu, Ts’ao and Ts’ai consistently engaging in coalitions and 
counter-coalitions (Hsu and Linduff 1988, 220-226; Legge 1972, 12-37; Maspero 1978, 
172-180; Walker 1953, 38-55), similar to all the other actors in the system, as the highly-
complex process of balancing, counter-balancing, and alliance-shifting reified the 
nonpolar structure of this period.   
Map 4.2 
 
680 BC – 580 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure 
 The consolidation of power at the regional level allowed several sub-system 
hegemons to attain system-wide status, thus transitioning the nonpolar structure into a 
multipolar power configuration. Ch’u sought to transition the multipolar system into a 
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unipolar one by challenging other system-wide hegemons, including Cheng, Sung, and 
Ch’i. Ch’i sought to counter-balance Ch’u aspirations by forming an alliance and coming 
to the assistance of Cheng as it was being invaded by Ch’u (Legge 1972, 62-117; 
Maspero 1978, 180-192; Walker 1953, 29-34). The containment of Ch’u’s attempt at 
restructuring the Far Eastern System into a unipolar structure was achieved by Ch’i, 
along with the other, albeit relatively weaker, poles in the system, Cheng and Sung, thus 
counter-balancing and sustaining the multipolar power constellation. Concomitantly, 
Chin (Jin in pinyin, not to be confused with Ch’in, which is Qin in pinyin), a small 
regional actor in the north of the Yellow River, attained sub-system hegemony, while the 
western state of Ch’in attained sub-system hegemonic status through its dominance of the 
Wei valley (Hsu and Linduff 1988, 190-194; Maspero 1978, 170-179). By 640 BC Ch’i 
weakened as a system-wide hegemon, allowing Ch’u to reassert its aggressive policies, 
only to be temporarily counter-balanced by Sung. Sung challenge to Ch’u remained 
unsuccessful, as Ch’u forced dominance over Cheng, Ch’en, Ts’ai, Lu, and Sung itself. 
The rising system-wide hegemon, Chin, preserved the multipolar system by coming to 
the aide of both Ch’i and Sung, thus assuming leadership of the Yellow River alliance 
and managing to defeat Ch’u and coerce peace. Chin was soon challenged by Ch’in, 
another sub-system hegemon that had elevated itself to system-wide status, opening the 
way for Ch’u to reassert its lost prestige against Chin (Hirth 1969, 208-216; Legge 1972, 
172-218; Maspero 1978, 188-203). This process of inter-polar conflict continued, as Ch’u 
and Chin remained the more powerful system-wide hegemons, while Ch’i and Cheng the 
relatively weaker poles. Chin and Ch’u temporarily stopped fighting, having reached an 
impasse, while Chin, suffering from internal crisis, was attacked by Ch’in, thus to the 
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advantage of Ch’i and Ch’u (Hsu 1999, 551-562; Legge 1972, 245-340). This cycle 
remained, as each pole temporarily weakened, then revived to either counter-balance 
another pole, or to reassert itself. 
580 BC – 540 BC Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 Ch’u continued with its ambitious expansionism, conquering Cheng, subjugating 
Sung, and neutralizing Ch’i. Chin was beaten in a great battle by Ch’u, thus temporarily 
weakening Chin. Attempting to capitalize on a weakened Chin and a Ch’u undergoing a 
succession crisis, Ch’i undertook expansionist endeavors, only to be thoroughly defeated 
by a revived Chin. With Cheng and Ch’i having been reduced to sub-system actors, the 
system transitioned into a bipolar structure, dominated by Chin and Ch’u (Hsu 1999, 562-
563). Chin-Ch’u bipolarity continued through proxy wars, polarization (Ch’u pole 
included Ts’ai, Hsu, and Ch’en, while the Chin pole included Chu, Cheng, Chou, Chi, 
Ts’ao, Lu, Hsueh, and Wey), and direct conflict between the system-wide hegemons (Hsu 
1965, 55-59; Walker 1953, 55-58). The bipolar power constellation of this epoch, then, 
included two system-wide hegemons, and several sub-system hegemons, ranging from 
Ch’in and Ch’i in the north, to Yeuh and Wu in the southeast and south of the Yangtze 
basin.   
540 BC – 275 BC Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 Ch’u proceeded to conquer Ch’en and Ts’ai, only to be counter-balanced by Wu, 
thus raising Wu to system-wide status. Chin maintained its status as a pole, 
demonstrating preponderance in the north, while Ch’in allied with Ch’u and Yeuh to 
counter-balance Wu ambitions (Legge 1972, 547-630, 724-769). System-wide hegemons, 
during this epoch, proceeded to both eliminate sub-system actors and limit the number of 
61 
 
poles in the multipolar structure. Capitalizing on the internal strife within Chin, Wu 
sought to dominate the northern league, thus challenging both Chin and Ch’i, while also 
threatening its southern neighbor, Yeuh. Yeuh would proceed to defeat and annex Wu 
(Hirth 1969, 261-262), thus removing one pole from the system. Similarly, Ch’u 
proceeded to destroy Ch’en, thus removing another potential system-wide actor (Ssu-ma 
1994, 77-109). By 450 BC Chin disintegrated into three, albeit powerful, units: Hann 
(Han in pinyin), Chao (Zhao in pinyin), and Wei (Hirth 1969, 264-266; Maspero 1978, 
235-250). While relatively weaker than Ch’in, Ch’i, Ch’u, and Yeuh, Hann, Chao, and 
Wei were not merely regional players, but had system-wide status (Hsu 1999, 594-606). 
Wei sought to re-establish the Chin dynasty by subjugating Hann and Chao, while at the 
same time repulsing an attempt by Ch’i at interference. Wei continued its ascendency by 
dominating Sung, Lu, and Wey, and even defeating Ch’u in battle (617). Wei ascendency 
was counter-balanced by the collective interference of Ch’in, Ch’i, and Ch’u, hence 
preserving the balance of power in the multipolar system. By 300 BC, Ch’in had become 
the most powerful system-wide hegemon, overtaking Wei, and facing a combined 
coalition of Ch’i and Ch’u, along with Chao and Hann. Unable to defeat Ch’in, a second 
coalition was formed in 296 BC, with Ch’i, Hann, Chao, Sung, and Wei (Ch’ien 1994, 
108-117). The balance of power was maintained, but Ch’in still remained the more 
powerful pole, as the other system-wide hegemons turned against each other: Ch’i 
annexed Sung, overwhelmed Lu, and sought to conquer Chao, Hann, and Wei, only to 
face a counter-alliance from the other system-wide actors, thus thoroughly being defeated 
(Hsu 1999, 632-638) and reduced to sub-system status. With Ch’i removed, Hann, Wei, 
and Chao being reduced to sub-system status by Ch’u, the only other system-wide 
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hegemon able to counter-balance Ch’in remained Ch’u. In 278 BC Ch’in thoroughly 
defeated Ch’u (Maspero 1978, 258-264), removing the only remaining challenger to its 
power in the system, and thus transitioning the 260 year multipolar period into a unipolar 
structure.      
275 BC – 210 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 Ch’in unipolarity was primarily defined by its irredentist policies, consistently 
attacking sub-system actors Wei, Chao, and Hann (Lewis 2007, 30-47; Ch’ien 1994, 118-
120), seeking not only territorial expansion, but also control of economic resources and 
trade (Blunden and Elvin 1983, 67-74). An attempt at a bipolar system was made by 
states opposed to Ch’in’s overly-aggressive endeavors, as five states sought polarization 
under the leadership of Wei, seeking to establish an opposing pole. In 247 BC the five-
state coalition managed to defeat Ch’in and hold off the unipole’s expansionism (Hirth 
1969, 327-328), but immediately dissolved after victory, thus negating any considerations 
of bipolarity. The unipolar structure was reified by Ch’in resurgence in a matter of few 
years, supplemented by the system-wide hegemon’s continuous policy of expansion. A 
similar attempt at polarization was once again undertaken to counter-balance Ch’in, a 
proto-pole including Ch’u, Chao, Hann, and Wei. This attempt at counter-balancing via 
polarization was an ephemeral one and proved to be unsuccessful as Ch’in remained 
victories and continued to exercise unchallenged preponderance (Reischauer and 
Fairbank 1960, 86-88; Ch’ien 1994, 121-134). Around 210 BC, due to both 
overextension and internal chaos (Qian 1993, 218-226), Ch’in disintegrated, only to 
restructure itself as Han. During this restructuration process, however, the unipolar epoch 
ended, transitioning from unipolarity to nonpolarity.      
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Map 4.3  
 
210 BC – 195 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 The fall of Ch’in and the establishing of Han as a successor state (Reischauer and 
Fairbank 1960, 90-92) was supplemented by the expansion of the Far Eastern System 
itself, which came to include multitude of sub-system actors in the periphery (Penkala 
1966, 7-9). In the southeast coast of the system, Nan-yeuh (Nam-Viet), in current 
northern Vietnam, began consolidating regional power (Ch’ien 1994, 140-146), while in 
the southwest mountains, the rise of Tibeto-Burman was noted, along with the sub-
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system hegemonic aspirations of Tai. In the northeast of the system, the proto-Koreans, 
as Ko-Choson (Lee 1984, 11-18; Han 1970, 11-17) under the dominion of the sub-system 
hegemon Yen from Manchuria (Hsu and Linduff 1988, 196-200), sought positioning as 
sub-system hegemons when the state of Wiman Joseon was formed through its seizing of 
Ko-Choson and expanding both east and south (Nelson 1993, 167-189). In the northwest, 
Kashgaria had risen to sub-system status, further compounding the diffusion of power 
during this period. The northern periphery of the system, however, displayed the largest 
number of rising sub-system actors, as the nomadic people of the Steppe started forming 
more coherent political units. These included the Alans, Mongols, Avars, Sienabi, the 
Yueh-chih, Turks, and the powerful Huns (McGovern 1939, 118-135; Barfield 1989, 30-
35; Grousset 1970, 26-32). Without the presence of any system-wide hegemons, 
primarily due to the fact that Ch’in had attenuated any potential actors, while Han was 
still in the process of regional consolidation (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 93-94), the 
power constellations of the system remained inchoate and quite diffused. Two major 
developments during this nonpolar period allowed for the transition of the system from a 
nonpolar structure to a unipolar one. As noted, the reestablishment of Han slowly brought 
about the restructuring of the system; but this was further augmented by the elevation of 
the Huns from regional, peripheral actors to system-wide hegemons. 
195 BC – 165 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure 
 By 209 BC the Huns had attained sub-system hegemonic status out of their base 
in Inner Mongolia (Kwanten 1979, 12), only to proceed in subjugating eastern Mongolia 
and western Manchuria after the fall of Ch’in (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 95). 
Around 200 BC the Huns reduced to vassalage most of the city-states of Kashgaria 
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(Ishjamts 1994, 152-158), only to face a massive invasion by the new Han state. The 
defeat of Han elevated the Huns to the status of unchallenged system-wide hegemons 
(Grousset 1970, 34), thus restructuring the Far Eastern System from nonpolar to a 
unipolar structure. Hun preponderance of the system was reinforced by its defeat of the 
Alans and the complete subjugation of Kashgaria, while having reduced Han to tributary 
status (McGovern 1939, 119-128; Barfield 1989, 36-55). While militarily dominant, the 
Huns remained economically reliant on the tributes extracted from Han, and as such, Han 
slowly reestablished its military might, while sustaining its economic capabilities, while 
the Huns remained stagnant, and even began falling under the Sino cultural influence.      
165 BC – 120 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 By 165 BC the Hans had repositioned as system-wide hegemons, challenging and 
counter-balancing Hun dominance (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 97-98) and creating a 
bipolar power configuration. Han expansion, fused with Hun dependency on Han 
tributes, not only created a co-dependent bipolar system, but methodically shifted the 
relative power of both actors. Han continued to amass both political strength and 
undertake territorial expansion. Concomitantly, this bipolar epoch had two system-wide 
hegemons, with growing differentiation in power capabilities, along with three 
independent states acting as sub-system hegemons: Wiman Joseaon in the Korean 
peninsula and northeast China, Nan-yeuh in northern regions of Vietnam, and the Dian 
Kingdom, covering much of the Yunnan region (Yao and Zhilong, 2012, 353-357).   
120 BC – 160 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 Han directly challenged the Huns for system-wide hegemonic status, severely 
defeating them in Outer Mongolia, and succeeding in reducing the Huns to vassal status 
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by 100 BC (McGovern 1939, 140-154; Grousset 1970, 36-37). By subjugating the Huns, 
Han became the single pole in the Far Eastern System, facilitating the transition to 
unipolarity. To display its preponderance, Han undertook the following conquests: 
Wiman Joseaon (Choson) (Lee 1984, 14-18; Nelson 1993, 165-171), removing a sub-
system actor from the system and assuming dominance of Korea (Reischauer and 
Fairbank 1960, 101); Kashgaria, setting up vassal states and tributaries (Yong and Yutang 
1994, 228; McGovern 1939, 170-178); northern Vietnam, subjugating Southern and 
Eastern Yeuh; Yunnan region, making Dian a vassal state, and thus removing another 
sub-system hegemon from the picture (Ebrey 1996, 8-11). Han dominance of the Far 
Eastern System seemed absolute by 25 AD, as most of the sub-system hegemons, from 
the Huns, to Korea, to Kashgaria, to Nan-yeuh, had accepted either vassal status or had 
become tributary protectorates (Bielenstein 1967). During this period, three new sub-
system hegemons rose to power, and while unable to challenge Han unipolarity, these 
actors nonetheless maintained political independence: Koguryo in southeastern 
Manchuria (Henthorn 1971, 25-30), Yarkard, a former Han vassal who was able to 
establish independent regional dominance in Kashgaria, and the Northern Huns, who 
soon replaced Yarkard (McGovern 1939, 222-240). By 150 AD, overextension, internal 
rebellion, and succession problems brought about the disintegration of the Han Empire, 
which soon came to be challenged by a rising regional power that attained system-wide 
status: the resurgent Sienbi (Hsien-pi) of the Steppe (Grousset 1970, 54). 
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Map 4.4 
 
160 AD – 180 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 By 150 AD Sienbi had attained sub-system hegemony through much of the 
northwestern region of the Far Eastern System, seeking system-wide status by 
subjugating the Puyo of Manchuria, reducing to vassalage tribes of Siberia, and managing 
to thoroughly defeat both the Northern and Southern Huns (Grousset 1970, 55). By 160 
AD Sienbi had begun challenging and counter-balancing Han, thus transitioning the 
system into a bipolar power constellation (Kyzlasov 1996, 317-321). During this bipolar 
epoch, Han’s relative power as a system-wide hegemon continued to decline, as Han 
vassals revolted and established independence, thus increasing the number of political 
units in the system. This process of deconsolidation was supplemented by the decay and 
collapse of Sienbi around 180 AD. 
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180 AD – 225 AD Transition from Bipolar to Nonpolar 
 With the disintegration of Sienbi and the fall of the Han Empire into various 
political units and sub-units controlled by warlords and generals as ephemeral statelets, 
the system transitioned from a bipolar structure into a nonpolar one. Similar to most 
nonpolar epochs, a methodical process of regional power consolidation began to take 
place, as ambitious sub-system actors sought regional hegemony to fill the power vacuum 
left by the absence of any system-wide hegemons. The Far Eastern System underwent an 
extensive diffusion of power, as the increased number of independent political units in 
the system negated any attempts at cogently formulating a power hierarchy, hence 
making the power configurations of the system inchoate. Koguryo moved from 
Manchuria to the Korean peninsula (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 404-406), only to 
witness the presence of post-Han statelets, while Manchuria itself had Koguryo presence 
and Puyo (Nelson 1993, 189-222). The Steppes of the periphery saw the decay of Sienbi, 
the disintegration of the Huns into various tribal units, and the presence of several 
independent city-states in Kashgaria (McGovern 1939, 310-319). The southwest region 
of the system also experienced the same process of power diffusion, as Tonkin and 
Champa (Majumdar 1985), in northern and southern Vietnam, established independence, 
while Funnan, in the regions of Cambodia (Hall 1981, 27-30), became another presence 
in the system. The diffused nature of the nonpolar structure necessitated the concentration 
of power at the regional level, as sub-system actors sought consolidation and the 
transition of the system into some form of a configuration with a clear power hierarchy. 
Thus, by 225 AD, the Three Kingdoms period had been established, restructuring the 
nonpolar epoch into a tripolar power configuration.   
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225 AD – 265 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Tripolar Structure 
 The consolidation process during the nonpolar period gave birth to three system-
wide hegemons: Shu Han based out of Szechwan in the Yangtze River basin, Wu based 
out of Nanking in the eastern Yangtze territory, and Wei based out of Luoyang in the 
Yellow River Basin (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 126-128). Of the three poles, Wei 
was perhaps the more powerful, subjugating much of Manchuria and the Korean 
peninsula (Henthorn 1971, 27-31), and thus reducing Koguryo to sub-system status and 
accepting satellite status from Puyo, while at the same time assuming dominance over 
Kashgaria in the periphery (Yong and Yutang 1994, 229-335). Shu Han preserved the 
balance of power in the tripolar structure, reducing former sub-system hegemon Dian in 
the Yunnan to vassalage, and directly challenging Wei. Wu sought system-wide 
supremacy by controlling most of southeastern China, reducing Funan to tributary status, 
and counter-balancing Wei ambitions. This tripolar epoch was primarily defined by 
cyclical warfare, with Wu and Shu Han resisting Wei irredentism, while at the same time 
neutralizing and dominating sub-system actors within each pole’s respective sphere of 
influence (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 130).     
265 AD – 300 AD Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure 
 By the mid-260’s Wei managed to annex Shu Han, eliminating one pole from the 
equation. With Shu Han removed, Wu remained incapable of counter-balancing Wei by 
itself. At the same time, Wei underwent a leadership change via military coup, assuming 
the new name of Chin (Jin in pinyin), specifically designated as Western Chin, with its 
capital in Luoyang. In 280 Western Chin subjugated Wu, completely solidifying its 
unipolar status within the system. This was followed by a repulsion of Sienbi invaders 
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against Puyo (Lee 1984, 21-24), who had accepted Western Chin suzerainty, followed by 
the submission of Funan and Champa (Majumdar 1985, 25-29). Western Chin unipolarity 
was supplemented by: the presence of sub-system hegemon Koguryo in Korea, who was 
balanced by Western Chin supported Paekche (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 408), 
another sub-system hegemon; suzerainty over Tonkin, Yunnan, and much of Cambodia; 
and the presence of rising sub-system actors in the periphery of the Steppe and the north 
that remained outside of the unipole’s sphere of dominance.   
300 AD – 425 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 For the first decade of the 4
th
 century, Western Chin underwent severe internal 
crisis, losing control over its territorial holdings and vassal states. The first to react were 
the Southern Huns, who not only revolted, but managed to conquer Louyang, the capital. 
The Chins fled south, reorganizing itself as Eastern Chin with its capital in Nanking 
(Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 132). The north of the Far Eastern System fell into 
disarray, as the collapse of Western Chin left a power vacuum that was temporarily filled 
by the Southern Huns, who also separated into two political units: Western Chao and 
Eastern Chao. Competing at the same time for Chin leftovers in the Yellow River basin 
were the Sixteen Kingdoms, a collection of numerous independent political units seeking 
regional hegemonic status (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 149-150). Several of these 
kingdoms claimed loyalty to Chin, while a large number of them sought sub-system 
hegemonic status, with potential aspirations of re-establishing the system-wide power 
structure of Western Chin (McGovern 1939, 321-366). In Korea and Manchuria the 
system was also shocked by the diffusion of power, as the Sienbi reclaimed parts of 
Manchuria, thus marginalizing Puyo, while three Korean states, Koguryo, Paekche, and 
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rising Silla, competed for regional dominance (Han 1970, 23-45; Reischauer and 
Fairbank 1960, 405-416). In the far south of the system, Champa, Tonkin, and Nam Viet 
temporarily attained independence, thus contributing to the number of actors in the 
system (Majumdar 1985, 23-29). From 350 the nonpolar structure included 
approximately fifteen sub-system hegemonic actors: Eastern Chin, Eastern and Western 
Chao, Koguryo, Puyo, Paekche, Liang, Nam Viet, Sienbi, Champa, Tibet, Yamato from 
Japan (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 468-469; Henthorn 1971, 33-37) (during this 
period Japan’s interaction with Korea, and its subjugation of Korean city-states, 
especially the Kayla league, incorporated Japan into the Far Eastern System), and several 
statelets from the Sixteen Kingdoms. By 400 relative consolidation of power had been 
taking place, as given sub-system hegemons had established regional preponderance, 
setting the stage for a transition of the system’s polar structuration. Eastern Chin had 
become established in the Yangtze basin; Northern Wei having somewhat tempered the 
chaos of the Sixteen Kingdoms in the Yellow River territories (Kwanten 1979, 15-16); 
Yamato practiced dominance in southern Japan and parts of Korea; Western Ch’in 
attained stability and status in the northwest of the system, based out of Kansu (Gansu in 
pinyin); the Tabgach of the Steppe began positioning in the north (Grousset 1970, 60-61); 
while the Avar (Juan-juan, Hephtalites) confederacy began building its central Asian 
empire in the periphery (Kwanten 1979, 20-23).       
425 AD – 555AD   Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure  
  By 425 the Far Eastern System had transitioned into a multipolar structure, as 
given regional powers had not only solidified sub-system hegemony, but had also 
expanded beyond its regional spheres. Eastern Chin had been replaced by the Sung 
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dynasty, with the Sung solidifying its system-wide hegemonic status in the Yangtze basin 
(Holocomb 1994, 29-36). Northern Wei (the Tabgach after becoming Sinified) 
consolidated power over the north, subjugating and absorbing the remnants from the 
post-Chin nonpolar period, thus assuming its system-wide status out of the Yellow River 
basin (Grousset 1970, 60-64). The Avar confederacy in the periphery of the system 
presented the third pole, having attained dominance over Mongolia and much of the 
steppe peoples of the surrounding regions. Yamato sustained itself as a system-wide 
actor, albeit relatively weaker than the other poles, yet nonetheless a pole in its own right, 
demonstrating dominance not only in its own region, but expanding into the Korean 
peninsula. Koguryo shifted between system-wide and sub-system status, at times 
challenging and counter-balancing other poles, and at other times accepting tributary 
status and thus limiting itself as a sub-system hegemon. Northern Wei proved to be the 
more aggressive pole during this early period, both subjugating Kashgaria (Mole 1970, 
17-19) and Togon, a former Western Ch’in vassal and a rising sub-system actor, while 
carrying out raids against the Avars to challenge and counter-balance their relative 
strength in the periphery (Grousset 1970, 58-66). Sung established dominance over much 
of the eastern and southern portions of the system, accepting vassalage from Tonkin, 
Champa, and Funan. By the end of the century the Sung dynasty was replaced by the 
Southern Ch’i dynasty, with no alterations to the balance of power structure. During this 
period Koguryo expanded into a system-wide hegemon, overrunning much of the Korean 
peninsula and further succeeding in its absorption of Puyo by conquering Manchuria 
(Han 1970, 21-51). Internecine war between the poles continued throughout this period, 
with the balance of power continuing to preserve the status quo. Internal problems, 
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however, by the early 500’s, slowly brought about a restructuration of the system. 
Southern Chi was supplanted by Southern Liang, weakening and bringing about the slow 
disintegration of this once-powerful Yangtze political unit. Northern Wei split into 
Western and Eastern Wei, and proceeded to weaken each other (Wright 1978, 31-44), 
with Western Wei soon becoming dominated by Northern Chou, and Eastern Wei by 
Northern Ch’i (Ebrey 1996). Koguryo underwent a civil war, losing much of its power to 
the other sub-system hegemons in the region, Silla and Paekche (Lee 1984, 42-47). The 
other remaining sub-system hegemon, the Avars, faced a growing threat from its subjects, 
especially the Turks (Kwanten 1979, 24-26).           
555 AD – 675 AD Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure 
    The Gokturks, a Turkish tribe of the Steppe, rebelled against the Avar empire, 
bringing about the latter’s destruction and supplanting it with the First Turkish Khaganate 
(empire), through which they proceeded to subjugated the Huns and the Kyrgyz at the 
extreme periphery of the system, thus dominating the entire northeast of the Far Eastern 
System (30-37). The loose multipolar structure became replaced with Turkish unipolarity, 
as the Khaganate incorporated northern China into its sphere of influence, both protecting 
and collecting tribute from the previous system-wide hegemons Northern Chou and 
Northern Ch’i (Grousset 1970, 66-84; Kyzlasov 1996, 320-323). Around 582, after a civil 
war, the First Turk Khaganate split into two: Eastern and Western Turkish Khaganate. 
Capitalizing on this development, Sui overthrew Northern Chou and assumed system-
wide hegemonic status, solidifying power in the Yellow River basin and then expanding 
into south to the Yangtze territory, conquering Southern Ch’en and taking Nanking 
(Wright 1978, 138-161). Sui assumption of unipolarity allowed for the continuation of 
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the system’s power configuration, as one system-wide hegemon replaced the previous 
system-wide hegemon, thus maintaining the unipolar structure. Sui influence expanded 
into the Korean peninsula, antagonizing sub-system hegemon Koguryo and accepting 
submission from Silla as Sui satellite in the region (Lee 1984, 42-47). Sui’s influence also 
spread to the southeast of the system, incorporating Yunnan, Tonkin and Champa into its 
sphere of influence (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 154-155). At this stage, the power 
constellations of the system included Sui as the single pole along with the presence of 
several sub-system hegemons: Koguryo in Korea, a rising Tibet in the south-west 
(Beckwith 1987, 14-23), a reviving Togon, the Eastern and Western Turkish Khaganates 
in the north and western periphery, and Tang, perhaps the most powerful of the sub-
system hegemons based out of its capital Ch’ang-an in north-central China. 
 Overextension, failed incursions into Korea, and several revolts disintegrated the 
Sui empire into various statelets (Wright 1997, 73-113), positioning the Far Eastern 
System for a possible transition into a post-unipolar structure. The emergence of Tang, 
however, maintained the system’s unipolar structure, which otherwise would have 
transitioned into a possible multipolar power configuration. As the most powerful sub-
system hegemon, Tang quickly assumed polar status after the fall of Sui (Wechsler 1997, 
153-166): establishing dominance over Yunnan, Tonkin, Champa, Funan, and Cambodia 
(Hall 1981, 30-36; Majumdar 1985, 37-39) in the south, accepting tributary status from 
Koguryo (albeit temporarily) and Silla in the Korean Peninsula (Henthorn 1971, 46-51), 
and repelling an Eastern Turkish invasion and managing to subjugate the Khaganate 
(Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 155), while accepting vassalage from the powerful 
Uighurs (Grousset 1970, 87-93). While several independent sub-system hegemons 
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remained present, with potential system-wide hegemonic aspirations, Tang unipolarity 
remained unchallenged during this period, as neither of the sub-system actors was 
powerful enough to either challenge or counter-balance Tang. By the 670’s, however, 
internal problems, fused with failed expedition into Korea and Kashgaria, relatively 
weakened Tang (Adshead 2004, 40-48), thus allowing rising sub-system actors to 
challenge Tang and restructure the power configurations of the system.       
675 AD – 840 AD Transition from Unipolar to Tripolar Structure 
 Tibet was the first sub-system hegemon to challenge Tang and thus attain system-
wide status. Tibet had already managed to destroy the Togon state, while subsequently 
submitting much of the Western Turkish Kaghanate (Beckwith 1987, 35-43) and then 
directly challenging Tang over Kansu and Kashgaria (Richardson 1962, 30-33). The 
Eastern Turks formed the Second Turkish Kaghanate after revolting against Tang, 
subjugating the Tang vassal Uighurs, and carrying out raids against Tang (Sinor and 
Klyashtorny 1996, 327-335). Tibet twice defeated Tang incursions into Kashgaria, while 
Yunnan rebelled against Tang, only to be followed by a resurgent Tang reconquering 
Kashgaria and pacifying Yunnan within a 20 year period. Tang counter-balanced the 
expansion of the Kaghanate by temporarily allying with Tibet to preserve the balance of 
power (Grousset 1970, 105-115), while at the same time preserving the power parity 
between itself and Tibet through internecine warfare. Due to internal conflict and 
succession problem, the Second Turkish Kaghanate collapsed, leaving a power vacuum 
in the Steppe that was quickly filled by the Uighurs, who, although allied with Tang, 
nonetheless presented a separate pole in the system (Mackerras 1972), thus preserving the 
tripolar structure. A rising sub-system hegemon, Nanchao, based out of Yunnan, broke 
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away from Tang, expanded into Burma, and allied (submitted) itself with Tibet (Backus 
1981, 68-80), thus threatening the balance of power. Uighurs responded by attacking 
Tibet, through Tang help, to counter-balance Tibet, while Tang succeeded in winning 
over Nanchao, thus weakening Tibet, and managing to establish a three-way peace treaty 
among the poles (Beckwith 1987, 156-167).     
840 AD – 880 AD Transition from Tripolar to Bipolar Structure 
 Two major developments around 840 altered the tripolar system: the Uighurs 
collapsed due to internal revolts (primarily due to Kyrgyz and Turkish tribes) (Grousset 
1970, 124-127), and the Tibetan empire disintegrated due to factionalism and civil war 
(Richardson 1962, 28-34; Beckwith 1987, 171-172). A weakened Tang, having survived 
several internal revolts, maintained its system-wide hegemonic status, only to be joined 
by Nanchao as a new opposing pole, who had managed to conquer Tonkin, establish 
dominance over much of the southeast of the system, and proceed to invade Szechwan 
(Backus 1981, 144-161). Tang-Nanchao animosity characterized much of this bipolar 
period, while the rest of the Far Eastern System underwent intense power diffusion, from 
the Korean peninsula, to the Steppes, to the southeast of the system.   
880 AD – 970 AD Transition from Bipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 By the end of the century Tang was in serious decay, as increased rebellions, 
warlords, and sub-units within the empire disintegrated Tang (Somers 1997, 682-689). 
The fall of Tang initiated the transition of the Far Eastern System into a nonpolar 
structure, as the period of Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms began: Later Liang, Later 
Tang, Later Chin (Jin), Later Han, and Later Chou (Zhou) succeeded one after another in 
ten year intervals during this inchoate period in the north (Standen 2009, 38-59; Gungwu 
77 
 
1967, 130-188). In the south, Wu, Wuyue, Northern Han, Southern Han, Southern Tang, 
Jingnan (Nanping), Later Shu, Chu, and Min (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 195-196; 
Clark 2011, 52-66) all struggled for power, intermittently, seeking regional consolidation 
and sub-system dominance (Clark 2009, 188-204).  
In Korea, nearly seven political units struggled for regional hegemony with Silla, 
Later Paekche, and Koryo (successors to Koguryo) being the main actors (Lee 1984, 90-
99), while in Manchuria Parhae struggled with both Korean political units, actors from 
the north, and the incursion of nomadic Mongols. In Japan the Fujiwara period 
introduced relative stability, as sub-system hegemon Kyoto remained content with  
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regional dominance (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960; 502-505). Nanchao’s power 
thoroughly declined in the Yunnan, with Tonkin, Champa, Tali, Cambodia, and a new 
Dai Viet all seeking sub-system status. The situation in the Steppes was was just as 
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chaotic, as the decline of Tibet and Uighur had created a power vacuum with numerous 
competing political units: Turks, Kyrgyz tribes, Tibetans, and Mongols, especially the 
Khitans (Grousset 1970, 125-131). The inchoate power structure began changing by 
around 960, as the diffusion of power became absorbed through regional consolidation 
(Lorge 2011, 225-231), taking approximately 90 years to formulate a power hierarchy in 
the system and thus allow for a transition from the nonpolar structure.        
970 AD – 1020 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Bipolar Structure 
 By 970 the Khitan Mongols had attained sub-system hegemony and expanded 
south into China, conquering Parhae, establishing a sphere of influence over the Yellow 
River territory, and forming the state of Liao as a system-wide hegemon (Mote 1999, 32-
60; Grousset 1970, 125-130). During the previous nonpolar epoch, Sung undertook a 
process of power consolidation similar to Liao, overthrowing Later Chao in 960, 
absorbing Southern Han, Southern Tang, and various other northern states by 980 (Nap-
Yin and K’uan-chung 2009, 206-239), and directly challenging Liao for system-wide 
dominance (Mote 1999, 68-71; Twitchett and Tietze 1994, 84-86), thus positioning the 
Far Eastern System in a bipolar configuration. Sung’s excessive size was matched against 
Liao’s superior military, only to be supplemented by the presence of sub-system actor 
Tangut (Dunnel 1994, 155-175), a powerful state established by Tibetan Tanguts, as Liao 
ally (vassal?) contributing to the balancing act against Sung (Mote 1999, 171-190). In the 
rest of the system, sub-system actors fought for regional hegemony both in the south 
(Champa against Dai Viet), and in the periphery (Karakhanid Turks against Uighur), 
while Korea became a battle ground for proxy conflict between the satellites of each pole, 
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only to fall under Liao’s sphere of influence, in the same fashion as Champa and Dai Viet 
in the south fell under Sung’s sphere of influence.    
1020 AD – 1115 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 During this period Tangut and Karakhanid initially succeeded in attaining system-
wide status, thus joining Sung and Liao in a new multipolar power constellation. While 
the latter two remained, relatively, the more powerful poles, Tangut successfully 
challenged and counter-balanced Sung, while Liao continued with its consolidation of 
Manchuria and extended Korea into its sphere of influence (Mote 1999, 60-68). The 
Karakhanids managed to dominate the western periphery by subjugating Dzungaria and 
Kashgaria (at least the west of it) (Grousset 1970, 133-147). Sub-system actors either 
struggled with one another for regional hegemony, or became vassals to one of the poles: 
Koryo and Manchuria vassalage to Liao; Champa vassalage to Sung; Cambodia-Burma 
(Pagan) struggle; Dai Viet-Champa-Cambodia struggle, etc. Tangut and Liao challenges 
to Sung reduced the latter to accepting unfavorable terms of peace (vassalage?), but the 
inter-polar conflict did not alter the polar structure of the system. The system 
transitioned, however, when Liao was overthrown around 1114 (Chan 1984, 52-60). 
1115 AD – 1205 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 In 1115 the Jurchen, a Tungusic people from Manchuria (Chan 1984, 51-54) 
overthrew Liao (Mote 1999, 199-205), establishing the state of Chin (Jin), also known as 
the Jurchen dynasty,
9
 submitting Koryo (Han 1970, 152-160), reducing Tangut to 
vassalage (Mote 1999, 249-256), and directly challenging Sung for system-wide 
hegemony (Grousset 1970, 135-138), thus transitioning the system into a bipolar 
                                                          
9
 To alleviate any confusion between this Chin dynasty (Later Chin) and the previous Chin dynasty, 
Jurchen dynasty will be utilized to refer to Later Chin. 
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structure. Jurchen proceeded to attack Sung, conquering much of the Yellow River 
territory, seizing Sung’s capital, and forcing the latter to flee the Yangtze River basin, yet 
failing to overtake Sung in the south (Franke 1994, 226-234), thus preserving Sung’s 
ability to counter-balance and maintain system-wide hegemonic status. Much of the 
north, then, remained under Jurchen suzerainty, while Sung exercised dominance, via 
vassal states, throughout the south of the system (Franke and Chan 1997, 58-82). 
Jurchen’s drive for unipolar status was hampered by the rise of the Mongol confederation 
in the north, which as former Jurchen vassals had broken loose and positioned to 
potentially challenge Jurchen’s system-wide status (Grousset 1970, 192-197). After 
moving their capital to Beijing, Jurchen once again attacked Sung, only to be repelled by 
the latter, hence agreeing to terms of peace and continuing with the status quo.      
1205 AD – 1235 AD Transition from Bipolar to Tripolar Structure 
 By the late 1200’s the Mongol confederation declared a Mongol empire of the 
steppe under Genghis Khan, proceeding to thoroughly conquer Tangut (Dunnel 1994, 
205-209), subjugate Manchuria and Korea, and threaten Jurchen (Grousset 1970, 229-
233), while Jurchen and Sung continued the inter-polar struggle into a stalemate (Chan 
1984, 100-116). The Mongols continued their solidification of the periphery by 
conquering Kashgaria and Dzungaria, overrunning the various tribal political units, and 
heading south to accept the submission of Tibet (Richardson 1962, 30-33; Grousset 1970, 
165-171). The inter-hegemonic conflict between Jurchen and Sung played to the benefit 
of the Mongols, and while Jurchen still exercised preponderance over the north-center of 
the system, as Sung did the same through the south, the drive of the Mongols for unipolar 
status brought about the restructuring of the system.   
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1235 AD – 1355 AD Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure 
 Shortly before 1235 the Mongols destroyed the Jurchen dynasty (Mote 1999, 243-
248; Kwanten 1979, 117), with Sung supporting the effort with the hope of alleviating 
their archenemy (Grousset 1970, 244-251; Kwanten 1979, 133) and creating a bipolar 
power constellation. Sung policy proved to be miscalculated, as the Mongols 
immediately turned against Sung, unleashing devastating defeats against the latter. The 
Jurchen remnants settled in southern Manchuria, accepting tributary status to the 
Mongols, while the latter proceeded south-east from Manchuria and accepted the 
submission of Koryo in the Korean peninsula (Henthorn 1971, 115-119). This was 
followed by the subjugation of Kashgaria, Tibet, and the complete conquest of Sung in 
1276 (Grousset 1970, 282-288). Its consolidation of unipolar dominance was 
complemented by the Mongol’s adopting a new dynastic name for their state: Yuan 
(Langlois 1981, 3-5). Yuan headed south and conquered the Yunnan province, submitting 
or accepting vassalage-tributary status from Champa, Tali, Dai Viet, Burma, and 
Cambodia (Hall 1981, 169-171; Grousset 1970, 289-291), while at the same time 
encouraging the migration of Thai populations into the south to serve as its satellite 
(Wyatt 1984, 44-48). Yuan’s capacity to exercise preponderance over the entire Far 
Eastern System—from mainland China, to the very south of the system, to the entire 
periphery in the north and west, and to the entire north-east from Manchuria to Korea—
remained neither challenged nor counter-balanced by any actor. Yuan absolute hegemony 
was only inhibited by its consistent failed invasions of Japan (Reischauer and Fairbank 
1960, 539-540), which remained a sub-system hegemon seeking neither expansion 
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nor challenging Yuan’s system-wide hegemonic status. Around 1350 several mass 
uprisings by the Chinese against their Mongol overlord crippled Yuan, and by 1355 Yuan 
disintegrated into several regional statelets under given warlords (Dardess 1994, 580-586; 
Mote 1999, 517-540; Kwanten 1979, 239-244). This was supplemented by an intense 
civil war among the Mongols themselves, leading to two major developments: 1) the 
Mongols retreating back into Mongolia, thus ending Yuan (Dardess 1973, 115-152); and 
2) the birth of the Ming state, as one of the regional statelets that quickly rose to power 
(Mote 1988, 11-38), defeated all challenging regional warlords, established itself in 
Nanking, and attained suzerainty over southern China, while also sweeping north and 
pushing Mongol remnants into the northern periphery (Grousset 1970, 321-329). 
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1355 AD – 1620 AD Continuation of Unipolar Structure 
 The stunning rise of Ming in replacing Yuan unipolarity not only allowed for the 
continuation of the unipolar epoch, but also prevented the Far Eastern System from 
transitioning into a nonpolar structure, for as the historic precedent demonstrates, 
nonpolarity tends to be the system’s power configuration after long periods of 
unipolarity, as the process of disintegration and re-consolidation characterizes nonpolar 
periods. Ming’s capacity to quickly consolidate power and assume the mantle of singular 
system-wide superpower after Yuan (Dreyer 1988, 72-105) allowed for the Far Eastern 
System to preserve the unipolar structure, albeit under a different system-wide hegemon. 
Ming’s near 350 year singular dominance of the Far Eastern System was initially 
characterized by the following developments: establishment of tributary status for 
Champa, Dai Viet, Thai state of Laos, Burma, and Cambodia in the south (Mote 1999, 
607-612); reducing to vassalage Koryo (and renaming it Choson) (Han 1970, 180-225; 
Clark 1998, 272-287), as well as subjugating the Jurchen in Manchuria, thus establishing 
sphere of influence in the north-east of the system. In the Steppe and the periphery, Ming 
either neutralized Mongol tribes or engaging in the game of divide et impera through 
diplomacy (Mote 1999, 608-611), such as playing the Oirat Mongols (a sub-system 
hegemon acting as Ming satellite) against the Alans and other Steppe actors, while in the 
process managing to impede the rise of Moghulistan as a possible system-wide actor 
(Grousset 1970, 493-510). Between 1500 to 1600 the system continued to preserve a 
similar power structure (Geiss 1988, 466-478; Gungwu 1998, 301-328), with Ming as the 
unchallenged unipole, and the rest of the Far East encompassing either states under the 
unipole’s sphere of influence, or sub-system hegemons being independent of, but neither 
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challenging nor counter-balancing, the unipole: the newly formed Siam and Vietnam, 
along with resurgent Burma, exercising independence, while struggling for sub-system 
hegemony; Kashgaria, Dzungaria, Mongolia, and rest of the periphery displaying sub-
system actors seeking regional consolidation, either independently or through Ming 
assistance, yet neither seeking system-wide status; while mainland China, Manchuria, 
and Korea remained under Ming dominance, with Japan (dominated by the Tokugawa 
Shogunate) remaining an independent/isolated sub-system hegemon (Reischauer and 
Fairbank 1960, 590-601).  
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By 1620, however, famine, internal unrest, and factional alignments (Mote 1999, 779-
180) profoundly weakened Ming, as the system verged on the disintegration of the 
unipole and a transition to nonpolarity. 
1620 AD – 1660 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 The disintegration of Ming was halted by the presence of powerful princes 
seeking to preserve the unipolar structure. This endeavor, however, proved unsuccessful, 
as the Jurchens of Manchuria, establishing the Manchu state, consolidated regional power 
and rose to challenge Ming at the system-wide level (Roth 1979, 7-30), bringing the 
Koreans (Lee 1984, pp. 210-217) and tribes of eastern Mongols into its sphere of 
influence, while expelling Ming out of Peking (Grousset 1970, 514-525), and ushering in 
a short bipolar period. The Manchu state adapted the name of Ch’ing (Qing in pinyin) 
(Crossley 1997, 78-79), expelling Ming from the north, then heading south and subduing 
Ming resistance in the Yunnan (Hall 1981, 400-407), thus proving to be the more 
powerful system-wide hegemon, and seeking to transition the Far Eastern System back to 
a unipolar power configuration.   
1660 AD – 1850 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 Ch’ing success over the Ming propelled the former to the status of unchallenged 
system-wide hegemon, as Ch’ing managed to suppress several large revolts by Ming 
loyalists, powerful tribes from Inner Mongolia, the Jungars of Dzungaria (Reischauer and 
Fairbank 1960, pp. 356-362) the sub-system actors in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand 
(Wyatt 1984, 115-122), and pretty much the rest of Southeast Asia. Ch’ing exercised 
preponderance over the entire Far Eastern System with the exception of the western 
periphery, as Turco-Mongol political units, from the Oirat to the Kokonors, established 
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sub-system hegemonic status, successfully maintaining the periphery as their power base 
against Ch’ing incursions (Grousset 1970, 525-536), while refraining from challenging 
Ch’ing hegemonic status at the system-wide level. Meanwhile, around the late 1680’s the 
first presence of European powers, in the form of France and England, began incursions 
into the Far Eastern System by way of Siam and Formosa (Hall 1981, 380-410), initiating 
what would eventually become the absorption of the Far Eastern System into the Global 
Political System. Ch’ing system-wide hegemony, however, remained indifferent to such 
developments, as the unipole finally succeeded in conquering Kashgaria, invading Tibet 
(even reaching Nepal), submitting Mongolia into vassalage (Mote 1999, 936-940), and 
thus solidifying its preponderance over the north and western periphery. While Ch’ing 
system-wide hegemony continued in the Far East, the days of the Far Eastern System, 
itself, remained numbered, which, in turn, meant the unipolarity of Ch’ing as well.     
Absorption of the Far Eastern World Political System into the Global Political System 
 While European interactions with the Far Eastern System became intensified in 
the late 1600’s, direct presence took place with trade and diplomatic relations around the 
1790’s, with France establishing a presence in the south of the system (what would 
become Indochina), and Britain seeking ports and trade routes around Formosa (Taiwan), 
Hong Kong, and pretty much the south-eastern seaboard of mainland China. This was 
complemented by European attempts at establishing trading ports in Japan from the 
1600’s, only to be actualized in the mid-1800’s by virtue of American forcefulness. The 
absorption of the Far Eastern System, that is, the end of its existence as a solitary (quasi-
insulated) systemic structure, into the Global Political System, primarily came about with 
the First Opium War between China/Ch’ing Dynasty and Britain, which resulted in the 
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defeat of the latter, the end of the Canton System (which had limited European presence 
to Macau and had thus allowed Ch’ing to control European trade in China and much of 
the Far East), the cessation of Hong Kong, and the opening of five additional trade posts. 
Complications with these arrangements would bring about the Second Opium War in 
1856 (which also included French involvement along with U.S. and Russian interests), 
also resulting in the defeat of China/Ch’ing, and the complete opening of the Far Eastern 
System to the rest of the world, that is, its absorption into the Global Political System.    
 
Analysis 
 The dataset for the Far Eastern World Political System, as coded utilizing the 
taxonomical categories for the different modes of polarity, provide for a total of 27 
observation points. Consistent with the analytical structure of other world political 
systems in the dataset, the compilation of the 27 data observations allow for four methods 
of analysis: 1) distribution of polar structures; 2) assessment of transitional patters after 
unipolar periods; 3) gauging the duration and longevity of polar periods; and 4) 
calculating probabilistic outcomes of polar structures after unipolar transitions. The 
analytical considerations provide two general conclusions: unipolar transitions tend to 
give way to nonpolar epochs in the Far Eastern System, and multipolar epochs never 
characterize the post-unipolar structural transitions. 
 The most common polar structure in the Far Eastern System is the unipolar power 
constellation, with 8 polar periods being coded as unipolar. While unipolarity, in relation 
to other modes of polarity, is the most occurring polar structure, it is not the norm in the 
system, for the distribution of the polar periods suggests a coherent balance. This is best 
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demonstrated by the presence of 7 bipolar periods, making bipolarity the second most 
common polar structure in the system. The third most common power configuration in 
the system is nonpolarity, with 5 periods, followed by multipolarity with 4 polar epochs, 
and tripolarity with 3 polar periods. Observationally, in the near 2800 years of the Far 
Eastern System covered in this study, unipolarity is the polar structure approximately 
30% of the time, followed by bipolarity (25%), nonpolarity (19%), multipolarity (15%), 
and tripolarity (11%).  
As the figures below demonstrate, the distribution of the polar structures indicate 
the system’s tendency to either transition into a unipolar or bipolar structure for more 
than 50% of the time, suggesting the Far Eastern System’s predisposition to gravitate 
toward structures where the concentration of power is within limited number of system-
wide hegemons. Multipolarity and tripolarity remain the least occurring power 
constellations in the dataset. If the coding, however, fused tripolarity with multipolarity, 
presupposing that any power configuration with more than two system-wide hegemons is 
a multipolar structure, than multipolarity will be tied with bipolarity as the second most 
occurring polar period in the system. For taxonomical and analytical reasons, however, 
the distinction between the two modes remains a necessity: the diffusion or concentration 
of power cannot ignore the difference between three poles and the dynamics involved 
with four, five, or six poles. 
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FIGURE 4.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCUTERS IN THE FAR EASTERN 
SYSTEM 
 
FIGURE 4.2 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN THIS DATASET 
 
  The longevity of a polar period is indicative of the system’s structural stability, 
with stability pertaining to the maintenance of a single power configuration for a given 
duration, as opposed to treatments of stability being gauged by conflict and war. In this 
sense, the longer a polar structure, on average, demonstrates longevity, the more stable 
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that given structure, vis-à-vis system’s maintenance, remains. On average, the most 
durable power configuration in the Far Eastern System is unipolarity, with duration of 
approximately 170 years. The second most durable polar structure is multipolarity, 
averaging 147 years of longevity, followed by tripolarity with 78 years, nonpolarity with 
75 years, and bipolarity with 46 years. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, by virtue of its durability, 
unipolarity remains the most stable structure at the system’s level, since it takes 
approximately 170 years in order for structural transition to take place. The longevity of 
the multipolar system is also quite telling: whereas it was initially assumed that the Far 
Eastern System demonstrates a tendency to gravitate toward structures that concentrate 
power within one or two polar formations, the system’s stability of multipolarity pits the 
duration of a structure against the number of occurrences for a given polar modality. This 
is made obvious by the short lifespan of bipolar epochs with an average of 46 years, 
against the multipolar structure’s average of 147 years. As such, while bipolarity occurs 7 
times in the system against the presence of multipolarity of only 4 epochs, multipolarity 
occupied the system for nearly 590 years, while bipolarity only occupied the system with 
325 years.  
Further contributing to this assessment is the durability of tripolarity with 78 
years, almost twice the durability of bipolarity, thus potentially negating the claim that 
the Far Eastern System strictly shifts towards the centralization of power. The aggregate 
occurrence of unipolarity and bipolarity, with 15 data observations, is double that of the 
aggregate of multipolarity and tripolarity with 7 data observations. With respect to 
durability, however, the aggregate average of the centralized polar structures is 216 years, 
while the aggregate average of the relatively diffused polar configurations is 225 years. 
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On average then, the period of time in which the Far Eastern System had a multi, or tri-
polar structure is similar to the system’s stability observed during unipolar and bipolar 
periods. The latter, however, still remains the least stable polar structure in the system.  
 
FIGURE 4.3 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR STRUCTURES 
 
 Consistent with this analysis, the durability of nonpolar periods, with an average 
of 75 years, is indicative of the system’s tendency to fluctuate between the 
centralization/concentration of power and its subsequent decentralization of power. As 
the dataset demonstrates, all five of the nonpolar periods came after unipolar or bipolar 
epochs. In this sense, the concentration of power within the system, either confined to a 
single pole, or two relatively equal poles, transitions to a diffused nonpolar structure 
approximately 33% of the time (of the 15 combined polar periods of unipolarity and 
bipolarity, the system transitioned into a nonpolar structure 5 times). The longevity of the 
nonpolar epoch is consistent with the historical data: nonpolar periods undergo the time 
consuming process of regional consolidation, inter-regional sub-system conflict, the 
0
50
100
150
200
92 
 
positioning of rising sub-system hegemons at the system-wide level, and then the 
restructuring of the system into a post-nonpolar configuration.             
 The transition of the system’s structure after unipolarity allows for probabilistic 
considerations of post-unipolar periods. With unipolarity presenting 8 polar periods, the 
data provides for similar number of post-unipolar transitions (since the final unipolar 
period transitioned the Far East System into its absorption by the Global Political System, 
only 7 post-unipolar data observations are applicable). Figure 4.4 shows the distribution 
of polar structures after the system’s transition from unipolarity: 3 periods of nonpolarity, 
3 periods of bipolarity, and 1 period of tripolarity. Gauging the data probabilistically, the 
unipolar structure in the Far Eastern System had a 43% chance of transitioning into a 
diffused nonpolar structure, 43% chance of a more centralized bipolar structure, and 14% 
chance of a tripolar structure.  
 
FIGURE 4.4 POST-UNIPOLAR POWER CONSTELLATIONS IN FAR EASTERN 
SYSTEM 
 
The analytical considerations of this distribution are three-fold. First, 43% of the time the 
system transitions into an inchoate, diffused structure, thus transitioning from a 
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centralized/concentrated structuration of power to a non-hierarchical power 
configuration. Second, 43% of the time the post-unipolar system transitions into the least 
stable structure, thus presupposing that the continuation of power concentration in the 
system will last, on average, an additional 46 years with bipolarity. Third, the post-
unipolar system never transitions into a multipolar structure, indicating two possible 
explanations: the concentration of power in the system during unipolarity is quite rigid, 
with the unipole thoroughly suppressing the rise of sub-system hegemons, thus the result 
being a diffused system after unipolarity. After which, the preponderance of the unipole 
is so severe that only the most powerful sub-system hegemons are able to rise to system-
wide status and provide a challenge, hence the tenability of bipolarity as opposed to 
multipolarity in the post-unipolar structure. To this end, either the unipole completely 
collapses, in which the system transitions to nonpolarity, and with most regional actors 
being subdued, multipolarity becomes impossible; or, one or two actors manage to 
consolidate enough sub-system power to stop the system from transitioning to 
nonpolarity and thus challenge the unipole in a new bipolar system. In either case, the 
unipolar structure in the Far Eastern System remains inhospitable to the development of 
strong sub-system actors, which, in turn, thoroughly limits the post-unipolar period 
transitioning into a multipolar one. The result, then, is a temporary continuation of 
bipolar power concentration, or a complete diffusion of power and a transition to a 
nonpolar configuration. Concomitantly, with 5 nonpolar periods in the Far Eastern 
System’s 2800 year history, three of the five nonpolar epochs came after unipolar 
periods. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 The Near East-Middle Eastern World Political System primarily refers to the 
political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-
wide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region that this 
given world political system encompasses.  This fundamentally presupposes a group of 
political units/entities/actors having relations that are, to a strong degree, permanent or 
continuous with one another. Spatial-territorially, the Near East-Middle Eastern System 
covers a specific geographical area, but to specify set regional and territorial boundaries 
in absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political system will obscure the 
reality of the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political 
entities at the periphery at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being 
absent from the system. System’s classification, then, does not specifically rely on 
establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering the political contacts, 
interactions, and power configurations of system-wide hegemons that function within the 
region that the given system encompasses. 
 The terms “Near East” and “Middle East”10 cover geographic areas that at times 
overlap and at times remain mutually exclusive. To avoid any controversy, or specify 
geographic designations that may not pertain specifically to one or either of the terms 
used for geographic designation, both terms will be used as a singular reference to a 
                                                          
10
 To avoid accusations of Eurocentrism, the term “Western Asia” is sometimes used to refer to the regions 
designated as the “Middle East” or the “Near East.” Since this work relies on historical sources, the usage 
of terms “Near East” and “Middle East” are used to be consistent and conterminous with the historical 
sources. The usage of these geographic terms, then, presents no political reference to contemporary 
geographic and geo-political terminology. The usage is purely historical and consistent with the historic 
scholarly sources. 
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geographic portion of the world that functioned as a world political system. The Near 
East-Middle Eastern System, territorially, includes the global region that covers the 
following areas: from its eastern periphery it ranges from western Iran in the south and up 
north through the Zagros Mountains and into the Armenian Highlands of south 
Transcaucasia; heading westward, it covers all of Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf to 
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and extends to the Mediterranean coast of Syro-Palestine; 
to the north it covers the entirety of Anatolia/Asia Minor all the way to the Aegean; and 
further south and south west, it encompasses Egypt, with the rest of northern Africa, from 
Libya to Numidia, serving as its south-western most periphery. In this sense, the term 
“Middle East,” for example, covers much of the territory within the designated world 
political system, but fails to include parts of Transcaucasia and North Africa west of 
Egypt, while including Afghanistan that is not part of the designated world political 
system. Similarly, the term “Wider Near East,” historically, covers the regions primarily 
associated with the Ottoman Empire, thus including all of the Balkans and various coasts 
of the Black Sea, which are not part of the designated world political system, while 
failing to include much of the Arabian Peninsula that is, in fact, part of the designated 
world political system. Consequently, the limited designation of the term “Near East,” as 
opposed to “Wider Near East,” specifically covers Anatolia, northern Syria, and upper 
and central Mesopotamia: territories that make up only part of the designated world 
political system. For these reason, the geographic designations “Middle East” and “Near 
East” are connected together by a hyphen and used as a single designation to 
conceptualize the region of the world that makes up the Near East-Middle Eastern World 
Political System. 
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  Data collection for polar periods within the Near East-Middle Eastern System 
begins around 2600 BC, where basic city-states have begun forming in parts of 
Mesopotamia, Syro-Palestine (Mediterranean Coast) and southern Anatolia. Egypt, by 
this time, has a highly-developed civilization, but Egypt’s interaction with the rest of the 
system remains almost non-existent until the 1600’s BC, and as such, Egypt remains 
classified as a sub-system hegemon at the periphery. Considerations of polar structures 
prior to this period present obvious complications: historical evidence is rather limited; 
formation of political units that function at the system-wide or sub-system level are quite 
unclear; and inter political interactions between newly-forming political units are 
structurally so underdeveloped that it makes no analytical sense to classify such 
developments through the criteria of polar structuration. For these reasons, the coding of 
polar periods in the Near East-Middle Eastern system begins from 2600 BC.  
2600 BC – 2330 BC Nonpolar Structure  
 Southern Mesopotamia, during this period, was comprised of approximately thirty 
five city states, “more or less evenly divided over the region” (Van de Mieroop 2004, 43). 
The agrarian economic structure of the region, primarily in Babylonia, gave way to inter-
city competition over agricultural land, reifying the nonpolar power configurations of this 
period by virtue of the excessive diffusion of power within the system. The irredentist 
aspirations of city-states to expand their sphere, or zone, of influence contributed to the 
inchoateness and the absence of any power hierarchies in the Near East-Middle Eastern 
System, which, in turn, provided the opportunity for rising sub-system hegemons to seek 
to consolidate regional power and thus provide some form of possible hierarchy to the 
system. Political units such as Lagash, Umma, Ur, Eridu, Adab, Isin, Kish, Shuruppak, 
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Larsa, Nippur, and various other prominent city-states methodically began positioning to 
fill the vacuum (Hall 1960, 182-190, 210-211). Uruk, for example, sought expansion 
around 2400 BC, conquering Ur, only to be soon challenged by Umma, as the latter not 
only conquered Uruk, but also Lagash, Ur, and the entire south of Babylon. Such 
conquests, however, were ephemeral, since coalitions and counter-coalitions among city-
states either challenged or undid the attempt of centralizing and concentrating power by 
given rising actors. The cases of Kish, Lagash, Umma, Sumer, and Uruk are cases in 
point (Langdon 1923, 373-401).  
 Outside of Southern Mesopotamia, rising city-states in the Levant and Northern 
Mesopotamia began establishing minor centers of power in the region, while expanding 
the Near East-Middle Eastern System into Anatolia, thus creating a link between the 
north and south of the system primarily through trade and diplomacy. Some of these 
states included Nagar, Shehna, Urkesh, Mari, Ebla, Ugarit, Assur, Carchemis, and 
Byblos. To the east, Susa, Ansham, and Elam began economic interactions with the 
Babylonian/South Mesopotamian city-states, thus establishing inter-civilizational 
relations between the periphery of the system at edges of modern-day Iran and the core of 
the system along the Euphrates (Podany 2010, 20-29). Diplomatic and economic relations 
also extended into the Persian Gulf region, especially to eastern Arabia and Oman. The 
south west of the system, during this period, remained excluded, as interactions between 
the sub-system hegemon Egypt and the rest of the political actors in Northern and 
Southern Mesopotamia were either nonexistent, or the historical evidence has not yet 
substantiated it. In totality, then, extensive diffusion of power throughout the entire 
system, with a large number of centers of power remaining unable to consolidate power 
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within their regional settings, contributed to the nonpolar structure of the system during 
this period by virtue of failing to establish any system-wide hegemonic actors.  
2330 BC – 2150 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The diffused power structure of the previous epoch witnessed a rapid 
consolidation, especially in Babylonia, as the Akkad dynasty, previously ruling the city-
states of Sumer and Akkad, undertook a precipitous process of political centralization, 
temporarily ending the system of city-states and establishing a large presence throughout 
much of Mesopotamia. Initial conquest of Kish and solidification of power in northern 
Babylon led to expansion into the south, where much resistance was provided by rising 
sub-system actors Uruk and Umma. Akkad’s conquest of these actors was followed by 
dominance of Adab and Lagash (Langdon 1923b, 403-421). Consequently, Akkad re-
altered the formerly independent city-states by integrating them “within a larger structure 
in every respect, politically, economically, and ideologically” (Van de Mieroop 2004, 
60). Attention was then applied to the political units in western Iran, conquering and 
exercising dominance over Simmurum, Prahshum, Susa, and Elam (Langdon 1923b, 418-
420). This was followed by expeditions into northern Syria and the upper Euphrates, 
overwhelming Tuttul, Dagan, Nagar, Urkesh, Shehna, and the most prominent political 
centers in the region, Ebla and Mari (Podany 2010, 58-59). Expansion into the Persian 
Gulf was undertaken for economic reasons, as selective raids were utilized to monopolize 
crucial trade routes, offering Akkad important commerce from such diverse regions as 
Bahrain, Oman, and the Indus valley (Podany 2010, 35-51).   
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 After approximately 180 years of unipolarity, the Near East-Middle Eastern 
System witnessed the collapse of the Akkadian empire, as the system-wide hegemon 
remained unable to curb the intense political fragmentation that soon followed. Several 
explanations are suggested for the disintegration of Akkad, and the underlying reason, it 
appears, is a clustering of all presumed factors. The irredentism of the unipole, coupled 
with incessant campaigning and consistent expansionism, slowly emboldened local actors 
to seek defensive measures against Akkadian preponderance, thus laying the groundwork 
for potential secessionism or independence. Economic decline, famine, demographic 
shifts, and environmental degradation also had a devastating effect on Akkad’s capacity 
to preserve its system-wide status: increasing aridity, supplemented by low rainfall and 
drought, skyrocketed grain prices and led to severe scarcity, thus contributing to famine 
and rapid demographic shifts. These explanatory factors played a crucial role in shaping 
the subsequent outcome that ended the unipolar epoch: the Gutians, nomadic barbarians 
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from the Zagros Mountains of Iran, poured into Mesopotamia, conquering Babylonia and 
ending Akkadian unipolarity (Langdon 1923b, 422-426). 
2150 BC – 2110 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 The decline of the system-wide hegemon presented the system without any 
coherent structures or hierarchies of power, as Akkadian preponderance had not only 
alleviated possible challengers for system-wide status, but had also formulated a political 
and economic system of dependence upon the unipole. For this reason, the collapse of 
Akkad immediately resulted in rapid diffusion of power, as no sub-system hegemons 
were initially present to assume some system-wide positioning, while rising regional 
actors seeking sub-system status lacked sufficient power and resources to fill in the 
vacuum. The singular concentration of power, from the initial nonpolar period to the 
subsequent unipolar structure, saw a return to a new nonpolar structure, since the capacity 
of actors to consolidate and engage in some concentration of power, even at the local and 
regional level, remained absent after the fall of the single system-wide hegemon. While 
economic trade and forms of commerce were sustained within the new structure of city-
states or groupings of political units, albeit in a much decreased form, political 
interactions remained somewhat unclear or inchoate. In this forty year period, then, the 
fragmentation of power, and the dispersion of previously centralized political units, 
allowed for a power constellation within the Near East-Middle Eastern System that was 
one of nonpolarity.  
2110 BC – 2010 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure 
  During the previous nonpolar period, regional actors proceeded to consolidate 
power, which brought about inter sub-system hegemonic conflict, as these rising political 
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units sought to restructure the system within a new form of power hierarchy. While the 
Gutians, after the fall of Akkad, sought to concentrate power in north Babylonia, Uruk, in 
southern Babylonia, had already positioned itself as a sub-system hegemon. The outcome 
was a bipolar conflict between rising sub-system actors for system-wide positioning, 
resulting in the victory of Uruk and the expulsion of the Gutians from much of 
Mesopotamia. The dynasty at Uruk proceeded to impose dominance over all of 
Babylonia and greater part of southern Mesopotamia, while switching its capital from 
Uruk to Ur (Langdon 1923c, 435-436), and seeking to reestablish a unipolar structure 
similar to Akkad. Ur expansion proceeded east, into western Iran, reclaiming Susa and 
taking Awan, while campaigning the Tigris River and the Zagros Mountains, and 
establishing full control over the area from Susa in the south to the Mosul plains in the 
north (438-440).  
 Ur’s preponderance of the system was quite different from Akkad, for Ur was 
geographically more restricted vis-à-vis size, yet it had more internal centralization of 
power. For this reason, while the previous unipolar structure did not allow the presence of 
any rising sub-system actors, Ur’s modality of preponderance was rather different: areas 
under direct Ur rule were highly centralized, regions to the east between Tigris and 
Zagros were militarily controlled, but the rest of the Near East was dealt with either 
diplomatically or through economic interactions. While some of these economic 
interactions presupposed military raids, much of the trade, however, involved the 
exporting of wool and textiles from Babylonia in exchange for copper and stones, and in 
this sense, “Ur’s contacts with the east and south were thus for the purpose of obtaining 
mineral resources, through trade, diplomacy, and military raids” (Van de Mieroop 2004, 
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75). By virtue of such developments, Ur unipolarity was not as dominant as Akkad’s, 
which, in turn, allowed regional actors in much of northern Mesopotamia, the Levant, 
and in the east to consolidate power as sub-system actors. Two rising sub-system 
hegemons, the Amorites from the west (primarily from northern Syria) and Elamites from 
the east, would challenge and end Ur unipolarity (Langdon 1923c, 456-460). Similar to 
what the Gutians did to Akkad, the Amorites poured into Babylonia, thus greatly 
weakening Ur’s capacity to exercise preponderance as the only system-wide hegemon. 
This was supplemented by an invasion from Elam, formerly a subject of Ur and a rising 
regional power. Elam’s conquest of Ur, and much of western Iran that was under Ur 
military dominance, ended the unipolar structure.   
2010 BC – 1980 BC Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 The transformation of the power configurations from unipolarity did not give way 
to extensive diffusion of power, since the existing sub-system hegemons filled the 
structural power hierarchy of the system by positioning at the system-wide level. The 
formation of Isin, from the remnants of Ur, as a system-wide hegemon, became 
substantiated as it immediately challenged and expelled the Elamite invaders from 
Babylonia (Thompson 1923, 470-473), thus presuming system-wide status by virtue of 
exercising sub-system hegemony. While the Elamites were expelled from Babylonia, 
Elam, itself, became a system-wide hegemon by both establishing regional dominance 
and counter-balancing other system-wide actors (Podany 2010, 67-68). In northern 
Mesopotamia, Assur established itself as one of the powerful actors in the region (Kuhrt 
1995, 81-88), only to elevate itself to system-wide hegemonic status by both exercising 
preponderance over the region and countering any system-wide challenges to its status. In 
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central Mesopotamia, east of the Tigris, Eshnunna also positioned itself as a system-wide 
hegemon, exercising extensive regional dominance (Yuhong 1994), while also acting at 
the system-wide level. While Egypt remained in the periphery, and its interactions with 
the rest of the system, similar to previous epochs, was rather lacking, its preponderance 
over the entire Nile Valley and up north into the Mediterranean is noted. During this 
thirty year period, then, the multipolar structure of the system was sustained by the 
regional actors that had managed to consolidate and exercise some power under the 
previous unipolar epoch. Consequently, their rise to system-wide status was a transitional 
byproduct of reifying the power configurations of the system. 
1980 BC – 1890 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure  
 The previous multipolar structure transitioned into a unipolar power constellation 
by virtue of three general developments. First, since the presence of several system-wide 
hegemons was a byproduct of the decline of the previous unipole, each of the hegemonic 
actors were presuming system-wide status as an extension of their existing regional 
power base. Second, once this reality set in, the transformation of the system allowed for 
the more powerful system-wide hegemon to presume unipolar status without being 
challenged by the other actors in the system. And third, since the previous system-wide 
hegemons became such through default, their demotion to sub-system hegemonic status 
was not inherently problematic, unstable, or violent as it would be expected. Simply put, 
by the end of the thirty year multipolar period, it had become evident that Isin, in fact, 
was the most powerful system-wide actor, and since all of the previous system-wide 
actors either lacked the ability or the will to challenge and counter-balance Isin, they 
accepted a return to sub-system status and thus recognized the positioning of Isin as the 
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single system-wide hegemon. Isin proceeded to establish dominance through the entire 
region of Babylonia and southern Mesopotamia, assuming control over Ur, Uruk, and 
Lagash in the south, while solidifying power to the north through Babylon, Kish, and 
Nippur (Van de Mieroop 2004, 85-88). The absence of any challenges to Isin’s unipolar 
status provided the Near Eastern-Middle Eastern System with nearly a century of peace, 
as the sub-system hegemons remained content or unwilling to engage in revisionism, 
while the system-wide hegemon sought neither irredentist policies nor an overexpansion 
of power. The power configurations of the system, then, were defined by a single system-
wide hegemon and a set of several sub-system hegemons, which included Elam, 
Eshnunna, Assur, and, by around 1930, the rising power of Larsa.    
1890 BC – 1800 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 By nineteenth century BC, the polar structuration of the system had not only 
transitioned, but had also developed into a complex hierarchy of competing powers, both 
at the system-wide and at the sub-system level. Around the 1890’s Larsa, a rising sub-
system hegemon in southern Babylonia, challenged Isin unipolarity (Thompson 1923, 
480-482), thus transitioning the system into a bipolar structure, which, in turn, gave way 
to a more diffused concentration of power throughout this world political system. Elam, 
Eshnunna, Mari, along with a rising Babylon, and a very powerful Yamkhad from 
northern Syria (southern Anatolia) (Langdon 1923c, 444-449), began engaging in sub-
system hegemonic conflict, as each actor sought to solidify regional dominance and 
expansion into the spheres of influence of other sub-system actors. Within this context, 
the inter sub-system hegemonic conflict allowed Isin and Larsa to play out their bipolar 
struggle without any of the regional actors having the capacity to rise up as an additional 
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pole in the system. Larsa managed to attain full control of the regions in the south (all the 
way to the Persian Gulf) and east (until Nippur) of Babylonia, thus containing Isin to 
primarily central Babylonia (Van de Mieroop 2004, 87), which, in turn, allowed 
peripheral states under Isin’s sphere of influence to reject the former unipole’s suzerainty. 
Larsa’s threat to the balance of power gave way to an alliance between Isin, Babylon and 
Uruk. But Larsa’s defeat of the coalition, followed by the destruction of Uruk sustained 
the former’s position as one of the reigning poles in the system.  
 The ephemeral polarization under the given system-wide hegemons allowed for 
the preservation of the bipolar system, but at the same time contributed to the internecine 
conflict between sub-system actors. Eshnunna’s rising power, for example, and its 
expansion into Mari territory, gave way to Elam, Mari, and Babylon forming an alliance, 
with Larsa’s approval, and offering Eshnunna a devastating defeat. Elam’s expansion in 
its region, which included Susa and the Zagros highlands around Anshan, along with 
Elam’s role as an important player in the macropolitics of the system, gave way to an 
alliance between Eshnunna and rising Babylon, which would soon extend pressure on 
Elam’s role as a regional powerhouse (Potts 1999, 189-207). The pole formed by Larsa 
would in turn seek expansion into Elamite territories, which, consequently, led Elam to 
join the pole led by Isin, which included Uruk and other local Babylonian actors. By the 
end of the century, the growing strength of Larsa had reduced Isin’s capacity as a system-
wide actor, hence the latter’s consistent need to rely on its sub-system allies. 
Concomitantly, the inter sub-system hegemonic conflict reduced the number of powerful 
sub-system hegemons in the system, as the cases of Eshnunna and Elam demonstrate. 
Within this developing structure, the bipolar system transitioned into a tripolar system, as 
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Larsa maintained its system-wide status, but was soon challenged by Hammurabi’s 
Babylon, and a new actor in the north of Babylonia, known as the Kingdom of Upper 
Mesopotamia.  
1800 BC – 1760 BC Transition from Bipolar to Tripolar Structure  
 Of the three poles within the system, Larsa remained the weakest and in decline, 
with the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia being perhaps the most powerful, while 
Babylon sustained a middle ground, assuaging the balance of power. What became the 
Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia initially began with the city-state of Assur, only to 
expand into northern Syria, the Habur valley, followed by a conquest of the powerful 
sub-system hegemon Mari. By the 1800’s, the entire region north of Babylonia, from the 
Tigris in the east to Balikh in the west, came to form the Kingdom of Upper 
Mesopotamia (Van de Mieroop 2004, 101). Babylon found itself bordered by the 
relatively more powerful Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia to the north, and Larsa to the 
south, while still having to balance the alliance formations and inter-regional conflict 
between many of the sub-system hegemons (especially Eshnunna and Elam). Babylon’s 
position as system-wide hegemon was rather unique: it selectively and strategically 
“bandwagoned” or “shirked” with the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia, but at the same 
time remained a power player in the sub-system hegemonic conflicts, while continuously 
positioning itself as a counter-balance and a potential challenge to its neighbor to the 
north. In this sense, as Larsa continued to methodically decline, while the Kingdom of 
Upper Mesopotamia sought overexpansion, Babylon chose to engage in resource 
maximization and bid for time (103-104). Consequently, the slightest weakening in the 
structural positions of either of the poles immediately gave way to Babylonian 
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revisionism, hence transitioning the system, in merely 5 years, from a tripolar structure to 
a unipolar one.  
1760 BC – 1710 BC Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure 
 By the 1770’s, the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia’s overexpansion brought it 
into severe conflict with regional actors, especially the sub-system hegemons Yamkhad 
and Enshnunna (Kupper 1973, 14-18). The result was a devastating defeated levelled 
upon the former, which gave way to its disintegration as a political unit, and the 
reification of local powers and collection of small independent states. The ability of 
Yamkhad or Enshunna to fill this vacuum and assume system-wide status was 
immediately curtailed by the speed with which Babylon assumed unipolar 
preponderance.  
Babylon immediately assumed dominance over southern Mesopotamia by 
defeating Larsa, along with all given actors that were under Larsa’s sphere of influence 
(Ur, Uruk, Lagash, Eridu) and thus absorbing the entire southern region (Kupper 1973, 
24-27). Upon removing the remaining system-wide hegemon, Babylon proceeded to 
subjugate Elam to the East, Eshnunna in central Mesopatamia, and Mari to the north-
west. This was followed by a protracted conflict in the north against a rising Assyria, 
which gave Babylonian ascendancy by virtue of Assyria’s acceptance of tributary status 
(Thompson 1923, 487-493). Thus, from the Persian Gulf in the south, to the Zagros 
Mountains to the east, the Middle Euphrates and Nippur in the center, Mari in upper west 
Mesopotamia, and Assur in the north, Babylon exercised unchallenged preponderance.  
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 The structure of this unipolar hierarchy, then, included Babylon as the single 
system-wide hegemon, with a weakened Elam as a sub-system hegemon subject to the 
unipole, Yamkhad as a powerful sub-system hegemon in the north that remained outside 
the reach of Babylon (Kupper 1973, 35-34), and Egypt in the periphery that, while not 
being incorporated in the Near East-Middle Eastern System yet, had limited interactions 
with other actors in the region through selective trade and commerce. Concomitantly, no 
actor in the system presented the capacity or the ability to either challenge or counter-
balance Babylon, for its preponderance and extraordinary concentration of power over 
the system had either thoroughly weakened potential regional actors, or, as in the case of 
Yamkhad, had necessitated the latter, by virtue of severe power disparity, to avoid 
confrontation and seek preservation through geographic distance. Due to the level of 
power concentration within this specific unipolar structure, the system underwent severe 
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power diffusion after the disintegration of Babylon. Series of rebellions in the south gave 
way to Babylon’s loss of control of southern Mesopotamia, which, in turn, thoroughly 
ended its sphere of influence in the east (Elamite territories), the north west (Euphrates 
and Syria), and upper Mesopotamia. Reduced to northern Babylonia, it sustained itself 
only as a regional actor, thus losing its system-wide status and ending the unipolar period.  
1710 BC – 1550 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 The decline of Babylon as the only system-wide hegemon introduced great deal of 
inchoateness in the Near East-Middle Eastern System, for the power configurations of the 
system had been structured to accommodate a unipolar system with a set of sub-system 
actors sustaining regional coherence. Three general developments explain the transition 
from the previous unipolar period to a nonpolar structure. First, the diffusion of power 
did not give way to regional disintegration, and as such, sub-system actors still exercised 
a great deal of power. At the same time, since they had been constrained and limited to 
primarily function at the regional level, no subsystem actor had the relative capabilities or 
the revisionist aspirations to attain system-wide status. Two, since power diffusion was 
intense at the system-wide level, it remained rather concentrated at the regional level, 
which allowed for a large number of centers of power to be established throughout the 
system, hence reifying the nonpolar structure. Third, the introduction of the Indo-
European people, primarily in the form of the Hurrians and the Hittites, as political units 
that had established regional relevance in western Asia Minor/Anatolia (both terms are 
used interchangeably, but due to the use of Anatolia by historic sources, this is the term 
that will be used in this work), further contributed to the dispersion of power at the 
system-wide level, yet consolidation of power at the regional level (Kupper 1973, 36-41). 
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The outcome, then, was intermittent inter-regional conflict, with existing sub-system 
hegemons primarily seeking to preserve their regional status, while the new Indo-
European actors consistently infringed unto their neighbors in the south, primarily in the 
Levant and Upper and Lower Mesopotamia, only to retreat back to their original 
territories. The absence of any single actor, at the system-wide level, is the primary 
explanatory variable that designates the power structure of this period as nonpolar. 
 The Hittite expansion from central Anatolia into the Levant brought it into 
conflict with Yamkhad, with this inter sub-system hegemonic conflict leading to the 
weakening of the latter, but not resulting in its destruction, since the former failed to 
occupy Aleppo or other centers of Yamkhad power (Gurney 1973, 240-245). The result, 
however, was diffusion of power within this specific region, as the weakening of 
Yamkhad gave way to the rise of local actors seeking regional recognition. Similarly, the 
Hittite conquest of Babylon was not followed by consolidation of power, which, in turn, 
resulted in more political confusion and disintegration within the region.  
The political disintegration in the Levant and Mesopotamia, and the absence of 
any powers filling the void in the structural hierarchy, further contributed to the 
nonpolarity of the Near East-Middle Eastern System. Concomitantly, internal 
complications within the Hittites (Old Hittite Kingdom) thoroughly limited its 
consolidation of power beyond its Anatolian base. During these developments, southern 
Levant, or the Syro-Palestinian region, saw the development of robust city-states, which, 
while interacting with the rest of the system, also opened up important interactions with 
Egypt in the periphery (Kenyon 1973, 77-85). In this sense, Egypt was slowly becoming 
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absorbed as an important actor in the system, as opposed to remaining limited to its sub-
system functions in the periphery.  
In totality, then, during this approximate 160 years of nonpolarity, the Near East-
Middle Eastern System had no system-wide actors, but rather a high number of centers of 
power: a rising Assyria and powerful Mitanni (Hurrian kingdom) in upper Mesopotamia; 
declining and then resurgent Babylon, under the Kassites, in lower Mesopotamia; 
Sealand dynasty in Sumaria; Yamkhad and Qatna in north Syria (upper Levant); Elam in 
the east (Hinz 1973b, 267-271); the Old Hittite Kingdom in Anatolia; rising Kizzuwatna 
in southern Anatolian; Hatti (a new Hittite kingdom) in central Anatolia; Egypt in the 
south-western periphery of the system in the Nile Valley of north Africa; and several 
mid-sized regional powers in the form of city-states primarily in Syro-Palestine (Arzawa 
in the western periphery of Anatolia, Alashiya in Cyprus, Amurru in northwest Syria, 
Byblos in central Levant, Kadesh in northern Levant, and Damascus) (Liverani 2000, 6-
9).        
1550 BC – 1450 BC Transformation from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure 
 By mid-16
th
 century BC, the Near East-Middle Eastern System had reached its 
fullest integration, with the previous nonpolar period giving way to the development of 
what became known as the Great Power’s Club. A general term used by historians, this is 
primarily a reference to the establishment of powerful system-wide hegemons that 
managed to consolidate power during the nonpolar epoch and transition the system into a 
multipolar structure that was fundamentally defined by a balance of power. Mitanni, 
centered in north Syria, between Euphrates and the Tigris, would expand its power to the 
south coast of Anatolia and further reach the borders of Babylonia (Grimal 1992, 213; 
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Hallo and Simpson, 1998, 107-109; Van de Mieroop 2004, 141-144). The Hittite state of 
Hatti dominated all of central Anatolia, parts of southern Anatolia, and extended west to 
the bordering states on the coast of the Aegean (Bryce 1998, 110-112). Hatti’s eventual 
expansion will methodically encroach east and south upon Kizzuwatna’s and Mitanni’s 
territory (Hogarth 1924, 262-264), but initially, Hatti was consumed with deterring sub-
system hegemons in northern Anatolia and western Asia Minor, while also dealing with 
internal problems (Gurney 1973b, 677-680). Kizzuwatna was perhaps the weakest of the 
five system-wide hegemons, based out of southern Anatolia, circling the Taurus 
Mountains, and primarily covering the region that would become Cilicia (Van de 
Mieroop 2004, 146-148).  
Serving as a power player in the balancing act between the relatively more 
powerful Mitanni, Hatti, and Egypt, Kizzuwatna maintained its system-wide status by 
initially allying with Mitanni, then shifting allegiances to Hatti, while at the same time 
preserving its position within the system. Babylon had slowly re-emerged from its initial 
decay under the new leadership of the Kassites (Drower 1973, 437-439), managing to 
absorb the southern kingdom of Sealand, and re-establish Babylonian regional dominance 
over southern Mesopotamia, while also having ambitious claims over Assyria in the north 
(Van de Mieroop 2004, 164). The least revisionist of the reigning poles in the system, 
Babylon primarily sought to preserve the status quo through diplomacy and trade. 
Egypt’s expansion from the Nile Valley into Nubia in the south (Bryan 2000, 223-234), 
and into Syro-Palestine to the north (Hornung 1999, 80), introduced Egypt as one of the 
more active and irredentist system-wide hegemons during this period. 
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 Since southern and central Mesopotamia remained stable under Babylon’s non-
revisionist policies, while Hatti initially dealt with internal problems and then solidified 
its dominance over the large geographical region of Anatolia (Bryce 1998, 120-123), 
much of the inter-hegemonic conflict took place in Syro-Palestine between Egypt and 
Mitanni, with Kizzuwatna initially succeeding as a powerbroker, but eventually being 
absorbed by Mitanni (Drower 1973, 457-464). Egypt’s expansion into Palestine 
immediately brought it into conflict with Mitanni, as Egypt overwhelmed Mitanni vassals 
in the region, reaching the important states of Ugarit and Kadesh (Van de Mieroop 2004, 
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154). Mittani, in the meanwhile, taking advantage of Hatti’s temporary indifference to 
system-wide developments due to its internal complications, had pushed westward, 
exercising preponderance over the strategic city-states of Aleppo and Alalakh, while 
subjugating Kizzuwatna and reducing it to a sub-system actor around the 1470’s (Bryce 
1998, 125-130). Around 1457 Mitanni orchestrated a coalition of north Syrian states, 
prominently including Kadesh, in a direct challenge against Egypt, only to be defeated by 
the latter and thus having to retreat from southern Syro-Palestine (Hornung 1999, 87-9; 
Sicker 200, 30-32). Ten years later Egypt’s expedition reached the Euphrates, and 
crossing the river, Egypt dealt a severe defeat upon Mitanni, proceeding to conquer 
Kadesh and establish control over much of Syro-Palestine (Grimal 1992, 215-216; Bryan 
2000, 244-251).  
 The power configurations of the system, then, during this period, was defined by 
five system-wide hegemons, with two of the more active actors (Egypt and Mitanni) 
confronting each other for dominance over Syro-Palestine, a third actor (Kizzuwatna) 
attempting to preserve its system-wide status in relation to the relatively more powerful 
actors, and Hatti and Babylon maintaining regional hegemony while also holding system-
wide status by virtue of diplomacy and equal recognition from the other system-wide 
hegemons in the system. Concomitantly, the initial 5 poles (being reduced to 4 at end of 
the period) were supplemented by a set of sub-system hegemons: Arzawa and Ahhiyawa 
in western Anatolia; Amurru and Kadesh in north Syria; a rising Assyria in north 
Mesopotamia; and a nascent Elam in the east. 
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1450 BC – 1345 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 Egypt’s defeat of Mitanni transitioned the multipolar structure into a unipolar one, 
for Egypt’s dominance of the system, during this period, remained neither matched nor 
counter-balanced by any other actor. By incorporating the entire coastal strip of Syro-
Palestine, Egypt’s preponderance of the system spread from the southern peripheries of 
Nubia and up north into Sinai, Canaan, Amurru, Upe, Carchemish, and the coastal areas 
of all of northern Syria and parts of southern Anatolia. Unable to match or challenge 
Egyptian unipolarity, previous system-wide hegemons accepted positioning at the sub-
system level, as the Hittites, Babylonians, and the rising Assyrian’s sent tribute in 
recognition of Egypt’s unchallenged dominance of the system (Grimal 1992, 215-216; 
Bryan 2000, 245-248).  
Egypt’s dominance of the entire Levant also made Egypt the economic might of 
the Near East-Middle Eastern System, as its control over seaports and trade routes, 
coupled with extensive collection of tributes from its vassals in Syro-Palestine, not to 
mention access to vast amounts of gold from Nubia, allowed for Egypt’s reification of its 
unipolar status. The power hierarchy during Egypt’s unipolarity, in this sense, did not 
undergo serious concentration of power, since many of the sub-system hegemons 
remained relatively powerful in their own rights within their own regions. The unipolar 
structure, then, was fundamentally a byproduct of these powerful sub-system hegemons 
not being powerful enough to either challenge or counter-balance Egypt, thus either 
bandwagoning (Babylon) or shirking (Hatti). 
 A temporary resurgence by Mitanni, after an uprising by Kadesh against Egypt, 
proved to be fruitless (Hall 1960, 345-353). This was followed by Mitanni turning its 
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attention east, undertaking an inter sub-hegemonic conflict with Assyria, defeating the 
latter, and inciting rebellion against Egypt through Carchemish and other vassals in Syro-
Palestine (Grimal 1992, 216-219). Egypt’s excessive economic might, robust diplomacy, 
and well-placed garrisons throughout Syro-Palestine proved Mitanni incapable of 
seriously challenging Egyptian unipolarity (Cook 1924, 299-301). This was more 
thoroughly confirmed by Mitanni’s acceptance of an alliance with Egypt (Van de 
Mieroop 2004, 147), thus assuming sub-system positioning, through which Egypt 
allowed parts of northern Syria to Mitanni, while maintaining control over strategic cities 
and ports (Bryce 1998, 155-159; Grimal 1992, 219). Mitanni’s reversal from being a 
revisionist state to one that supported the status quo may also be attributed to the threat it 
received from Hatti, since the latter demonstrated possible system-wide aspirations, and a 
potential challenge to Egyptian unipolarity, by overwhelming Anatolian sub-system 
hegemons Arzawa and Assuwa, while also heading south and dominating Kizzuwatna, 
Aleppo, and posing a direct threat to Mitanni (Bryan 2000, 250-255; Bryce 1998, 135-
148).  
The possible transition of the system, in the 1390’s, from unipolarity to Hatti-
Egypt bipolarity was hindered by the former’s inability to thoroughly consolidate power 
in Anatolia, as attacks from a revived Arzawa and the nomadic Kaska from the north 
forced Hatti to stop its system-wide ambitions and return to regional consolidation. By 
the 1350’s, Egyptian unipolarity was supplemented by the presence of several, albeit 
bandwagoning, powerful sub-system hegemons: Mitanni (tributary); Babylon (tributary); 
Assyria (had broken off from Mitanni suzerainty and become a tributary to Egypt); Elam 
(non-aligned in eastern periphery); and a resurgent Hatti (revisionist).   
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Map 5.4   
 
1345 BC – 1290 BC Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 Hatti’s direct challenge to Egyptian unipolarity structurally altered the Near East-
Middle Eastern System, as powerful sub-system hegemons, capitalizing on the relative 
weakening of Egypt, sought positioning at the system-wide level, and curtailed tributary 
or bandwagoning behavior. Hatti’s invasion of Mitanni, Egypt’s close ally and tributary 
in the region, was followed by absorption of Kizzuwatna, conquest of Aleppo and 
Kadesh, and the establishment of vassal relations with Ugarit, Byblos, and Amurru 
(Bryce 1998, 170-190; Van de Mieroop 2004, 147-148). Hatti’s complete dominance of 
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northern Syria was solidified as Carchemish and Amki were removed from the Egyptian 
camp and placed under the former’s suzerainty. This was followed by the destruction of 
sub-system hegemon Arzawa in western Anatolia, and subsequent Hatti hegemony over 
the regions of Anatolia and northern Levant (Hogarth 1924, 263-265). The demotion of 
Mitanni to Hatti vassal introduced a new system-wide actor into the system: Assyria. A 
once Mitanni vassal, and sub-system hegemon, Assyria positioned itself at the system-
wide level, demanding recognition from Hatti (even temporarily encroaching on its 
sphere of influence) and Egypt, and challenging Babylon for dominance of upper 
Mesopotamia (Campbell 1924, 234-237; Gadd 1975, 28-30). Babylon, in turn, assumed 
system-wide status by forming an alliance with Hatti, while balancing its relationship 
with Egypt (not as a tributary, but as equals), only to proceed to a protracted war with 
Assyria to the north (Gadd 1975, 28-33).  
In the meantime, Elam attained system-wide status by establishing equal relations 
with all the other system-wide hegemons, relying more on its economic and diplomatic 
successes rather than on military expansionism (Potts 1999, 209-230; Hinz 1973, 112-
119). Within these developments, Egypt’s inability to placate Hatti ambitions gave way 
to structural consequences in which powerful sub-system tributaries transitioned from 
status quo preservation to revisionist behavior, as Babylon, Elam, and Assyria assumed 
system-wide hegemonic status, joining Hatti and Egypt in a five pole multipolar 
structure.  
1290 BC – 1210 BC Transition from Multipolar to Tripolar Structure 
 Two major developments during this period transformed the previous multipolar 
structure into a tripolar power configuration: Assyria’s defeat of Babylon and Elam’s 
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unexplained retreat (Wiseman 1975, 340-346; Labat 1975, 379-384) from the system-
wide level (Munn-Rankin 1975, 288-290). Assyria undertook an intense expansionist 
policy during this period, thoroughly defeating Babylon, thus reducing it to sub-system 
status, and extending its presence into the northern hills of the Zagros Mountains. Much 
of former Mitanni territory east of the Euphrates was also annexed by Assyria, along with 
expansion into northern Syria at the expense of Hatti (Van de Mieroop 2004, 171), only 
to be followed by Assyrian expansion all the way to the Uruarti-Nairi regions in the 
Armenian Plateau, thus covering much of middle and upper Mesopotamia, northeastern 
and east Anatolia, and northern Syria (Munn-Rankin 1975, 280-292).  
Egypt attempted to reclaim its lost sphere of influence in north Syria by 
challenging Hatti’s gains during the previous epoch, retrieving Tyre, Byblos, Amurru, 
and Ugarit back to its sphere of influence (Bryce 1998, 255-263). The result was a 
massive reaction by Hatti in the famous Battle of Kadesh, as close victory against Egypt 
symbolically left much of Syria under Hatti sphere of influence, while much of Palestine 
managed to establish independence from Egypt (Grimal 1992, 251-256). The recognition 
of Hatti’s pyrrhic victory, coupled with the exhaustion of both sides, gave way to what 
would become a long-lasting peace treaty between the two system-wide hegemons in 
1259, as both sides recognized each other’s spheres of influence, sought to preserve the 
status quo, and agreed to mutual assistance in cases of war or internal rebellion (Hornung 
1999, 110-112; Bryce 1998, 308-312). By the end of the century, the tripolar structure of 
a much weakened Egypt, a disintegrating Hatti, and an internally decaying Assyria, was 
supplemented by much weaker sub-system hegemons in the forms of Babylon and Elam, 
along with rising number of independent small actors in much of Syro-Palestine. 
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1210 BC – 1120 BC Transition from Tripolar to Nonplar Structure  
 During this period, the “entire system collapsed” (Van de Mieroop 2004, 158), 
with two general factors explaining these developments: the inflow of the Sea Peoples 
and the internal decay of previous system-wide actors. The initial collapse begins with 
Hatti, as it disintegrating into an inchoate constellation of various actors dispersed across 
much of Anatolia. The causes of the upheavals throughout most of Anatolia remain 
unclear, but three general explanations prevail: famine, political disintegration, and the 
migration of the non-sedentary Sea Peoples from the west (primarily from the areas of the 
Balkans and north east Asia Minor) giving way to much fragmentation and destructive 
violence (Barnett 1975, 363-366). Concomitantly, the collapse of the Hittite empire 
reduced a very large portion of the Near East-Middle Eastern System into an 
indeterminate sub-structure of highly diffused power configurations.  
The consequence of such developments upon the rest of the system was profound: 
the power structure over Syria collapsed, leading to the formation of several independent 
city-states, many of which, in turn, would also be destroyed by the inflow of the Sea 
Peoples (Barnett 1975, 366-370). In Assyria, internal revolt greatly weakened and 
reduced the former system-wide hegemon to a mere regional actor, leading to its defeat, 
and further contraction, at the hands of a similarly weak Babylon (Wiseman 1975, 444-
451). Similarly, Babylon remained a minor regional actor, with its own internal problems, 
along with much conflict with neighbors Assyria and Elam, the latter which, itself, had 
been reduced to sub-system status (although the historical evidence remains unclear as to 
why) (Hornung 1999, 120-126). Egypt also faced extensive internal turmoil, ranging 
from issues of succession to rebellion, the case of the latter being prevalent in Palestine. 
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Rising independent actors Israel, Ashkelon, and Gezer, for example, challenged Egyptian 
hegemony over the region, as did the new Philistines (Hornung 1999, 118-119), while 
raiding parties out of Libya greatly weakened Egypt’s initial capacity for system-wide 
positioning, only to be supplemented by the incursion of the Sea Peoples on the borders 
of Egypt (Grimal 1992, 268-271).  
 Gauged from the macropolitical level, the power constellations of the system 
during this period may be summed up as followed. First, internal turmoil and regional 
disintegration forced the previous system-wide hegemons to divert inwardly, thus 
shirking away from system-wide positioning. Second, the inflow of the Sea Peoples from 
the west exasperated these complications by reifying the already unstable and weak 
predisposition of the power actors on the Mediterranean coast, while at the same time 
leading to the destruction of such important centers of power as Alasiya, Arzawa, Hatti, 
Cyprus, Ugarit, Tyre, and Amurru (Bryce 1992, 377-381). Third, the consequence of 
these events transitioned the system into a highly diffused power constellation: Anatolia 
and northern Syria remained thoroughly disintegrated, as new centers of power were 
formed by neo-Hittite, Syro-Hittite (Albright 1975, 526-529), and Kaska peoples: 
Melitene, Gurgum, Hamath, Commagene, Tabal, and Carchemish (Bryce 1998, 382-
388); Palestine possessed multitude of disintegrated regional actors and settling Sea 
Peoples, who, led by the Philistines, established five centers of power: Ashkelon, 
Ashdod, Edron, Gath, and Gaza (Cook 1924b, 376-380; Barnett 1975, 371-377); southern 
Syria displayed similarity with Palestine, as the new-settling Phoenicians established 
such centers of power as Tyre-Sidon, Arvad, and Byblos-Berytus (Albright 1975, 511-
526); much of Mesopotamia, cut off from the Mediterranean coast, displayed weakened 
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regional actors barely sustaining territorial integrity, as Assyria, Babylon, and Elam 
engaged in internecine warfare (Van de Mieroop 2004, 183-185; Wiseman 1975, 454-
457); and a struggling Egypt seeking to both sustain its internal structure due to problems 
of succession, as well has dealing with the incursion of the Libyans and the Sea Peoples. 
With no coherent structure of hierarchy in the system, and lacking any system-wide 
actors to gauge relative power or system-wide positioning, the Near East-Middle Eastern 
System, during this period of the invasion of the Sea Peoples, underwent extensive 
diffusion of power, both at the sub-system and system-wide level, thus designating the 
polar structure of this period as one of nonpolarity.      
1120 BC – 1050 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The ascendancy of Assyria to system-wide hegemonic status transitioned the 
nonpolar structure of the previous epoch to a unipolar power constellation. Two major 
events offer explanatory strength to this development. First, the inter-regional conflict 
between Babylon and Elam led to the disintegration of both actors, which was, in turn, 
coupled by the presence of the Arameans (from north Syria, possibly of the Sea Peoples) 
moving into Babylonia (Albright 1975, 31-33). Thus, the collapse of Kassite Babylon, 
due to Assyrian, but especially Elam pressure, resulted in temporary revival of local 
Babylonian leaders, who, in turn, sacked and destroyed Elam itself as a regional power 
(Wiseman 1975, 443-446). In this context, mutual destruction between the two regional 
actors opened up much of lower Mesopotamia and western Iran to Assyria (Van de 
Mieroop 2004, 176-177). Second, the remaining power structuration of the system, 
specifically at the sub-system levels, remained largely unchanged from the previous 
nonpolar period. Syro-Palestine, with its multitude of independent city-states, functioned 
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specifically at the sub-system level, primarily engaging in trade and commerce. The 
situation remained similar in Anatolia as well, with its multitude of independent centers 
of power politically operating primarily at the regional level, with no single actor, or set 
of actors, seeking regional consolidation or positioning at the system-wide level. The 
developments in Egypt indicated its continued decline, as internal instability, raids by 
external tribes, and loss of its sphere of influence in Palestine (even in the Sinai) reduced 
Egypt to the level of a weak sub-system actor (Grimal 1992, 288-312), soon to be 
followed by the splitting of Egypt into Lower and Upper. In totality, then, during the 
previous nonpolar period, the extensive diffusion of power continued to sustain itself, 
regionally, unto the subsequent unipolar period, as evident within Syro-Palestine and 
Anatolia, and complemented by a chronically weak Egypt, thus leaving the system ripe 
for a unipolar dominance by Assyria.  
 Soon after 1120 BC, Assyria revived its irredentist aspirations, undertaking 
unprecedented conquest of the entire central and eastern portion of the Near East-Middle 
Eastern System, beginning up north from the Nairi-Urartu Tigris regions around Lake 
Van to Babylon and Elam in the south east, and all the way to the Mediterranean coast in 
the west, battling such newcomers as the Arameans and the Mushku/I (Barnett 1975b, 
420-426). Concurrently, expansion into Lebanon led the acceptance of Arvad, Byblos, 
and Sidon as vassals (Hornung 1999, 122-127). The extensive trade and commercial 
wealth of the Phoenician states remained important sources of income for Assyria’s 
tributary relations with the coastal city-states. This was juxtaposed by Assyria’s policy of 
plunder and massacre up north, primarily against the Nairi-Urartu cities. Expansion into 
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southern Mesopotamia was also one of pillage and destruction, forcing Babylon to accept 
Assyrian suzerainty, especially in the face of continued Aramean incursions.  
Structurally, then, the power configuration of the system during this period is 
defined by a single system-wide hegemon, with the bottom of the power hierarchy made 
up of important regional actors and rising sub-system hegemons functioning within a 
relatively diffused power structure: Upper Egypt, Lower Egypt, Babylon (under local 
dynasties), Philistine Confederation in Palestine, Carchemish Confederation in north 
Syria, Tyre-Sidon in central Levant, the Nairi Confederation around Lake Van, and 
powerful political units in the Cappadocia region of Anatolia (Mushku/i, Hurrians, 
Kaska, Luwians, etc.).     
1050 BC – 940 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 Around 1055 BC Assyria experienced a civil war that reduced its system-wide 
behavior to the sub-system level, fragmenting the extensive gains it had made during the 
previous epoch, and thus re-altering the Near East-Middle Eastern System into a nonpolar 
structure (Wiseman 1975, pp. 466-469). The Assyrian empire was reduced to its 
heartland, having lost control of most of northern Syria and large parts of Mesopotamia 
(Van de Mieroop 2004, 172). Consequently, the power configurations of the system 
assumed the diffused power structure as having been present prior to Assyrian unipolar 
ascendency. Namely, most of the sub-system actors and aspiring regional hegemons had 
not fully consolidated power, and as such, there remained no system-wide actor(s) after 
Assyria’s decay, but rather a continuation of multitude of centers of power for almost 
every region in the system. Much of Anatolia maintained a diffused power structure with 
the Neo-Hittite city-states in eastern and southern Anatolia, along with the quasi-nomadic 
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Mushku/i, Kaska, and Arameans operating in western and central Anatolia, with the 
Arameans pouring into upper Mesopotamia, and central Anatolia witnessing the presence 
of the Phrygians (Katzenstein 1973, 74-77).  
Northern Syria continued with its set of commerce-rich city states, primarily in 
the form of Tyre-Sidon, Damascus, and the Carchemish confederation, soon to be 
dominated by the Arameans (Aubet 2001, 29-35). Palestine witnessed the regional 
struggle between Philistine and Israel for sub-system hegemony (Ehrlich 1996, 23-25), 
while further south and west of the Sinai, Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt competed for 
regional dominance. Assyria sustained itself as the sub-system hegemon in upper 
Mesopotamia, while having to deal with the Nairi-Urartu confederation up north; and this 
was complemented by Babylon’s positioning as sub-system hegemon in lower 
Mesopotamia, only having to deal with the presence of the invading Arameans and 
internal instability (Wiseman 1975, 470-473). 
 The system during this nonpolar period had approximately nine centers of power 
(Assyria, Babylonia, Upper Egypt, Lower Egypt, Israel, Philistine, Tyre-Sidon, Neo-
Hittite city-states, inchoate Anatolia, and the presence of powerful peoples such as the 
Kaska, Mushku/i, Phrygians, and the Arameans, who would soon dominate much of 
northern Syria) with no single actor(s) possessing enough relative power to assume 
system-wide status. The diffusion of power, then, while not extensive, was nonetheless 
dispersed through the various regions, with sets of regional actors continuing the process 
of consolidation. On first consideration, some might suggest that the system during this 
period be classified as multipolar, since several observable centers of power are present. 
This assumption is refuted for three reasons. First, categorically, the system continuously 
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and consistently exceeds the 7-actor threshold in the set criteria of polar designation, thus 
qualifying the structure of the system as nonpolar. Second, the observable centers of 
power remained functional primarily at the regional level, and as such, none of the 
regional power actor(s) functioned at the system-wide level. And third, balancing and 
counter-balancing, and any possible treatment of relative power capabilities, was 
fundamentally limited to the sub-system level, making considerations of multipolarity 
incoherent at the structural, system-wide level. By 950 BC, however, a united Egypt, a 
powerful Tyre-Sidon, and a resurgent Assyria would restructure the Near East-Middle 
Eastern System. 
940 BC – 880 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Tripolar Structure   
  The unification of Upper and Lower Egypt by 940 BC allowed Egypt to 
reposition itself as a system-wide hegemon, extending its sphere of influence to Palestine, 
thus exercising suzerainty over the south-western section of the system (Myśliwiec 2000, 
23-45). Tyre-Sidon became the most powerful political actor in the Levant, primarily due 
to its powerful navy and excessive wealth by virtue of its ever-present dominance of the 
sea routes in the Red Sea and the Phoenician coast of the Mediterranean (Katzenstein 
1973, 116-128). Assyria also reasserted itself as a system-wide hegemon, re-establishing 
dominance of Mesopotamia, reducing Babylon to the level of sub-system actor, while 
also turning up north to check the growing power of Urartu (Grayson 1982, 246-251; 
Brinkman 1982, 301-303). This was further supplemented by a westward expansion, 
primarily fighting the Arameans (Aram-Damascus) for control of northern Syria. Much 
of Anatolia remained similar to the previous epoch, as rising regional actors, especially 
Phrygia, slowly attempted to consolidate power, while Neo-Hittite centers of power such 
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as Carchemish and Malatiya worked hard to resist Aramean, Assyrian, and Urartu 
pressure (Van de Mieroop 2004, 206-207). This tripolar power configuration, then, was 
defined by the presence of Assyria, Tyre-Sidon, and Egypt as system-wide hegemons, 
with Israel, Babylon, Aram-Damascus, Charchemish, Malatiya, and Urartu as sub-system 
hegemons.     
880 BC – 830 BC Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure 
 By 880 BC Assyria once again unleashed its expansionist policies, undertaking an 
impressive dominance of the Near East-Middle Eastern System, and transforming its 
structure from tripolarity to unipolarity. An initial incursion south reified Assyria’s 
dominance of lower Mesopotamia, followed by tribute collection and economic-military 
control of Babylon. An excursion north targeted sub-system hegemon Urartu, subjugating 
the later into its sphere of influence, and demanding tribute (Smith 1925, 32-34). This 
was soon followed by an expedition west, conquering much of Lebanon and north Syria, 
including Carchemish, Tyre-Sidon, Byblos, Arvad, and Bit Adini (Grayson 1982, 254-
267). In 853, at the battle of Qarqar, Egypt, Ammom, Byblos, Cilicia, Israel, and Aram-
Damascus fought as a coalition against Assyria, temporarily halting the latter’s expansion 
into southern Syro-Palestine (Smith 1925b, 21-23). The coalition, however, soon 
dissolved, and Assyria devastated Aram-Damascus, Israel, Tyre-Sidon, Cilicia, and 
Byblos, only to follow up by demanding tributes and reducing much of the Mediterranean 
coast (with the exception of Damascus and Phoenicia) to vassalage (Grimal 1992, 324-
328). In sum, Assyria expanded its preponderance of the system from its northern border 
with the Urartu Kingdom around the south of Lake Van to all of upper Mesopotamia; 
down south to Babylonia; north-west all the way to Cilicia, southern Anatolia, and 
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northern Syria; and westward to large chunks of the Mediterranean coast (Van de 
Mieroop 2004, 226).  
 Assyria’s unmatched dominance of the system transformed the previous tripolar 
power constellations into a unipolar structure, with a single system-wide hegemon, set of 
relatively powerful sub-system hegemons in the form of Urartu, Egypt, and Damascus, 
and multitude of weaker sub-system actors such as Babylon, Sealand, Israel, Cilicia, 
Carchemish, and Tyre-Sidon. Various other political units were reduced to vassalages. 
Assyria’s economic reliance on tributary states necessitated excessive military 
concentration to extract and punish actors who at times obstructed the flow of goods into 
Assyria (such as cloth and dye from Phoenicia, or horses from the Zagros Mountains, 
etc.), while its awareness of possible revisionist sub-system hegemons led Assyria to 
constantly attack and limit such actors within its regional scope, hence making certain 
that its unipolar status would remain unchallenged.     
830 BC – 745 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
  Precipitous expansion does not merely give way to overextension, but also to an 
inability to organize and institutionalize such gains in a timely fashion. As such, in the 
face of internal discord, ephemeral and precipitous overextension immediately results in 
precipitous disintegration. Assyria’s nearly 50 years of unipolarity came to end in such a 
fashion, as a dynastic civil war produced three general outcomes: vassal states stopped 
paying tributes, local autonomy became reified after the decay of centralized power, and, 
Assyria went from being the system-wide hegemon to one of many sub-system actors. 
The diffusion of power during this nonpolar period remains somewhat unique: between 
129 
 
the previous unipole and the set of weaker sub-system vassals, the system also possessed 
a set up powerful regional sub-system hegemons.  
Assyria’s decline, however, did not lead to one of the revisionist sub-system 
hegemons assuming system-wide status. Rather, the result was the opposite: Egypt 
underwent internal conflict, once again splitting into various political units; Damascus 
remained one of many active players in northern Syria, but lacking the ability to be a 
regional powerhouse; and Urartu, while perhaps the most powerful of the sub-system 
hegemons after the fall of Assyria, failed to expand past its regional boundaries. For these 
reasons, the possibility of system-wide power concentration sustaining itself within a 
specific hierarchy was negated through the extensive diffusion of power throughout the 
entire system. The result was a highly complex development of a very high number of 
political actors and centers of power, only to be accompanied by the presence of new 
actors in the east.  
 In the north of the system, Urartu maintained sub-system hegemonic status, only 
to have Assyria to its south maintaining, albeit weakly, regional control of upper 
Mesopotamia (Sayce 1925,173-177). Southern Mesopotamia was further diffused by 
retaining three centers of power: Babylon, the Chaldeans, and Sealand. At the eastern 
periphery of the system, a resurgent Elam rose at the southern tip of the Zagros 
Mountains, while to the west of the mountains the presence of the Persians was observed, 
only to be accompanied by the growing power of the Medes in north-central Zagros. 
North Syria remained as complicated as before, with the fusion of the previous Neo-
Hittite city-states being absorbed by the new Aramean city-states, ranging from Aram-
Damascus to Bit-Adini to Arpad (Hogarth 1925, 158-164). Anatolia continued its 
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inchoate power structure, with Cilicia initially falling to Assyria and then to Urartu 
(Smith 1925, 53-55), while central and western Anatolia remained in the process of 
power consolidation by Phrygia and soon Lydia.  
The power structure of the Levant and Palestine were distributed between Israel, 
the city-states of Philistine, and Tyre-Sidon (Van de Mieroop 2004, 226, 234). The 
centers of power in Egypt were perhaps the most numerous in its history, as 
approximately five political units, during this period, defined the power hierarchy of this 
region: Leontopolis of Lower Egypt, Sais of Lower Egypt, Tanis-Bubastis centered on 
Thebes, Kingdom of Kush (south of Thebes, modern day Sudan), and Upper Egypt 
(Grimal 1992, 328-335). Collectively, for nearly 80 years, the diffused nonpolar structure 
of the system sustained itself, as neither of the sub-system actors managed to position and 
function at the system-wide level. To the contrary, possible revisionist sub-system actors 
remained at the regional level, while potential sub-system hegemons further remained at 
the sub-regional level. The cases of Urartu, Babylon, and Assyria attest to the former, 
while much of Syro-Palestine and Egypt attest to the latter.  
745 BC – 620 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure 
  By the end of the previous nonpolar period, Assyria had laid the groundwork to 
restructure the system by re-establishing its irredentist aspirations and transitioning the 
Near East-Middle Eastern System to a unipolar structure. The continued inability of sub-
system actors to attain system-wide status played in Assyria’s favor, since its ascendancy 
to unipolar preponderance was absent of any direct challenges or counter-balancing by 
any other actor in the system. Assyria’s first act was to reconquer much of Babylonia, 
thus incorporating lower Mesopotamia back into its sphere of influence (Hallo and 
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Simpson 1998, 128-131). Seeking to further solidify suzerainty over the south, Assyria 
targeted the nascent states in the Zagros Mountains, reducing them to tributary vassals 
and establishing provinces at the eastern periphery of the system. This would eventually 
be followed by an invasion of Elam (Smith 1925c, 67-68) and contact with Media, 
demonstrating a clear desire to dominate the entire eastern periphery of the system. 
 Having placated the south and the east, Assyria immediately turned its attention 
north toward aggressive Urartu, which had expanded all the way to northern Syria and 
might have challenged Assyrian unipolarity if the latter had not so quickly sought to 
weaken its northern enemy. Assyria defeated Urartu and its ally Arpad, further 
weakening the former as sub-system hegemon, and thoroughly conquering the latter 
(Sayce 1925, 179), thus removing it as a sub-system actor and reducing it to an Assyrian 
province (Barnett 1982, 348-351). This was followed by expansion to the west, reducing 
most of the powerful Syro-Palestinian actors to tributary status: Cilicia, Carchemish, 
Hamath, Byblos, Israel, Tyre-Sidon, and Damascus.  Philistine city-states, especially 
Gaza, Gezer, Ashdod, and Ashkelon did not comply, only to be crushed and annexed. 
This was followed by the annexation of Israel and Damascus as Assyrian provinces 
(Katzenstein 1973, 210-219). A newly unified Egypt made an attempt at polarization to 
possibly counter-balance Assyrian expansion, bringing into its camp Hamath, Ekron, 
Gaza, Israel, Tyre-Sidon, and Judah, only to be thoroughly defeated by the unipole 
(Thompson 1925, 210-212). Similarly, a few years later, Urartu, Phrygia, and 
Carchemish formed an alliance to limit Assyria’s western expansion, only to be 
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crushed, with Carchemish being annexed as an Assyrian province (Barnett 1982, 351-
353). This process of temporary and ill-fated revolts, followed by massive Assyrian 
military response and annexation, along with mass deportations and resettling of 
conquered people, continued throughout much of this unipolar period (Van de Mieroop 
2004, 235-236). Having attacked and thoroughly defeated all possible revisionist sub-
system actors, Assyria accounted for the preservation of the unipolar structure by 
maintaining an aggressive militaristic policy, only to be supplemented through the 
extraction of material resources via tributaries and vassals. The approximate 130 years of 
Assyrian preponderance of the system, however, would soon be challenged by the rising 
power of a new actor from the east, the Medes, and a rejuvenated Babylon.   
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620 BC – 540 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 Around the 620’s BC the political confusion in Assyria had allowed Babylon (at 
times referred to as “Neo-Babylon) to reassert itself as a powerful sub-system hegemon, 
with designs to challenge Assyrian unipolarity. By 615 BC, Babylon challenged Assyria 
by attacking vassals of the latter in Mesopotamia, and even directly attacking a much 
perplexed Assyria (Thompson 1925, 212-214). At the same time, the Medes, covering 
central Zagros and heading east all the way to Elam (Assyria’s destruction of Elam had 
allowed Media to assume sub-system dominance of the region), had created a rather 
powerful military state. A joint Babylonian-Median alliance, with assistance from the 
semi-nomadic Scythians (having recently defeated Phrygia) from the north Caucasus 
(Minns 1925, 192-195), gave way to a direct invasion of Assyria, the sacking of its 
capital Nineveh, an extensive destruction of the Assyrian heartland, and the end of 
Assyria as both system-wide hegemon and political unit (Smith 1925d, 126-131). The 
entirety of Assyrian lands became split between the two allies, as Media assumed control 
of the north, dominating Urartu, and heading westward toward Anatolia. The Median 
state reached all the way to central Anatolia, creating a treaty with the sub-system 
hegemon Lidya in western Anatolia (Mellink 1991, 649), and exercising preponderance 
from there to western Iran and the entire eastern periphery to all of northern Mesopotamia 
and much of the Armenian Highlands of southern Transcaucasia (Young 1988,16-23). 
Media’s expansive growth made its southern neighbor quite uneasy, leading Babylon to 
build the Median wall from the Tigris to the Euphrates as a barrier to the geo-political 
boundaries of each pole. Babylon assumed dominion over the remaining territories of 
Assyria to the south and the west, primarily Syro-Palestine. Initially challenged by Egypt, 
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since much of Palestine remained the latter’s historic sphere of influence, Babylon 
defeated the Egyptians near Carchemish in 605 BC, annexed Cilicia, followed by Tyre-
Sidon, and then headed south to assume control of the entire region, destroying Jerusalem 
and Judah, and entertaining an invasion of Egypt itself (Thompson 1925, 212-216). The 
latter objective did not materialize, but Babylonian dominance of the entire 
Mediterranean coast remained unchallenged, with Babylonian system-wide hegemonic 
presence ranging from all of Mesopotamia (with exception of northern portions under 
Median rule) to the entire western coast of Syro-Palestine. At the macro level, during this 
period, the Near East-Middle Eastern System observed a power configuration of two 
system-wide hegemons, and several introspective or rising sub-system hegemons (Egypt, 
Lydia, Scythians, Cimmerians, Persians, etc), with the rest of the political units in the 
system reduced to vassalage or tributary actors.      
540 BC – 330 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure, 
 Absorption of the Near East-Middle Eastern System by the Mediterranean System 
 The bipolar structure of the previous period was immediately transformed into a 
unipolar configuration upon the overthrow of the Median state by the Persians, with the 
latter assuming power in the Median territories, and swiftly challenging Babylon for 
singular dominance of the system. By 550 BC the Persians had taken over all areas under 
Median rule (Van de Mieroop 2004, 257), and proceeded further west to conquer Lydia 
by 547 BC (Gray 1926, 9), assuming dominance of all of Anatolia, even the Ionian Greek 
city-states on the Aegean coast of. In 539 BC Persia directly invaded Babylon from the 
Zagros, defeating the latter, overtaking the capital (Thompson 1925, 223-225), and 
assuming dominance of not only the entirety of the Babylonian empire, but of the Near 
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East-Middle Eastern System. This was further reified by the conquest of Egypt in 525 
BC, extending all the way to Libya and extracting tribute from Nubia in the periphery 
(Gray 1926, 19-20). From these developments, Persian system-wide hegemony managed 
to cover the entire system, from the very edges of the eastern periphery (even infringing 
into the Indic System) to all of Mesopotamia, Transcaucasia, Egypt, Syro-Palestine, and 
Anatolia. Persia’s dominance of the Near East-Middle Eastern System was absolute and 
unchallenged, with highly weakened sub-system actors functioning at the regional level, 
and no possible revisionist actors either posing a counter-balance or a threat to Persian 
unipolarity.  
 Persian unipolarity, however, would come to an end not from any developments 
within the Near East-Middle Eastern System, but rather as a result of Persia’s endeavor to 
infringe into the Mediterranean World Political System in its desire to conquer Greece. 
Around 499 BC the Ionian Greek city-states on the Aegean coast of Anatolia rebelled 
against Persian suzerainty (Murray 1988, 480-490), not challenging the latter’s unipolar 
status, but merely seeking local independence. Within five years the unipole managed to 
subdue and repress the rebellion, but the political developments of these events were 
three-fold. First, inter-system interactions between the Near East-Middle Eastern System 
and the Mediterranean System became more prevalent, as the Ionian Greeks had clear 
allegiance to their mother city-states as opposed to Persia. Second, Persia did not only 
hold the Ionian Greeks responsible for the uprising, but the Greek mainland itself, thus 
developing plans to infringe into the Mediterranean System. Third, Persian incursion into 
the Mediterranean System, while ephemeral, allowed for the development of a precedent, 
which would lead to Persia’s destruction at the hands of Macedonia. Within this context, 
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Persia’s incursion into the Mediterranean System did not lead to the absorption of one 
system by the other, since the Persians were repelled in a set of military confrontations, 
from Marathon, to Salamis, to Plateau (Munro 1926, 239-251; Hammond 1988, 502-
517). As such, this incursion resulted neither in Persia’s absorption into the 
Mediterranean System, nor Persia’s dominance of Greece and hence the absorption of the 
Mediterranean System into the Near East-Middle Eastern System. Due to the temporary 
nature of the inter-system incursions, inter-system absorption did not take place, and for 
this reason, a Greece-Persian bipolar system would seem analytically incoherent. 
Concomitantly, Persia continued its unipolar dominance within the Near East-Middle 
Eastern System until the invasion of the Macedonian Greeks, which not only ended 
Persian unipolarity, but also ended the Near East-Middle Eastern System, absorbing it 
into the wider Mediterranean System. 
 
Analysis 
 The cumulative dataset from the polar periods in the Near East-Middle Eastern 
System produce 23 observational data points, with the set modalities of polar structures 
being coded within the criteria set forth. Categorical demarcations between polar 
structuration and subsequent transitions allow for four general schemes of evaluations: 
the general distributive nature of polar structure during given periods; transitional 
patterns for polar structures after unipolar epochs; system’s analysis concerning the 
duration and longevity of polar periods; and a probabilistic treatment of possible 
structural outcomes after unipolar transitions. Three general remarks may be suggested at 
the outset: the system demonstrates a consistent tendency in its fluctuation between 
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unipolar and nonpolar configurations; tripolarity appears to be unfit as a transitional 
structural outcome after unipolarity; and multipolar periods demonstrate the least stable 
structures with respect to durability.  
 The distribution of polar periods in the Near East-Middle Eastern System shows 
unipolarity to be the most occurring power configuration, as 9 out of the 23 polar 
structures in the dataset are coded as unipolar. In relation to other world political system, 
the Near East-Middle Eastern System lacks a coherent balance between the various 
modes of polar periods. This is consistently demonstrated by the presence of 6 nonpolar 
periods as the second most common polar structure in the system, followed by tripolarity 
and multipolarity, with each structure, respectively, having three polar periods. The least 
common polar structure remains bipolarity, with only two bipolar periods. Collectively, 
in the approximate 2300 years of the Near East-Middle Eastern System investigated in 
this chapter, 39% of the time the system’s structure assumed a unipolar configuration, 
followed by nonpolarity with approximately 26% of the time, tripolarity and 
multipolarity with 13% each, and bipolarity with only 9% of time.  
 The analytical considerations are rather unique and quite telling of the Near East-
Middle Eastern System: for nearly 65% of the time, the system was either defined by 
unipolar concentration of power, or, at the very end of the continuum, defined by 
nonpolar diffusion of power. In this sense, during the vast majority of the system’s 
history, the structure of the system shifted from one extreme to the next, with the 
remaining power configurations, collectively, only assuming 35% of the system. The 
system, then, displayed a tendency to either be fit for dominance by a single pole, or the 
absence of any system-wide poles. In this sense, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar 
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structures remained somewhat unfit to the structural power hierarchies of the Near East-
Middle Eastern System. As Figure 5.1 shows, 15 out of the 23 polar periods were 
 
FIGURE 5.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN THE NEAR EAST-
MIDDLE EASTERN SYSTEM 
 
 
 
either defined by singular concentration of power, or nonpolar diffusion of power. As 
such, even if tripolarity and multipolarity are collapsed together into a single category, 
both collectively merely match the number of nonpolar epochs in the system, thus 
suggesting that the Near East-Middle Eastern System did not seem fit for power 
distribution between a set of equal powers: the system experienced either singular or no 
power hierarchy at all for the majority of its existence 
 The durability of polar periods allows for important knowledge-accumulation 
with respect to system’s maintenance. Specifically, the longer a polar structure 
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demonstrates longevity, the better a system demonstrates fittidness vis-à-vis structural 
power hierarchies with respect to concentration or diffusion. This assessment is also 
related to considerations of systemic stability: the duration of polar structures suggests 
the extent to which the conditions of the system are favorable to specific power 
configurations. The distribution of polar periods, for example, shows the number of polar 
periods with respect to structural coding. This, however, does not measure the longevity 
of the given polar structures, but merely the number of occurrences. By gauging duration, 
numbers of occurrences are better understood in relation to the historic space that the 
given polar structures occupy.  
 Within the Near East-Middle Eastern System, the most durable polar structure, on 
average, is nonpolarity, with duration of approximately 126 years. The second most 
durable polar period is unipolarity, averaging 109 years, followed by bipolarity with 85 
years, multipolarity with 62 years, and tripolarity with 60 years. At the system-wide 
level, then, the most durable, and systemically stable, power configuration remains 
nonpolarity, for it takes approximately 126 years for a nonpolar structure to transition. 
This tentatively suggests that diffused power constellations in the Near East-Middle 
Eastern System was not an exception or an outlier, but rather part of the norm, since the 
system, on average, was consumed for longer periods by diffused power structures than 
by relatively equally concentrated power structures. The almost dialectical relationship 
between nonpolarity and unipolarity becomes even more interesting when observing the 
longevity of unipolar periods lasting on average of 109 years.  
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FIGURE 5.2 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR PERIODS 
  
 As Figure 5.2 suggests, this observation is quite interesting: the system either had 
long periods of nonpolar structures, on average, or long periods of unipolar structures, on 
average. In this sense, the system demonstrated longevity either in a highly diffused or 
highly concentrated structure, and less stability and longevity under relatively equal 
distribution of powers, such as in bipolar, tripolar, or multipolar structures. In totality, as 
Figure 5.3 demonstrates, of the 2300 years of the Near East-Middle Eastern System, the 
system had a unipolar structure for 980 years and nonpolar structure for 755 years. As 
such, for nearly 75% of the time (1,735 years), the system fluctuated from singular 
concentration of power to a diffused power configuration.  
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FIGURE 5.3 HISTORICAL SPACE OF THE NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN 
SYSTEM 
 
 
  Post-unipolar patterns of structural formations provide important calculations in 
gauging probabilistic outcomes with respect to systemic transitions. Of the 23 data points 
collected in this chapter, 9 of the observations are unipolar periods, of which 8 allow for 
examinations of post-unipolar transitions (the final unipolar period transitioned the Near 
East-Middle Eastern System into its absorption by the Mediterranean System, thus 
excluding it as an applicable data observation with respect to post-unipolar transitions). 
Figure 5.4 displays the distribution of polar structures after unipolar transitions: 4 periods 
of nonpolarity, two periods of bipolarity, no period of tripolarity, and two periods of 
multipolarity. Analyzing the data probabilistically, the unipolar structure in the Near 
East-Middle Eastern System had a 50% chance of transitioning into a nonpolar structure, 
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25% probability of a bipolar structure, 25% possibility of a multipolar structure, and no 
probability of a tripolar structure.   
FIGURE 5.4 POST-UNIPOLAR POWER CONFIGURATIONS  
 
 
 The probabilistic patterns of post-unipolar power configurations appear consistent 
with much of the results observed in the dataset. Since the system displays a consistent 
tendency to fluctuate from highly centralized to highly diffused power structures, 
nonpolarity remains the most probable structural transition after unipolarity in this 
system. Of the six polar periods that are defined as nonpolar, four of these resulted after 
unipolar transitions, indicating a systemic connection between concentrated power 
structures that last for approximately 109 years and subsequent diffused power structures 
that sustain system’s stability for approximately 126 years. The remaining probabilistic 
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outcomes suggest a relatively more concentrated power structure in the form of a bipolar 
configuration, or an equally probable outcome of a relatively more diffused power 
structure in the form of a multipolar configuration. 
   Possible explanations of these developments are four-fold. First, since the Near 
East-Middle Eastern System displayed, consistently, high numbers of centers of power, 
even at regional and sub-regional/local levels, these centers of power were able to re-
establish their capabilities after long periods of unipolar dominance. Second, unipolar 
system-wide hegemons displayed a very conscious effort to immediately confront and 
weaken possible revisionist states, hence allowing for long periods of unipolarity, while 
at the same time leaving no actors strong enough to fill in the power vacuum after 
unipolar epochs. Third, shirking remained an observable reality in the Near East-Middle 
Eastern System, as many sub-system hegemons, even with the potential capacity to 
expand and exercise relative power, chose to remain at the regional level, thus refraining 
from functioning at the system-wide level. And four, since bipolar, tripolar, and 
multipolar structures have much shorter lifespans, this suggests that many of these 
arrangements were relatively unstable and difficult to maintain, and as such, the 
probability of these power configurations forming after unipolarity remained relatively 
low. That is, the presence of two or more revisionist sub-system hegemons ready to 
assume system-wide positioning after the decline of a unipole remained a low probability 
in the Near East-Middle Eastern System. For these general reasons, unipolarity primarily 
gave way to a diffused power constellation with high numbers of regional and sub-
regional centers of power.    
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CHAPTER 6 
THE INDIC WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM   
 The Indic System primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra 
civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between 
political units/entities/actors within the region of the Indian subcontinent, or the region of 
South Asia. Territorially, the Indic World Political System covers much of South Asia, 
but to specify set regional and territorial boundaries in absolute terms in the 
conceptualization of a world political system obscures the reality of the political realm. 
The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at the periphery at 
times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from the system.
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System’s classification of the Indic System, then, does not specifically rely on 
establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering the political interactions 
and power configurations of system-wide hegemons that function within the structural 
perimeters of this world political system.    
 The historiographical method of political history will begin analysis of polar 
periods within the Indic System from 500 BC. Prior to this period, the Indic System is 
defined by the Verdic Age, with approximately 16 large rising proto-states (Gokhale 
1959; Bongard-Levin 1985b) that are in transitional and developmental stages, at times 
                                                          
11
 For example, Afghanistan tends to be on the periphery, yet is part of the system, yet Persia, while 
bordered on the periphery, is considered to be part of the Near East-Middle Eastern System. In cases where 
the Persian Empire encroaches into the Indic System and becomes a system-wide hegemonic actor, it is 
then considered to be part of the power configurations of the system. As such, we anticipate, from time to 
time, external actors encroaching into the system. Yet this remains ephemeral and does not indicate the 
absorption of one system into another. The case of Alexander the Great’s conquest of Bactria (modern 
Afghanistan and Pakistan) is a case in point. This was a temporary infringement by the Macedonians, and 
did not lead to the incorporation of the Indic System into any other world political system. As such, for the 
sake of historical accuracy, the infringement of powers outside of the system into the system will be taken 
into consideration. But this will be treated in two ways: either the system is conquered and absorbed into 
another system, thus ending the given system (such as Britain’s colonization of India and its absorption into 
the Global Political System), or outside power(s) become absorbed into the system and remain part of it as 
one of the given poles (Mughal system-wide hegemonic status is a case in point). 
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merging, at times being conquered (Schwatzberg 1992), and as such, not displaying 
coherent units of political analysis (Bognard-Levin 1985a) with respect to gauging the 
power configurations of the system. Thus, it is from the period after 500 BC that the 
political history of the region is substantiated and allows for the coding of polar 
structures, as historical records of power politics are established (Basu 1969) and 
coherent political units formed (103), hence allowing for the structuration of polar 
systems based on the “struggle…for hegemony” (Bognard-Levin 1985b, 56). Each polar 
epoch will be specified chronologically, indicating the timespan of the polar period and 
the specific power configurations that define the system. Specific analytical attention will 
be provided for system’s configurations coded as unipolar periods, and the subsequent 
system at the end of unipolarity. In the chronological narrative, in order not to have 
consistent gaps, the polar structures of non-unipolar periods are also coded.  
550 BC – 450 BC Unipolar Structure 
 In the mid-6
th
 century BC much of the northwest of South Asia fell under the 
dominance of the Achaemenids, beginning with the periphery in the distant western 
frontiers and expanding to the east with their conquest of Gandhara and Kaisa (north of 
Kabul), followed by Sogdiana and an extension all the way to the south of the Hindu 
Kush mountains (Bongard-Leving 1985b, p. 62; Keay 2000, 58). The Achaemenids 
reinforced their system-wide hegemonic status by annexing Zaranka, Seistan, and 
Haraubatish, allowing them to further expand west by joining Artakona and Phrada, south 
by taking Arachotus, east by consuming Gazaca and Kapisi, and north by conquering 
Bactria (Schwatzberg 1992, 166). In sum, Persian dominion in the system stretched from 
Herat and Gandhara through the north-western Punjab, along with the whole of Sind and 
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a large portion of Punjab east of the Indus (Gokhale 1959 30). From 550 BC – 500 BC 
the Achaemenids remained the single system-wide hegemon in the Indic System, levying 
taxes on Indian provinces, receiving tributes from neighboring states, and recruiting 
soldiers for their ever-expanding military (Chattopadhyaya 1950). During this period, 
Achaemenid unipolarity was neither challenged nor counter-balanced by any other 
political unit within the Indic System.  
 During Achaemenid unipolarity, various sub-system hegemonic states were 
formed in the system, as several of the initial 16 mahajanapadas (large developing states) 
from the Verdic period were beginning to merge or envelop each other within their 
specific regions, allowing given dominant regional actors to position themselves as sub-
system hegemons. Along the Ganga Plain, Kashi had established regional dominance in 
the center, Kosala in the north, Magadha and Anga in the east, the Vajji confederacy 
north of Magadha, and the Avanti in the west (Mishara 1962; Singh 1967). 
Concomitantly, the Indic System in the entire northwest, and much of the greater 
northern region was dominated by the Achaemenids, while to the south, in the greater 
Ganga region of central South Asia, various regional actors were competing for sub-
system dominance. Within this context, three general observations are prevalent. First, 
Achaemenid dominance of the system is unmatched, for its preponderance is reified 
through both its unmatched strength and the absence of any system-wide challengers. 
Second, due to the emerging stages that the regional power players are going through, 
none of the sub-system actors have either attained sub-system hegemony, or the ability to 
challenge and counter-balance Achaemenid supremacy. Third, for these reasons, the 
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power configuration of the system is one of unipolarity, with a single system-wide 
hegemon and numerous rising sub-system hegemons.  
 By 500/late-400 BC two major developments took place that reshaped the internal 
power dynamics of the system, but provided no changes to the mode of polarity. First, as 
the Achaemenids solidified their complete dominance of Iran, their attention shifted West 
(Olmstead 1948), and away from the Indic System, as the beginning stages of the Greco-
Persian conflict removed the Achaemenids as actors in the Indic System, marginalizing 
them to the periphery of the subcontinent. This was confirmed by the Ionian Revolts in 
Asia Minor in 499 BC, as the Achaemenids become preoccupied primarily with the Near 
East-Middle Eastern System and its intrusion into the Mediterranean System, and thus 
exiting as hegemonic actors from the Indic System. Second, the sub-system hegemons 
were positioning themselves as potential system-wide actors through warfare and inter-
hegemonic competition (Rapson 1922; Ghoshal 1966), and with the exit of the Persians, 
the vacuum was filled by the ascendency of sub-system actor(s) to system-wide 
hegemonic status.  
 Kosala, Magadha, Kashi, Vasta, Vajji Confederacy, and Avanti were the “major 
regional powers…in the late 6th century BC” (Schwartzberg 1992, 166-167), and under 
the unipolar system, each not only sought to establish sub-system dominance, but also 
position itself as a potential system-wide challenger. Within the specific sub-system of 
the central Ganga Plain, inter-regional hegemonic competition between Kosala and Kashi 
for sub-system preponderance first led to Kashi’s initial triumph over Kosala, giving way 
to Kashi expansion all the way to Anga in the south and Magadha in the east. Kashi 
dominance, however, was short-lived, as Kosala reasserted its power base, re-establishing 
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lost territories and eventually conquering Kashi itself (Majumdar et al 1967). Kosala’s 
absorption of Kashi not only gave way to Kosala sub-system hegemony, but also 
elevation to the status of system-wide hegemon by 500 BC, for the only system-wide 
hegemon, the Achaemenids, exited the Indic System, thus making Kosala, by default, the 
only system-wide hegemon. Due to these developments, while the system-wide hegemon 
changed from one political actor to another, the structure of the system did not, for the 
power configuration of the system still remained unipolar. Kosala unipolarity was 
supplemented by the presence of several sub-system hegemons, and until these sub-
system hegemons rose to the position of system-wide hegemons by way of challenging 
and counter-balancing Kosala, the Indic System remained unipolar until 450 BC.  
 During these 50 years of Kosala unipolarity, Magadha established itself as a sub-
system hegemon in the east and laid the foundations to challenge Kosala dominance at 
the system-wide level, while the Avanti undertook similar steps through its establishment 
of sub-system hegemony in the south. Thus, while Kosala attained unipolar status, the 
regional hegemonic actors were in the process of consolidating their own drive for 
system-wide status. Magadha undertook the conquest of Anga, a regional power, 
allowing for control of its rich forest and mineral resources, as well as trade routes to the 
sea (Gokhale 1959, 30). Magadha’s expansion to the north and west, however, during this 
period, was barred by the other sub-system hegemon, the Vajji Confederacy (Trautmann 
2010, 55). As such, Magadha’s drive for system-wide status was at this point hampered 
through the counter-balancing capabilities of the Vajji Confederacy at the sub-system 
level. The Avanti, on the other hand, had demonstrated dominance over the southern 
region by proceeding to absorb Vasta, one of the other major regional powers 
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(Raychaudhuri 1972, 180), and thus practice hegemony over the entire Malwa Plateau. 
Concomitantly, Avanti had positioned itself with the Vajji Confederacy to counter-
balance Magadha’s expansionist endeavors (Raychaudhuri 1972, 213.), and as such, a 
three-way sub-system inter-hegemonic balance of power was playing out within the 
wider context of attaining system-wide hegemonic status. As a result of this sub-system 
hegemonic competition, Kosala’s unipolar status remained unchallenged, since none of 
the sub-system actors, at this stage, had established the necessary ability to become 
system-wide actors. 
Map 6.1 
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450 BC – 400 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 By 450 BC Kosala’s status as unipole was challenged by Magadha, having risen 
to the status of system-wide hegemon. Magadha’s system-wide hegemonic status was 
confirmed after its eventual conquest of Vajji, the main sub-system hegemon that had 
managed to previously counter-balance Magadha’s aspirations for expansion and 
complete domination of the entire eastern region. This was augmented by Magadha’s 
defeat of Malla, another regional actor and ally of Vajji. After attaining dominance of the 
eastern region, Magadha challenged Kosala for system-wide dominance (Bognard-Levin 
1985b, 58-59), seeking to expand north and establish hegemony over the entire north-
east. In the pursuing system-wide hegemonic struggle, Magadha defeated Kosala (Keay 
2000, 65-67), thus establishing itself as a pole in the structure of the Indic System. 
Magadha’s hegemony over the north-east was countered by the rise of Avanti as a 
system-wide hegemon with its preponderance of the southwest, and expansion into the 
northwest (Bognard-Levin 1985a, 104-105).  
 After having consolidated power over the Malwa Plateau, along with its conquest 
of Vasta, Avanti had expanded north by challenging Gandhara and gaining control over 
the material resources of the western seaboard and the Southern Route. The polar 
structure of the system, then, had transitioned from Kosala unipolarity to the bipolarity of 
Magadha and Avanti. As system-wide hegemon, Magadha controlled the entire eastern 
and north-eastern region of the system, while Avanti, as the other system hegemon, 
controlled the entire southern and western region, and large portions of the north-western 
region. The subsequent power configurations within this epoch demonstrate structural 
transition from unipolirty to bipolarity, with two new system-wide hegemons formulating 
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the mode of polarity, while the previous system-wide hegemon being conquered and 
absorbed.  
400 BC – 180 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The bipolar system proved to be unstable by the end of the 5
th
 century BC, as 
Avanti’s system-wide hegemonic status, through its dominance of the southwest and the 
northwest, brought about hegemonic war with the other system-wide hegemon, Magadha. 
The confrontation between the two poles was predicated on two factors. First, 
economically, both sought control over the Ganges river system, which was a crucial 
trade route (Bognard-Levin 1985a, 104-105). Second, politically, while each sought to 
restructure the system into a unipolar one, there was also the underlying issue of Avanti’s 
consistent threat to Magadha by allying itself with Magahda’s enemies as a method of 
counter-balancing (Schwartzberg 1992). In the ensuing conflict, after a set of prolonged 
wars, Magadha managed to defeat and conquer Avanti (Iyer and Chawla 1983), thus 
altering the previous bipolar system into a unipolar one. It established itself “into a 
leading force in the whole of North India and had become the centre of a unified Indian 
state” (Bognard-Levin 1985b, 60). From around 400 BC, upon its victory over Avanti, 
Magadha maintained its system-wide hegemonic status over the Indic System, only to be 
disturbed from 327-325 BC by the conquest/intrusion of Macedonia, under Alexander the 
Great (Snyder 1966), into the Indic System.  
 Magadha’s positioning as the single pole is best expressed through three 
developments. First, due to the fact that it had initially established sub-system hegemony 
prior to becoming a system-wide hegemon, it had absolutely no challengers within its 
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sphere of influence. Second, since Avanti had done the same, the southwest and the 
northwest also did not present any regional challengers to the given poles. And thirdly, 
since polarization does not seem to have been present during this bipolar system, 
Magadha’s dominance became complete, since neither alliance obligations nor the allies 
of its defeated foe served to constrain Magadha’s behavior as the single system-wide 
hegemon. In this sense, unlike the unipolar structure under the Achaemenids, or the 
Kosalans, the power constellation under Magadha’s initial 70 years of unipolarity was 
one of a single system-wide hegemon with no sub-system hegemons or rising 
(revisionist) actors.   
 Alexander the Great’s incursion into the Indic System produced two general 
results. First, by destroying the Persian Empire, the Achaemenids were completely 
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removed from the periphery (Bury 1963, 798-313), and replaced with what would 
become in the future Indo-Greek political units (Prakash 1964). Second, it temporarily 
shook the unipolar structure, as it posed a severe threat to the existing system-wide 
hegemon. The exit of the Greeks, however, allowed for the strengthening and 
continuation of the unipolar system, as Magadha, under the Muaryan Dynasty, became 
the Muaryan Empire (Bognard-Levin 1985b; Dikshitar 1953), and reified the power 
constellation of the system. The Greek invasion contributed to Mauryan system-wide 
hegemonic preponderance by destroying all potential sub-system actors in the entire 
north and northwest, hence alleviating any challenges to the unipolar structure 
(Schwartzberg 1992, 169). At the same time, Mauryan system-wide dominance allowed it 
to deal with Alexander’s successor in the north-western periphery, the Seleucids, on 
equal terms. Portions of the north-west, including Gedrosia, Arachosia, Paropamisadae, 
and Aria (most of modern-day Afghanistan), were conceded by the Seleucids to the 
Mauryans (Rostovtsev 1959; Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 1987), along with accepting non-
involvement (Grainger 1990) in the Indic System (hence remaining in the periphery and 
operating primarily in the Near East-Middle Eastern System). This was reciprocated by 
Mauryan allocation of military assistance (primarily war elephants) to the Seleucids and 
solidification of amicable terms (Trautmann 2010, 56-58). The result was the continuous 
absence of the Seleucids in the political affairs of the Indic System, with Mauryan 
friendly recognition of Seleucid presence in the periphery.  
 Having solidified its dominance in north India, with its western boundaries all the 
way to the Indus River in the west, and parts of Punjab to the north (as part of its peace 
treaty with the Seleucids), the Muaryans turned to the south of the subcontinent, 
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conquering Andhra and after a vicious war, taking Kalinga around 260 BC (Eggermont 
1956; Raychaudhuri 1972). As such, with the exception of the lands at the very south of 
the subcontinent, and the lands north-west of the Punjab region (the periphery ruled by 
the Seleucids), the Mauryans of Magadha dominated the unipolar structure as the 
unchallenged system-wide hegemon of the Indic System.  
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180 BC – 140 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 Around 255 BC the Indo-Greek state of Bactria revolted against the Seleucids, 
breaking off and formulating its own military-imperialist state (Sidky 2000, 135-147). 
This signaled the decline of the Seleucids and the birth of separate Indo-Greek political 
units with aspirations of becoming major actors (Schwartzberg 1992, 172-173) in the 
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Indic System. By 200 BC the Indo-Greek Bactrians had become sub-system hegemons, 
with aspirations of challenging the Muaryans for system-wide hegemonic status. The 
power constellations of the system were beginning to change. This was complimented by 
the incremental decay of Muaryan unipolarity, primarily contributed to the rise of 
regionalism and secessionist behavior within Maurya’s sphere of influence 
(Raychaudhuri 1972, 346-351). Bactrian aggression gave way to Indo-Greek conquest of 
Mauryan territory west of the Indus River around 180 BC (Bongard-Levin 1985a, 137-
139), along with dominance in most of the northwest, including the Punjab region (Keay 
2000, 104-108). This paved the way for Bactrian ascendance as system-wide hegemons, 
for not only had they established sub-system hegemony, but had also began to counter-
balance and directly challenge Mauryan system-wide dominance.  
 A bipolar system was formulated as Bactrian system-wide hegemonic status was 
supplemented by the overthrow of the Mauryan dynasty by the Sunga dynasty of 
Magadha. As Magadha continuously lost territories to new independent political units 
formed out of the old Mauryan Empire, the Indo-Greeks managed to conquer 
Paropamisadae and Gandhara by 190 BC (Tarn 1951). Magadha, thus, faced a two-front 
war: one against rebelling provinces, and one against the Indo-Greeks (Pusalker et al 
2001). The potential for Indo-Greek unipolarity, however, was hampered by the split 
within Bactria itself, for in 170 BC the Indo-Greek kingdom was split into two: the 
eastern Indo-Greek kingdom based out of Gandhara, and the western Indo-Greek 
kingdom based out of Bactria (Trautmann 2010, 63-34; Sidky 2000, 189-227). While 
both Indo-Greek kingdoms kept gaining at the expense of the declining unipole, 
especially Gandhara’s expansion south of the Hindu Kush by 155 BC, Gandhara, as a 
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rising sub-system hegemon, began to counter-balance Bactria, which not only ended 
Indo-Greek unity, but allowed Magadha some breathing room. The power configurations 
of this period, then, are defined by two system-wide hegemons, and a rising sub-system 
hegemon. 
Map 6.4 
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140 BC – 120BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The inter-hegemonic conflict between the two system-wide hegemons in the 
bipolar structure, Bactria and Gandhara (Tarn 1951), thoroughly weakened both actors to 
such an extent that by 130 BC, exhaustion, coupled with Gandhara’s inability to defeat a 
weakened Bactria, ended the Indo-Greek dominion in the Indic System (Narain 1957). 
The decline of both actors from system-wide status to sub-system actors allowed 
Magadha, under the Sunga dynasty, to reassert its system-wide hegemonic status. 
Structurally, then, the system transitioned from a bipolar constellation to a unipolar one, 
with a single system-wide hegemon and two sub-system hegemons in the northwest.  
120 BC – 60 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 As Magadha’s system-wide hegemonic status declined, multitude of regional, 
sub-system actors overwhelmed the system. This was supplemented by the invasion and 
settling of new political units from the north. The Tukharians, Northern Sakas, and 
Scythians/Sakai (Shrava 1981), as a byproduct of the tribal upheavals in central Asia, 
migrate into the Indic System, with the Scythians overwhelming Sogdiana and its 
surrounding areas, the Northern Sakas conquering Gandhara and driving south, while the 
Tukharians engulfed and settled in Bactria (Chaudhuri 1955). The northwest was also 
presented with the presence of the Parthians (Isidorus 1914).  The Indo-Greek sub-system 
hegemons were replaced with a multitude of rising sub-system actors, ending the loose 
sub-system bipolarity of the north with a nonpolar structure of various Indo-Parthian 
political units. In the north-central region, west of the Ganga Plain, several independent 
republics, such as Yaudheyas and Arjunayas, were expansionist powers with irredentist 
objectives (Schwartzberg 1992, 174). In the Ganga Plain, with the decay of Magadhan 
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power, Mathura, Pancala, Kosala, and Kausambi (Sharma 1969) established themselves 
as independent powers, while in the southeast Kalinga established itself as a sub-system 
hegemon with system-wide aspirations, only to be challenged by a rising system-wide 
actor, the Satavahanas of Mulaka (Yazdani 1960). As such, the system, during this 
period, was quite chaotic and in a state of flux, without any system-wide hegemons, and a 
very high number of sub-system actors and minor actors trying to become sub-system 
actors. Each region witnessed a process of consolidation, where each rising sub-system 
hegemon sought to solidify power in relation to other rising regional actors. 
Concomitantly, this period saw a process of regional consolidation of power, with no 
actors being able to attain system-wide dominance, rather only driving to achieve sub-
system hegemonic status.  
60 BC – 30 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The continuous consolidation process during the nonpolar epoch continued in 
much of the region, except for the northwest, as the various political units of the 
Scythians, Sakas, and Parthians intermingled to form the Indo-Parthian dynasty, 
proceeding to conquer Arachosia, Kandahar, and Paropamisadae (Colledge 1968). While 
many of the other sub-system actors in the system had ambitions of system-wide status, 
most were still in the process of either consolidation or simply solidifying regional 
hegemony. As such, only the Indo-Parthians were able to elevate themselves to the status 
of system-wide hegemons, qualifying this given period as unipolar. By virtue of all the 
other actors being weak or in the process of developing, the Indo-Parthians displayed 
system-wide preponderance, not only dominating the Indus and the west, but also having 
ambitions of expanding to the Ganges region.  
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30 BC – 40 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 Indo-Parthian unipolarity was quickly challenged and thoroughly counter-
balanced by the rising sub-system actors who had attained system-wide hegemonic status. 
This development gave way to the formulation of a multipolar system, with four sub-
system hegemons solidifying regional power and positioning themselves at the system-
wide level. Seeking to display their system-wide hegemonic position, the Indo-Parthians 
sought expansion to the east, seeking to dominate the Ganges region. This advance, 
however, was blocked and counterbalanced by the Sakas of Mathura (Chattopadhyaya 
1967), who had consolidated regional power and elevated themselves to system-wide 
status.  
 The ability of Mathura to challenge the Indo-Parthians, as indicative of the end of 
the unipolar epoch, was further reinforced by the rise of Kalinga and Mulaka. To the 
southeast, Kalinga had also consolidated regional power and had become a system-wide 
hegemon, even penetrating all the way to the northwest (Majumdar 1996). In the center-
west of the subcontinent, the Satavahana of Mulaka had attained system-wide hegemonic 
status, not only displaying regional hegemony, but expanding all the way south and 
controlling vast regions of the southern portion of the subcontinent (Sircar 1939). While 
the Indo-Parthians were perhaps the strongest of the four system-wide hegemons, they 
nonetheless failed to construct a unipolar system by virtue of their inability to 
demonstrate preponderance. Namely, the ability of the other powers, especially of 
Mathura, to counterbalance and challenge the Indo-Parthians, clearly indicates a 
multipolar structure.    
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40 AD – 90 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 The Indo-Parthian dominance of the northwest was challenged by rising sub-
system actor Kushanas, which not only sought to overthrow the Indo-Parthian dominance 
of the northern sub-system, but also conquer Indo-Parthia and attain system-wide 
hegemonic status. The Kushanas, who were the Tukharians of Bactria, reduced the Indo-
Parthians to vassalage in the northwest (Banerji 1908), conquered Mathura in the north 
center, and thus rose to the status of system-wide hegemon, “ranking among the major 
contemporary Eurasian empires” (Szhwartzberg 1992, 174). Kushanas would soon 
proceed to envelop Gandhara, making Gandhara the center of their realm. Kushanas’ 
system-wide status was balanced by the other system-wide hegemon in the system 
operating in the south, the Satavahanas of Mulaka. To this end, the Indic System during 
this epoch was structurally bipolar, with the more powerful Gandhara being 
counterbalanced by the relatively less powerful, yet nonetheless a system-wide hegemon, 
Mulaka. Western Sakas, in the Deccan, was in the process of conquering Avanti (Sen 
1999, 185-189), hence solidifying power as a sub-system hegemon with aspirations of 
challenging Mulaka.   
90 AD – 150 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The Kushanas of Gandhara extended their empire from Central Asia all the way 
to northeast India (Trautmann 2010, 65), demonstrating preponderance of the system that 
was neither matched nor challenged by any other actor. Mulaka was reduced to sub-
system status as it became challenged by Western Sakas (Basham 1953), engaging in 
continuous conflict that weakened both actors and alleviated their ability to position 
themselves as system-wide hegemons in relation to Gandhara. In this sense, the decline 
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of Mulaka from system-wide to sub-system actor, and the inability of Western Sakas to 
overwhelm Mulaka and position at the system-wide level, left Gandhara as the only 
system-wide hegemon in the Indic System, hence qualifying this period as unipolar.  
150 AD – 200 AD Transition from Unipolar to Tripolar Structure 
 After reasserting themselves in Surashtra (Narain and Prasad, 1998), Western 
Sakas not only established sub-system hegemony, but also rose to the status of system-
wide hegemon by reconquering lost territories to Mulaka and proceeding even to 
challenge and overtake parts of the southern territories held by Gandhara. Similarly, 
Mulaka had also attained system-wide hegemonic status by serving as a bulwark against 
Kushana penetration to the south (Puri 1965), thus counter-balancing Gandhara at the 
system-wide level. These developments clearly indicate the relative decline of Gandhara 
and the rise of Mulaka and Surashtra, thus transitioning the power configurations from a 
unipolar structure dominated by Gandhara to a tripolar structure that includes Mulaka and 
Surashtra.  
200 AD – 310 AD Transition from Tripolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 By the end of the 2
nd
 century Kushana power was in serious decline, as the Indo-
Scythian Murundas in the northeast, the Kuninda republic in the northwest, the Maghas 
in the lower Ganga, and the Yaudheyas republic all broke away from Kushanas and 
proclaimed independence (Sen 1999, 201-202). Mathura was lost to the Nagas by mid-
century, while the rising power of the Guptas destroyed all Kushana power in the Ganga 
Plain (Fleet 1888). The Mulaka empire of the Satavahanas also underwent a similar 
disintegration (175), with various newly-formed republics dominating the Rajasthan 
region, while multitude of kingdoms sprang up on the Ganga Plain, only to be 
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complimented by Satavahana feudatories proclaiming independence in the south. With 
this continuous disintegration, the mode of polarity in the Indic System underwent a 
massive transition, as centers of political power were dispersed to a wide-ranging number 
of units and actors. Sub-system actors during this period were numerous within every 
region of the system, thus eliminating any considerations of rising sub-system hegemons 
at this point. The entire system underwent a methodical process of re-consolidation, as 
rising regional actors slowly developed sub-system status, only to attain sub-system 
hegemony toward the end of the century, and thus seek system-wide hegemonic status at 
the start of the 3
rd
 century. In this sense, with approximately 10-15 centers of power 
throughout the system during this period, the structure had transitioned to one of 
nonpolarity.   
310 AD – 350 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Bipolar Structure 
 More than hundred years of nonpolarity in the Indic World Political System 
allowed for the formulation of new regional actors that by the start of the 4
th
 century had 
consolidated sub-system hegemony, with two political units managing to establish 
system-wide hegemonic status: the Vakataka and the Guptas (Altekar 1946). This bipolar 
structure was augmented by the presence of several sub-system actors: the Hunas in the 
northwest, the Naga in the north, the Sakas in the Deccan, and the Pallavas, after the 
disintegration of the Satavahanas, in the south. The Vakatakas attained system-wide 
hegemonic status by conquering Kalinga in the central-eastern coast of the subcontinent 
and stretching all the way to the Decann region (Banarjea 1957, 280-286), overwhelming 
the sub-system hegemons the Sakas of Avanti and the Western Sakas of Surastra (Keay 
2000, 130-131). Vakatakas’ system-wide status was counter-balanced by the rise of the 
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Guptas. As system-wide hegemons that dominated the Ganga Plain, Gupta suzerainty 
stretched all the way from Kosala in the west to Kajangala in the east, and virtually 
assumed the territorial size of the first Magadha empire (Banjeri 1933). The inter-
hegemonic conflict between Vakatakas and Gupta brought about the polarization of allies 
into the two distinct bipolar structures: Vakatakas incorporated the sub-system Nagas and 
several other allies into its pole, while Gupta brought Vaisali and Pataliputra into its 
camp. The post-nonpolar structure, thus, observed the formation of a bipolar system that 
was characterized by a process of polarization. 
350 AD – 460 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The Guptas restructured the Indic System into a unipolar power configuration, 
establishing system-wide hegemony that was neither challenged nor counter-balanced for 
over a century. Guptas initially conquered northern India, including Vakatakas ally the 
Nagas, proceeding to overtake Malwa, Mathura, and reach all the way to Kalinga. 
Heading south, the Guptas established suzerainty over Kosala and Kanci, the Pallava 
capital. In the Ganga Plain, the long-standing republics, beginning with Madrakas and 
ending with the powerful Yaudheyas, were brought under Gupta control. In the north, the 
Kushanas where overwhelmed, while in the Deccan, the Saka kingdoms of Avanti and 
Surastra were conquered (Agrawal 1989, 103-132). Gupta’s conquest of much of the 
Indian sub-continent, complete with the strategic subjugation of Vakatakas allies, along 
with reducing Vakataka as “virtual appendage of the Guptas” (Schwartzerg 1992, 179), 
solidified the unipolar structuration of this specific epoch. Gupta system-wide hegemony 
was defined by satellite rulers and tributaries that obeyed imperial edicts, and the 
concession of all political units within Gupta sphere of influence of its hegemonic status. 
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Sub-system hegemons that remained outside of Gupta dominance, but were unable to 
counterbalance the only superpower, were the Hunas in the northwest, elements of the 
Sassanians of Persia on the periphery (around Gandhara), and the Pallava in the very 
south of the subcontinent.  
460 AD – 510 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 By mid-5
th
 century, Gupta power declined, primarily due to internal revolts, the 
rise of sub-systems hegemons seeking system-wide status, and the reassertion of 
Vakatakas as a challenger counter-balancing Gupta at the system-wide level. While 
dealing with internal instability, the Guptas faced a direct challenge from the Hunas, the 
sub-system hegemon in the north. Gupta’s ability to repel Hunas’ ascendance reaffirmed 
Gupta system-wide hegemonic status and temporarily blocked the Hunas from attaining 
system-wide positioning (Sharma 1989, 195-196). But these developments allowed for 
Vakatakas to restablish itself as a system-wide counterbalance to the Guptas (Majumdar 
and Altekar 1986), hence restructuring the power constellations of the system to one of 
bipolarity by establishing control in the west and coastal northeast of the subcontinent 
(from Avanti all the way to Kosala and Kalinga).  
510 AD – 540 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 While the previous period was bipolar, both system-wide hegemons were in 
severe decline, allowing Hunas to elevate itself from sub-system hegemon to the most 
dominant power in the system. The Hunas were a Central Asian people that migrated 
from the north and became absorbed by the Indic System. The Hunas had split into two 
distinct political units after being initially repelled by the Guptas: the Hephthalites in the 
northern most part of the system, and the Southern Hunas, who drove south to absorb 
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Kushana and finally defeat Gupta (Biswar 1971). The defeat of Gupta, and the 
disintegration of Vakatakas by 510 AD, made Southern Hunas the only system-wide 
hegemon in the system. Southern Hunas suzerainty stretched from the vast areas of 
Aghanistan to Gandhara, Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, and central India, while keeping 
the defeated Gupta as tributaries (Banjeri 1962, 57-62). The disintegration of both the 
Gutpas and Vakatakas, however, would produce a very high number of independent, 
ambitious political units that the temporary superpower, the Southern Hunas, will have 
difficulty exercising preponderance over.  
540 AD – 580 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 The disintegration of both Gupta and Vakataka allowed for the temporary rise of 
Southern Hunas unipolarity in the previous epoch, yet the consequences of the previous 
political fragmentations had begun to restructure the power hierarchy of the system. 
Within this framework, intense, multipartite struggles both at the regional and system-
wide level, as consequence of the numerously new independent political actors that had 
broken away from Gupta and Vakataka dominance, sprung up, forming scores of centers 
of inchoate power through the Indic System. These developments were accompanied by 
the disintegration of Hunas system-wide positioning as a result of defeats handed down 
by Iranian Sassanid and Central Asian Turkish incursions into the northwest of the 
system. The outcome was a plethora of regional actors seeking consolidation, sub-system 
dominance, and potential system-wide aspirations. Both the Hephthalite Hunas and the 
Southern Hunas were reduced to regional actors, while Sind, along with the Gonandas in 
Kashmir, offered regional challenge to both Huna states. Maukharis began its slow rise in 
the north-central region (Pires 1934), only to be challenged by Magadha (Sinha 1977, 
166 
 
110-115), another rising sub-system actor. Pushyabhunti, a rising sub-system actor in the 
north-center began positioning itself for regional dominance (Singh 2008, 562-563), 
while Karnata in the west, Kadambas in the south (Mishra 1979), and Kamarupa in the 
northeast began consolidating regional hegemony. The very south of the system saw 
continuous conflicts for regional preponderance, as Pallavas and Pandyas 
counterbalanced the ambitions of Kongu, while a little west, Kadambas was consistently 
pressured by the rise of Karnata (Schwartzberg 1992, 179-181). In this sense, with the 
absence of any system-wide hegemons, the previous regions under hegemonic control 
first began the consolidation process of formulating sub-system hegemons, thus primarily 
acting at the regional level. Consequently, the mode of polarity transitioned to a nonpolar 
configuration, as several actors, within every sub-system itself, sought regional 
dominance, while at the larger system-wide level, no hegemons were present.     
580 AD – 650 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure 
 The consolidation of sub-systems by regional powers brought about the transition 
from a nonpolar structure to a multipolar one, as given sub-system hegemons sought 
expansion and system-wide status. Maukharis, based out of Kanyakubja, attained mastery 
of the entire Gangetic Plain, overwhelming Magdha, Kosala, and reaching far east into 
Gauda (Sinha 1977, 112-118). Pusyabhuti, having defeated the Hunas of Punjab, along 
with the rulers of Gandhara, Sindhu, the Gurjaras of Rajasthan, and the kings of Malava 
and Lata, allied itself with Maukharis, but once Maukharis fell (Maukharis system-wide 
presence was relatively short, as Sasanka, one of its feudatories, rebelled and thoroughly 
weakened Maukharis, hence its need for alliance with the rising Pusyabhuti), Pusyabhuti, 
moving into Kanyakubja, became the most powerful system-wide hegemon in the 
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multipolar structure (Devahuti 1998; Goyal 2006). In the Deccan region, Kalacuris, based 
out of Anupa, attained system-wide hegemonic status by conquering Maharastra, Lata, 
the Malwa Plateau, and the Maitrakas, while counter-balancing and serving as a buffer 
against Pusyabhuti incursion into central India. To the south the Calukyas, based out of 
Karnata, established sub-system hegemony over the entire south of the sub-continent and 
proceeded northwest, overtaking much of the lower Deccan and “rivaling the dominant 
Pusyabhutis of the North” (Schwartzberg 1992, 181). Calukyan dominance in the south, 
however, was challenged by Pallavas, a sub-system actor that had positioned itself at the 
system-wide level, counter-balancing Calukya in the south while Calukya sought 
expansion in the north (Gopalan 1928, xxxii). This multipolar structure, then, saw a 
balance of power between Pusyabhuti in the north; Kalacuris in the upper Deccan and 
central India; Calukyan ascendancy from the south and its challenge to Kalacuris over 
central India; Pallavas challenge to Calukyan power in the south; and Calukyan and 
Kalacuris counter-balance to Pusyabhunti aspirations south of the Gangetic Plain. 
650 AD – 700 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 By 650 AD the Pusyabhuti empire had disintegrated, Kalacuris was reduced to a 
sub-system actor by Calukyas, while the Calukyas itself had been reduced to sub-system 
status by its defeat at the hands of Pallavas. Inter-hegemonic rivalry had either destroyed 
previous system-wide hegemons, or reduced surviving ones to regional actors. The 
outcome was a structural transition from multipolarity to bipolarity: Pallavas attained 
system-wide hegemonic status by virtue of its defeat of Calukyas and its dominance over 
the south and southwest of the system (Sen 1988, 446-449), while Cacas, based out of 
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Sind, attained dominance of the northwest, defeating the rising sub-system hegemon 
Karkotas out of Kashmir and overtaking remnants of the Pusyabhutis.  
700 AD – 740 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 Arab incursion into the periphery of the Indic System had a detrimental effect on 
powerful actors in the northwest, especially Cacas, as the Caliphate’s continuous attacks 
on Sind greatly weakened Cacas, forcing Cacas to reposition as a sub-system hegemon 
(346-352). The other system-wide hegemon in the previous epoch, Pallavas, was 
consistently challenged by rising sub-system actors in the south, only to be defeated by a 
new system-wide hegemon: the revived Calukyans of Karnata (359-363). Calukyas 
ascendance to unipolar preponderance was a direct byproduct of the geopolitical 
consequences of the Arab incursions, including Calukyas’ ability to repel the Arabs, 
along with the inter-regional conflicts in the south that reduced the only existing system-
wide hegemon from the previous period to sub-system status. As such, with the northwest 
in disarray (including the Ganga Plain) and the south destabilized, the Calukyas 
consolidated power throughout much of south-central India, stretching from the western 
coast of the subcontinent all the way to the eastern coast. This unipolar structure was 
supplemented by the presence of several sub-system hegemons: Cacas, Karkotas, 
Kalacuris, Magadha, and Pallavas.  
740 AD – 780 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 The inability of the Arabs to consolidate power in the Indic System was followed 
by the rise of several new sub-system actors seeking to fill the power vacuum in the given 
sub-systems.  The decay of Calukyas further contributed to this development, bringing 
about a nonpolar structure, as the system remained absent of any political units that 
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exercised power system-wide, only having a high number of regional actors seeking to 
solidify local hegemony, hence suggesting a very high number of power centers 
throughout the system. The Varmans of Kanyakubja were challenged by the rising sub-
system hegemon Karkotas for dominance of the northwest; the Calukyas, who had been 
slowly weakened by the rise of sub-system hegemons, especially Rastrakutas, were 
reduced to sub-system status; from the Bengal region, Pala established itself as a sub-
system hegemon, only to be challenged by Gurjara-Pratiharas, another regional power; 
and in the south, the conflict between Andhra, Pallavas, and Pandya continued and 
intensified. These constellations of mid-ranged powers were supplemented by the 
presence of Kalacuris, Magadha, Kamarupa, and Maitrakas. In sum, following the 
unipolar system, the power structure during this epoch became inchoate and highly 
diffused, thus indicating a nonpolar structure.    
780 AD – 880 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure 
 Rastrakutas establishes itself as the singular system-wide hegemon during this 
period, conquering the entire Deccan region, proceeding south and submitting Pallavas, 
and then turning north and defeating Gurjara-Pratiharas. While Rastrakutas’ military 
victories up north did not translate into sustained political gain, all of southern and central 
India, from its western to eastern coast remains under Rastrakutas dominance (Altekar 
1967). Only the north of the Indic System did not fall under Rastrakutas dominance, 
where two sub-system wide hegemons, the Gurjara-Pratiharas and Pala, remained in 
constant struggle over regional hegemony. Thus, Rastrakutas dominated approximately 
60% of the Indic System, while the remaining 40%, which comprised the Ganga Plain of 
the north and the territories to the northwest, where the battle ground of the two powerful 
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sub-system actors. If it was not for the inter-sub-system hegemonic conflict between 
Gurjara-Pratiharas and Pala, where which each political unit may have attained its own 
sphere of influence and cease weakening each other, in relation to Rastrakutas, this 
period may have been designated as tripolar. However, the consistent utilization of 
resources at the regional level, as opposed to counter-balancing Rastrakutas at the 
system-wide level, along with Rastrakutas initial defeat of Gurjara-Pratiharas and Palas’ 
continued reliance on Rastrakutas (412-417), suggests the unipolar structure of this 
period. Namely, while both sub-system hegemons had the potential to counterbalance the 
much more powerful Rastrakutas, and thus suggest a tripolar structure, this potential was 
marginalized by Rastrakutas’ ability to intervene intermittently in the conflict, further 
destabilizing the northern region, and thus further reifying its system-wide hegemonic 
status. 
880 AD – 920 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 Rasrakutas unipolarity came to end when Gurjara-Pratiharas finally conquered 
Palas in 883 AD, thus transitioning the Indic System into a bipolar structure. Rasrakutas 
maintained its status as the most powerful political actor in the system, but the elevation 
of Gurjara-Pratiharas from regional actor to system-wide hegemon brought about a 
counter-balance to Rasrakutas preponderance. Gurjara-Pratiharas’ domain extended from 
coast to coast, from the Eastern to the Western Sea, and from the Himalayas to the 
Vindyas, thus establishing domination from the upper-Deccan and throughout the Ganga 
Plain (Puri 1986). Gurjara-Pratiharas consistently succeeded in deterring Rasrakuta 
ambitions of conquest to the north (Allan et al 1943, 132-136), but Rasrakuta power 
allowed for its continued dominance of Southern Gujarat and Kalacuris, much to the 
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dismay of Gurjara-Pratiharas. The bipolar system was best illustrated by the number of 
times Avanti changed hands, as each actor used this strategic city to counter-balance and 
demarcate the limits of each polar power. A state of perhaps equal power was Hindu 
Sahis, based out of Gandhara in the northwest after the Arab conquests (Mishra 1972). 
However, since Hindu Sahis, regardless of its power, remained a regional actor, thus 
refraining from involvement at the system-wide level, it primarily positioned itself as a 
sub-system hegemon.    
920 AD – 970 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The Rastrakutas re-transitioned the Indic System into its previous unipolar 
structure by embarking on several major expansions: Gurjara-Pratiharas was invaded, 
thus being thoroughly weakened, while expansion to the south reaffirmed Rastrakuta 
hegemony in its defeat of Cola, Pandya, and Simhala. Rastrakutas hegemonic status was 
neither balanced nor seriously challenged by any actors at the system-wide level, thus 
creating a unipolar structure. The decline of Gurjara-Pratiharas, however, created 
important developments that soon brought about the end of Rastrakuta preponderance. 
The Candellas of Bundelkhand, the Paramaras, the Calyukas, and the Palas all re-
established themselves as independent, regional actors and rising sub-system hegemons 
(Sen 1988, 307-321). In the northwest the Hindu Sahis came into regional conflict with 
Ghazni, another Arabic kingdom absorbed into the periphery of the Indic System.  
970 AD – 1120 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 By 970 AD, Rastrakuta faced severe challenges by the given sub-system 
hegemons seeking system-wide status, and this was reified in the defeat of Rastrakuta by 
the Paramaras of Malwa (Bhatia 1970). Paramaras thus established itself as a system-
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wide hegemon, seeking suzerainty over Kalacuris, Cahamanas, Caulukyas, and Guhilas 
(Seth 1978, 47-66). Hindu Sahis became a system-wide hegemon upon entering in 
conflict with Ghazni, as both system-wide actors sought control of the northwest and 
expansion in the Indic System. Ghazni remained the most powerful hegemon in the 
system, conquering lands from the Kabul region, to Punjab, to all the way across central 
India (Bosworth 1963). Paramaras and Hindu Sahis stubbornly sought to counter-balance 
Ghazni growth, thus limiting Ghazni from altering the system into a unipolar structure. 
By 1021 Ghazni achieved its destruction of Hindu Sahi, thus removing a hegemonic actor 
from the system, only to be confronted by the elevation of Candellas to system-wide 
status, which not only staved off Ghazni encroachment into the Ganga Plain, but 
expanded the former’s dominance of the region as well (Dikshit 1977, 55-65). In the 
south the rise of Cola added a fourth actor to the multipolar system, as the new system-
wide hegemon subjugated Ganga, conquered Simhala, and pressed gains in Bengal at the 
expense of Palas. In a matter of a decade, Kalacuris overwhelmed Candellas and replaced 
it as one of the poles in the system (101), while the Calukyas of Karnata established 
system-wide hegemonic status by proceeding to challenge and thoroughly weaken Cola, 
Palas, Candellas, and Paramaras (Schwartzberg 1992, 188-90). In this sense, at any given 
time during this period, between four and five system-wide hegemons challenged and 
counter-balanced each other, while rising sub-system hegemons overwhelmed the 
declining ones, and thus reinforcing the continuous multipolar system.   
1120 AD – 1175 AD Transition from Multipolar to Tripolar Structure 
 Around 1120, due to Seljuk ascendancy in Central Asia and Middle East, Ghazni 
was overwhelmed and thus removed as hegemonic actor from the Indic System. The 
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structure thus transitioned into a tripolar configuration through the rise of Caulukyas from 
Gujarat (not to be confused with Calukyas of Karnata), the Cahamanas based out of 
Rajputana (Singh 1964), and the Gahadavalas of Kashi (Niyogi 1959). Caulukyas 
proceeded to annex Paramaras and counter-balance and even weaken Cahamanas, while 
establishing supremacy in western India, including much of Rajasthan. Cahamanas had 
established dominance in parts of the Ganga Plain and in the Punjab, while constantly at 
conflict with Caulukyas, initially Candellas, and then Gahadavalas (Dikshit 1977, 129-
138). Gahadavalas became system-wide hegemons by weakening Palas, annexing 
Magadha, and counter-balancing the ambitions of Cahamanas.    
1175 AD – 1220 AD Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The decline of Ghazni, along with the inflow of Muslims into the Indic System’s 
periphery, gave way to the incursion of Turkish dynasties into the system. The most 
powerful political unit to replace the Ghazni in the north were the Ghurids, who 
conquered southern Punjab, Sind, Ghazanavid, the Cahamanas, Kashi, parts of Bengal, 
and Malwa, thus extending their power from the periphery in the northwest all the way 
across the Gangetic Plain (Nizami 1998, 180-186). In a period of 15 years, the Ghurid 
established itself as the most powerful system-wide hegemon in the Indic System by 
defeating the previous system-wide hegemons, or reducing them to sub-system status, 
thus alleviating any challenges or counter-balance to its preponderance. The power 
constellation during this period is thus coded as unipolarity, with a single unchallenged 
hegemon, and various sub-system actors, including the rising sub-system hegemon 
Yadavas (Schwartzberg 1992, 196-197). 
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1220 AD – 1295 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 The Ghurids, seeking consolidation of power into the Middle East, exited the 
Indic System, yet conferred on the Mamluks politically autonomy to control the 
conquered domains (Jackson 1999, 3-21), thus creating the Sultanate of Delhi (the Ghurid 
dynasty, however, soon collapsed, with the northwestern states gaining independence, but 
this had no effect on Delhi’s system-wide status) (Chaurasia 2002; Aziz 1987; Habib and 
Nizami 1970).Delhi’s position, however, was soon challenged by the rise of Yadavas, a 
new system-wide hegemon based out of Maharastra, who managed to expand both east 
and south, dominating the Deccan and central India (Altekar1960). The system had thus 
transitioned into a bipolar structure, with the usual motley crew of sub-system actors: 
Candellas, Caulakyas, Orissa, Gujarat, Paramaras, and Pandya.    
Map 6.5 
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1295 AD – 1400 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 In 1290 the Mamluks were replaced by the Khalji dynasty (Day 1963), yet the 
Sultanate of Delhi remained a single political unit, only this time it managed to defeat the 
only other system-wide hegemon, Yadavas (Jackson 1999, 171-176), thus transitioning 
the Indic System into a unipolar structure. While Mongol groups had moved into the 
northern periphery of the system, and proceeded to undertake raids on Delhi territories 
from time to time, a coherent Mongol political unit was not formed, thus removing any 
systemic challenge to Delhi unipolarity. In 1320 the Tughluq dynasty replaced the 
Khaljis, undertaking a massive expansion that engulfed almost the entire Indic System. 
Ghazni, Qandahar, and Kabul were raided in the northwest to deter any future Mongol 
incursions, while Peshwar, Gujarat, Telingana, Malwa, Rajputana, Pandya, Mahrastra, 
Bengal, and even the Himalayas, were all conquered (Chaurasia 2002, 47-66). With the 
exception of tribal areas in the northwest periphery, Kashmir, small parts of the eastern 
sea coast, and parts of Rajputana, the Delhi Sultanate controlled the entire Indic System. 
Delhi’s system-wide hegemonic status remained unchallenged until the end of the 
century, and while its expansive size gradually limited the Sultanate’s capacity to control 
all of its realms, as vassal states slowly broke off during Delhi’s decline, no system-wide 
hegemon, however, rose to challenge or alter the unipolar structure.  
1400 AD – 1550 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 The incursion of Tamerlane (Amir Timur) into the Indic System, albeit 
temporarily, threw the power constellation of the system into inchoateness for nearly 150 
years, as endless conflict between sub-system actors, rising regional hegemons, and 
aspiring system-wide actors transitioned the power configurations from the Delhi 
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Sultanate’s unipolar structure to a nonpolar one. In 1398 Tamerlane launched his 
invasion of India, conquering most of the northwest and the Ganga Plain, thus ending the 
Delhi Sultanate (Ashrafyan 1998). Tamerlane’s incursion, however, did not translate into 
any consolidations or annexations, as Tamerlane proceeded west to conquer Persia, 
Eurasia, and much of the Middle East, while solidifying his empire in Central Asia 
(Mukminova 1998). His incursion, however, left the Indic System in a state of chaos, as 
the decay of the unipole brought about multitude of new political actors in the northwest 
and north-center, while in the periphery new political units started forming that would 
continue incursions into the sub-content, thus contributing to its continuous nonpolarity. 
Kashmir, Sind, Rajputana and Punjab established themselves as competing sub-system 
hegemons in the northwest, soon to welcome the rising Mughals (Tamerlane’s Turkic-
Mongol descendents) in the periphery; Jaunpur and soon Malwa (under the new 
Ghurids), then a resurgent Delhi, positioned as regional powers in the north-center; 
Bengal, Assam, and Orissa establish sub-system hegemonic status in the northeast; while 
Bidar, soon to be challenged by Gujarat, then Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, competed in the 
West; and in the South, Vijayanagar, Andhra, and Ceylon intensely struggling for 
regional dominance (Schwartzberg 1992, 199-204). 
 Inter-regional conflict, along with cross-regional conflict between aspiring sub-
system hegemons continued until 1550 AD, with no single political unit being able to 
attain system-wide hegemonic status. From time to time given actors temporarily 
succeeded in attaining sub-system hegemonic status, but this was soon challenged by new 
rising sub-system actors, thus limiting the capacity of such regional powers to attain 
system-wide positioning. Concomitantly, a continuous cycle presented itself, as new 
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independent actors popped up in the system, while older ones declined; conquests 
became ephemeral, with limited longevity of five or ten years at the most, thus 
reinforcing the nonpolarity of the system by virtue of intense dispersion of power, with 
centers of power in the system ranging from a minimum of 10 actors to a maximum of 16 
actors.     
1550 AD – 1725 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure 
 By 1525 the Mughals had established itself as sub-system hegemons in the 
northwest, seeking system-wide positioning by attempting to make headway into the 
Ganga Plain, and finally attaining after 30 years by conquering and solidifying their base 
of power in Delhi (Akbar 1948; Richards 2001, 9-15). The Mughals proceeded to absorb 
Awadh, Rajputana, Bihar, Sind, and Malwa in the north-center (Chaurasia 2002, 181-
205), then turning north and subjugating Kabul, Kandahar and Kashmir (Mattoo 1988), 
followed by heading northeast to absorb Bengal and northern Orissa (Ray and Raya 
1981), to then conquer Ahmadnagar to the west (Shyam 1966, 297-312), and finally 
overwhelm Bidar and Golkonda in the south (Chaurasia 2002, 275-277), reaching all the 
way to Arkat at the southeastern tip of the subcontinent. Mughal suzerainty, thus, 
extended all the way from Kabul and Kandahar in the periphery of the Northwest, all the 
way across the Ganga Plain in the North-center to the eastern seacoast, the entire Deccan 
and all of central India, and much of the southern tip of the sub-continent. Mughal 
system-wide hegemony remained neither challenged nor counter-balanced by any 
political units in the system until the 18
th 
century, classifying this epoch as fundamentally 
unipolar. While incursions by Persia into the northwest periphery especially into 
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Kandahar, created military problems for Mughal, Persia was neither an actor in the Indic 
System (since these incursions were inherently ephemeral), nor did they pose any threat 
or challenge to Mughal unipolarity. Similarly, Maratha resistance to Mughal expansion 
(Dighe 1944), for example, does not suggest a capacity for counter-balancing or Maratha 
status as system-wide challengers to Mughal hegemony (Mughal would proceed to 
conquer Maratha as a final outcome). To this end, the polar structure of the Indic System 
remained unipolar for nearly two centuries.  
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1725 AD – 1820 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 By 1725 the Mughal Empire had disintegrated, as various political units, either by 
breaking away from Mughal dominance, Mughal governors declaring independence, or 
outside powers infringing into the system, resurrected their respective states as system-
wide actors. Hyderabad, Marathas, the Durranis of Afghanistan, and the British Empire 
became the system-wide hegemonic actors in the new multipolar structure of the Indic 
System. British selective incursion, through the British East India Company, had begun 
from 1740’s, only to be supplemented by methodical British expansion and complete 
dominance, colonization, of the sub-continent by 1819.  
 During this period, however, Marathas became a system-wide hegemon by 
controlling Bundelkhand, Gujarat, and Malwa, raiding Rajput territories, (Gordon 1993, 
132-149; Chhabra 2005, 15-27) and directly challenging and counter-balancing one of the 
other system-wide hegemons, Hyderabad. Hyderabad established its dominance 
throughout the Deccan, thus directly confronting Marathas to its north, both militarily and 
diplomatically (Bawa 1986). In the northwest, Afghanistan established system-wide 
hegemonic status by seizing Punjab and Kashmir, only to meet a challenge from 
Marathas over Punjab and offer Marathas a severe defeat (Schwartzberg 1992, 211-212). 
Afghanistan’s ability to deter and weaken Marathas further balanced power through the 
system, as Hyderabad did not face an overly-powerful Marathas by itself. The inter-
hegemonic conflict between the indigenous powers, while relatively balancing their 
strengths, also, relatively, weakened their capabilities in relation to the British. As such, 
Marathas, Hyderabad, and Afghanistan, by early 19
th
 century, slowly began to cede 
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territory to the British, either through treaties or conquest, only to be enveloped by British 
power (Chaurasia 2004, 94-127; Chhabra 2005, 131-144). 
1820 AD – 1858 AD Transition from Indic System to Global System 
 During this period, British dominance of the Indic System not only included 
territorial conquest and consolidation, but also administrative and political solidification 
of British power. In 1757 British victory at the Battle of Plassey over Bengal and its 
French allies had paved the way for what would become British domination of the Indian 
subcontinent. This dominance, however, was not immediate as took Britain some time to 
consolidate its economic and terriotiral interests. This process, at the same time, was 
primarily led by the British East India Company, as it both administered and controlled 
the given territories and trading posts under the auspices of London. Disenchantment 
with British East Indian Company’s rule, however, gave way to the Indian Rebellion of 
1857, with regions from Delhi, Maratha, Utter Pradesh, and Bihar joining the uprising, 
while Bengal, Madras, Punjab, and Bombay did not.  
 In 1858 the rebellion was suppressed, but the outcome was two-fold: the British 
East Indian Company was dissolved, hence ending its administrative rule; at the same 
time, however, the entire country and much of the sub-continent became directly 
administered by Britain, hence replacing the political units of the Indic System with 
British Raj. As such, the territories, political units, and the socio-cultural and economic 
structures that comprised the Indic System officially became part of the British Empire. 
Forthwith, this period witnessed the colonization by Britain of the Indic System, and the 
absorption of the Indic World Political System into the Global Political System. 
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Analysis 
 
 A total of 32 data observations are collected as polar periods where the power 
constellations of the system are categorized according to the coding for modalities of 
polarity. The collected data allow for four types of analytical considerations: distribution 
of polar structures, transitional patterns after unipolar periods, duration of polar periods, 
and probabilistic considerations of polar structures after unipolar transitions. In the Indic 
World Political System, the most common power configuration is unipolarity, with 13 
unipolar periods being observed. In relation to other modes of polarity, unipolarity tends 
to be the norm, as the system consistently transitions to a unipolar structure after, on 
average, two different polar systems. This is indicative of the Indic System’s tendency to 
transition into configurations that display high concentrations of power.  
 Bipolarity remains the second most common polar structure in the system, with 8 
periods, followed by nonpolarity with 5 periods, multipolarity with 4 periods, and 
tripolarity with 2 periods. Concomitantly, in the 2200 years of the Indic System covered 
in this study, unipolarity was the polar system 40 percent of the time, followed by 
bipolarity (25 percent), nonpolarity (15 percent), multipolarity (12 percent), and 
tripolarity (6 percent).  Figure 6.1 charts the distribution of the polar structures, 
demonstrating the system’s tendency to consistently transition to a unipolar structure. 
Multipolarity and tripolarity remain the least occurring modes of power configurations, 
and even if the two were combined, presupposing, for the sake of argument, that any 
system over two system-wide hegemons is a multipolar system, its occuramce remains at 
six, lower than bipolar periods and not even half of unipolar structures. 
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FIGURE 6.1   DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN INDIC SYSTEM 
 
 
 
 On average, the most durable power constellation is nonpolarity, its average 
duration lasting approximately 80 years. As Figure 6.2 demonstrates, unipolarity remains 
the second most durable polar structure, averaging 75 year of longevity, followed by 
multipolarity with 71 years, tripolarity with 52 years, and bipolarity with 49 years. By 
virtue of its durability, nonpolarity remains the most stable structure at the system’s level, 
since it takes nearly 80 years in order for structural transition to take place. This appears 
to be consistent with the historical data: nonpolar periods witness the time consuming 
process of regional consolidation, inter-regional sub-system conflict, and then the 
positioning of rising sub-system hegemons at the system-wide level. In this sense, 
nonpolarity is structurally stable vis-à-vis system’s maintenance, not in relation to 
conflict and war. Similarly, unipolar longevity suggests the predisposition of the Indic 
System as favorable to system-wide hegemonic actors, since the removal of a pole either 
revolves around new challenging actors, or the disintegration of the hegemon by virtue of 
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internal weakening or overextension. In either case, the unipolar structures average 75 
years of preponderance. An interesting observation is the system’s stability of a 
multipolar modality in comparison to bipolar structures. While bipolar configurations 
appear to be far more common, they at the same time are the least durable, while 
multipolar systems, while relatively less common, are almost as durable as unipolar 
periods. Systemically, then, bipolarity remains the most unstable power configuration in 
the Indic System.   
 
 FIGURE 6.2   AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR STRUCTURES  
 
  
 The distribution of polar structures after unipolar periods offers insight into the 
probabilistic nature of post-unipolar system’s formation. 13 data observations allow for 
analytical consideration of trends after unipolarity, which suggests an almost equal 
distribution of polar structurations. As Figure 6.3 shows, of the 13 unipolar periods, the 
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system transitioned into a bipolar structure 5 times, a nonpolar structure 4 times, 
multipolar structure 3 times, and tripolar structure only once.   
 
FIGURE 6.3   POST-UNIPOLAR POWER CONSTELLATIONS IN INDIC SYSTEM 
 
 
 Probabilistically, then, the unipolar structure in the Indic System had a 38% 
chance of transitioning into a bipolar configuration, 30% chance of diffused nonpolar 
structure, 23% chance of multipolar constellation, and 7% chance at tripolarity. The 
analytical conclusion of these observations is two-fold: 38% of the time the post-unipolar 
system transitions into the least stable structure, while 30% of the time the system 
transitions into the most stable structure. The explanations for these developments are 
consistent with the historical data. In instances where system-wide hegemons disintegrate 
internally or due to overextension, the system generally transitions into a nonpolar 
structure, where which its longevity is sustained through the long climb that regional 
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actors must take in seeking to fill the vacuum left by the disintegrated, post-unipolar 
structure. In instances where the unipolar structure transitions into a bipolar one, this is 
generally the byproduct of rising or new system-wide hegemons counter-balancing and 
challenging the existing hegemon, in which case a sustained bipolar structure remains 
untenable, as either one of the poles succeed in dominating the other, or they manage to 
weaken each other to such an extent that new actors rise to the system-wide level, thus 
restructuring the power configurations.   
 The data allows for the rejection of any general hypotheses that contend 
multipolar or bipolar systems as the norm, rather suggesting the opposite: unipolarity is 
the most occurring polar structure in this given world political system. Likewise, the 
traditional disregard of scholars for considerations of nonpolar systems is also questioned 
by the data produced in this chapter.  In the Indic System, nonpolarity was present 15% 
within its historic sequence, more prevalent than multipolarity or tripolarity. 
Interestingly, the durability of nonpolar configurations, especially after unipolar 
transitions, is very telling: in 5 polar periods, nonpolarity accounted for 400 years of 
system’s maintenance, while multipolarity, with 4 polar periods, accounted for a total of 
285 years of system’s maintenance. The long-term presence of diffused, inchoate power 
constellations in a system are very important findings that have implications for our 
assessment of the overarching structurations of polar periods. To this end, should a post-
unipolar system transition into a nonpolar structure, this period will not be a temporary 
epoch, but would last for a fairly long period of time without any system-wide hegemons 
or superpowers.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 
 
 The Mediterranean World Political System primarily refers to the political 
interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide 
hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region that the given 
world political system encompasses. This fundamentally presupposes a group of political 
units/entities/actors having relations that are, to a strong degree, permanent or continuous 
with one another. Spatial-territorially, the Mediterranean System covers a specific 
geographical area, but to specify set regional and territorial boundaries in absolute terms 
in the conceptualization of a world political system will obscure the reality of the political 
realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at the periphery 
at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from the system. 
System’s classification, then, does not specifically rely on establishing absolute regional 
boundaries, but rather considering the ebb and flow of powerful political actors, primarily 
the political contacts, interactions, and power configurations of system-wide hegemons 
that function within the region that the given system encompasses. 
 The Mediterranean System, territorially, includes the global region that covers the 
following areas. The western periphery begins with the Atlantic Coast of the Iberian 
Peninsula, along the Sea of Gibraltar, heading south to the northern coast of modern-day 
Morocco, and proceeding eastward along the North African coast all the way to Cyrene 
(modern day Libya), with the Egyptian periphery of Numidia serving as the eastern-most 
periphery of the Mediterranean System. Heading north, the system covers much of the 
Mediterranean all the way to Cyprus, with Cyprus serving as its easternmost periphery, 
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heading northwest to the island of Rhodes and the entire eastern coast of Asia 
Minor/Anatolia (Ionian Asia Minor) serving as the central-eastern periphery of the 
system. Heading westward from Ionian Asia Minor, the system covers all of the Balkans, 
the Aegean Sea, the mainland of Greece along with all of the accompanying islands in the 
Mediterranean, the Adriatic Sea, the Italian Peninsula (with the accompanying islands of 
Sicily and Sardinia), and the entire south of the European continent all the way to the 
Iberian Peninsula.  
 The collection of data for polar periods within the Mediterranean System begins 
around approximately 2000 BC, with Aegean Greece providing the first case of unitary 
political actors, chronologically speaking, within the system. Evidence of political actors 
during the Neolithic Period within the Mediterranean System remains fundamentally 
limited, and for this reason, historical evidence is primarily extrapolated from the Late 
Bronze Period, with the Minoan Civilization serving as the initial subject of observation. 
In this sense, the scope of data collection undertaken in this work sharply differs from 
much of the scholarship undertaken by political scientists that have covered the political 
interactions and power configurations of ancient Mediterranean, especially of Greece: 
scope of research has primarily concentrated on the Archaic and Classical Periods, with 
extensive attention to interstate relations between city-states and the Peloponnesian War 
(Bederman 2001; Adcock and Mosley 1975; Kozak 2001; Kauppi 1991; Eckstein 2003; 
Gilpin 1981, 1988; Evera 1999; Doyle 1991; Lebow and Strauss 1991; Finley 1991; 
Waltz 1979; Wight 1978; and Rostovtzeff 1922). As such, the research at hand greatly 
expands the scope of data collection by observing the historical and archeological 
evidence prior to these periods, presenting findings of macropolitical developments for 
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approximately 1200 years of history that has been generally ignored by political 
scientists. 
 While the Mediterranean System covers the entire world region specified above, 
at its inception, however, it primarily covered four sub-regional civilizations of Aegean 
Greece: Crete, the Cycladic Islands, Helladic Civilization (Peloponnese and southern, 
mainland Greece), and Thessalonian Civilization (north-eastern Greece) (Wace 1923a, 
174) . Until the expansion of the system into Macedonia, Thrace, eastern (Ionian) Asia 
Minor, Italy, southern France, and the Mediterranean coast of Spain, for approximately 
900 years (2000BC–1100BC), the Mediterranean System remained limited to these four 
sub-regions. However, interactions with other world political systems, primarily the 
Middle East-Near East System, did take place primarily through trade with Egypt and the 
Syro-Palestinian Levant. Political interactions, however, remained almost non-existent, as 
system-wide actors within the Mediterranean System applied all of their attention to the 
Aegean, while system-wide actors in the Middle East-Near East System limited their 
reach to Cyprus, or, in the case of Anatolian system-wide actors, to the periphery of 
Ionian Asia Minor. Interstate relations between system-wide hegemonic actors of each of 
the respective systems did not come into political, high-level diplomatic, or military 
contact until the incursions of the Persian Empire into the Mediterranean System. Within 
this context, the two systems existed separately until the temporary incursion of the 
Persians during the Greco-Persian Wars, and the final absorption of the Middle East-Near 
East System into the Mediterranean System after Macedonia’s conquest of the Persian 
Empire and the formation of a single world political system.  
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2000 BC – 1700 BC Bipolar Structure 
 The classification of power configurations within the Mediterranean System 
begins around 2000 BC with the island of Crete, as the Minoan Civilization of the island 
represented the most politically and economically developed culture of the Aegean. 
Evidence of developed political entities in the system remain absent until the spread of 
Minoan Civilization to the Cycladic, Helladic, and Thessalonian sub-regions during the 
next 300 years. Within this period, then, the power configuration of the Mediterranean 
System is defined by the two power centers within Crete: Cnossus in the north and 
Phaestus in the south. While the historical evidence remains obscure as to whether these 
system-wide hegemons were rivals or separate seats of power, there is conclusive 
evidence that the two were the “great centers of power in Crete.” No archeological 
evidence exists to demonstrate any challenges to the dominance of Cnossus in the north 
and Phaestus in the south, leading to the possible assessment that the two “may have been 
the Athens and Sparta of the time; and the other towns of Crete may, like most states of 
fifth-century Hellas, have been divided between two political alliances” (Wace 1923b, 
593). The naval powers of these Cretan states also gave way to two developments: 
extensive trade relations with political units on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean 
(primarily Egypt), and the complete dominance of trade in the Aegean. Much of Aegean 
Greece, then, became enveloped with the culture, trade, and civilizational developments 
of the Minoans (Freeman 2004, 123-124).  
1700 BC – 1550 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The complete decline of Phaestus is noted during this period, with the overthrow 
and destruction of much of the city, yet with no clear historical evidence as to why. 
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Concomitantly, the decline of Phaestus “ended with the transference of the seat of power 
elsewhere, probably to Cnossus in the north,” thus transitioning the polar structure of the 
system from a bipolar constellations to a unipolar one. Within this context, a unipolar 
Crete came to dominate much of the system, with a “far stronger and wider Cretan 
suzerainty over south-eastern Greece and the adjacent islands,” that is, the Cyclades, 
where the “influence of Crete seems to have been practically supreme in the islands;” 
while in the Peloponnese and central Greece, it “is possible that Cretan colonies were 
established at some sites, Mycenae, Tiryns, Corinth, Orchomenus, Thebes; or we might 
believe that the influence was exercised, not by colonization or conquest, but by peaceful 
penetration, trade, settlement” (Wace 1923b, 597-608). While the colonization theory 
remains controversial and unsubstantiated, Cretan dominance, however, remains 
unquestioned. For no political actor had an “interest in disputing the position of Crete, 
and the Aegean world from which she had emerged was as yet no match for her” (Matz 
1973, 557). Within this context, toward the end of the Cretan unipolar period, the system 
had three possible sub-system hegemons in the form of Orchomenus, Thebes, and 
Mycenae, with a single unipole whose “domination of her neighbors was a foregone 
conclusion” (Wace 1923b, 614-615). The rise of Mycenae, however, will lead to a re-
alteration of the Mediterranean System, as a dominant actor from mainland Greece will 
proceed to counter-balance Crete’s system-wide hegemonic status.  
1550 BC – 1400 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 Around 1600 BC, Mycenae of mainland Greece, in the Achaean-Argolis region, 
began its rise as a sub-system hegemon by challenging regional hegemon Thebes for 
local power, proceeding to sack the latter and begin solidifying Mycenaean power in 
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north-east Peloponnese (Stubbings 1975a, 169-171). While Mycenae remained the 
cultural center from which the Mycenaean civilization spread, as a political unit, 
however, Mycenae, at this point, observed the presence of two other sub-system 
hegemons: Elis in the north-west and Pylos in the south-west of the Peloponnese 
(Stubbings 1973, 651). Rising Tiryns and a nascent Athens, while active politically, did 
not present positioning at the sub-system level, while Mycenae, Elis, and Pylus displayed 
a rather peaceful balance of power, with Mycenae as not only the relatively stronger actor 
(Freeman 2004, 127), but also the revisionist actor with aspirations of system-wide 
hegemonic status. Mycenae’s interactions with Crete were both frequent and extensive, 
since Crete had exercised suzerainty over much of the southern Peloponnese for the 
previous few hundred years. At the same time, while archeological evidence 
demonstrates Cretan dominance over Athens, southern Peloponnese, and the Cycladic 
islands, Cretan preponderance over Mycenae has never been established. Within this 
context, a rising Mycenae not only viewed Crete as its equal, but also a challenge to 
system-wide preponderance. Mycenaean expansion into the Cycladic island, as evidenced 
in Melos, into Asia Minor as evident in Melitus, establishment of settlements on Rhodes 
(a traditional Cretan sphere of influence), and extensive trade with not only Egypt, 
southern Palestine, and Syria in the east (Stubbings 1973, 644-645), but Sardinia, the 
Italian Peninsula, and Malta to the west, clearly represent the rise of Mycenae as system-
wide hegemon challenging and counter-balancing Crete’s system-wide hegemonic status 
(Matz 1973, 577). By around 1550, the Mediterranean System had transitioned into a 
bipolar structure, with Mycenae dominating mainland Greece, while also expanding into 
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the Aegean, and Crete dominating the southern Aegean and attempting to preserve its 
system-wide status.   
1400 BC – 1100 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The increased wealth and expansion of Mycenae was coupled with its growing 
military power: unlike Crete, the Mycenaeans were “outward looking and often 
aggressive” (Freeman 2004, 125), with a warrior-aristocratic culture that was more 
violent and war-prone than the Cretans (Levi 1966, 32-36). As Mycenae became the 
“metropolis of Greece” and the “first major efflorescence of civilization in Hellas” 
(Stubbings 1973, 629), Crete underwent much decline, reasons for which possibly range 
from natural disasters, internal decay, and external Mycenaean pressure. As such, while 
the specifics as to why Crete fell cannot be substantiated through the archeological 
evidence, one fact remains undisputed: by 1400 BC Crete was dominated by Mycenaean 
Greeks, perhaps having “been conquered by Mycenaean Greeks,” due “to Mycenaean 
arms” (655-657). Mycenae’s unipolarity was perhaps unique, in that usage of the term 
Mycenae and Mycenaean might lead to some confusion with regard to analysis of power 
configurations: Mycenae refers to the political unit, existing in the form of a city-
kingdom, while Mycenaean refers to the culture and civilization that dominated the 
Greek world after the fall of Cretan Minoan Civilization. Within this context, Mycenae 
was the most powerful political unit in the system, with the following sub-system 
hegemons: Pylos (who were also Mycenaean, but a separate, independent political unit), 
Elis, Mycenaean Crete (dominated by Mycenaean Greeks, but perhaps politically 
independent from Mycenae), Tiryns, and possibly Athens and Sparta. The interesting 
feature of Mycenae’s unipolarity, however, is that none of the sub-system hegemons were 
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revisionist, but rather, they engaged in bandwagoning or shirking. In this sense, relative 
strength remained somewhat moot, for almost all of the sub-system hegemons displayed 
complementary, reciprocal, or neutral relations with the unipole.  
 As the archeological evidence suggests, only the Peloponnese, Crete, Cyclades, 
and eastern Asia Minor, within the Mediterranean System, were developed civilizations 
during this period with functional political units. As such, Mycenae’s domination of 
Peloponnese, Crete and the Cyclades led to an expansionist attention toward the east, 
primarily Cyprus (where Mycenaean settlements were observed) and Asia Minor. These 
eastward expansions led to tense relations with the Hittites, only to be diffused by the 
disintegration of the latter, while Mycenae’s interest in Asia Minor gave way to the 
Trojan War. While the historical evidence is rather murky, two general assumptions have 
been substantiated: Troy was destroyed and the endeavor was undertaken by a joint 
Greek contingent led by Mycenae (Stubbings 1975b, 342-350). The general outcome, 
then, until the 12
th
 century BC, appears Mycenaean Greece’s domination of the eastern 
Mediterranean, with Mycenae as the leading system-wide hegemon.         
1100 BC – 850 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 By 1100 BC, the Mycenaean Civilization had pretty much been eradicated, with 
Mycenae, along with Pylos, Tiryns, regions of Argolid, Messenia, Achaea, Corinthia, 
Phocis, and Boeotia being destroyed, great portions of their population migrating, and 
new patterns of settlements taking place by non-Mycenaean culture (Desborough 1975, 
659-660; Stubbings 1975b, 352-354). This was soon followed by the desertion and 
destruction of the Cycladic centers of trade, such as Melos, Naxos, and Rhodes, while 
Miletus, on the coast of Asia Minor, was also destroyed (Desborough 1975, 666-667). 
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The reasons for these developments remain rather obscure. Historical evidence 
unquestionably proves that these developments did in fact take place: the problem, 
however, is lack of archeological evidence to explain these developments. Three general 
theories have been suggested: over-exhaustion of military resources in a war in Asia 
Minor (possibly the Trojan War); over-population growth, resource scarcity, drought, and 
internal instability; and the invasion of people from the north unto rest of Greece (the 
presumed Dorian invasion) (Hammond 1975, 681-701). Regardless of the reasons for the 
collapse of Mycenae’s system-wide dominance, one outcome remains rather clear: “the 
break-up of the central political power” and the “flight from affected areas” by the 
Mycenaean Greeks. The outcome, then, was the complete disintegration of the 
Mycenaeans, with the Mediterranean System restructuring into a nonpolar configuration, 
as no coherent or system-wide political units seemed to appear, with much of the 
dominant city-kingdoms being destroyed, along with mass desertion and migrating, and a 
general conception of chaos prevailing within the macropolitical structuration of the 
system. The diffusion of power during this period appears to have been extensive, as the 
collapse of an entire civilization gave way to the destruction of the existing centers of 
power, with the outcome being some 300 years of nonpolarity: their remained no centers 
of power, but rather, secluded concentrations of pockets of small political units.   
 During this nonpolar period, three important developments took place that came 
to shape much of the future Greek world. First, migrations into Attica and Euboea 
provided the population basis for the future resurgence of this region, especially Athenian 
Attica (Thomas and Gognat 1999, 61-66); while migrations into the Aegean islands, and 
further east to Cyprus, provided the initial basis of Greek colonization on the eastern 
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periphery of the system. Second, while the ethno-racial identity of the northern invaders 
remains controversial, their settlement in the south of the Peloponnese remains 
undisputed. And third, toward the end of this nonpolar period, consolidation of power 
slowly began to take form regionally, especially in the formation of the four ethnē with 
their distinct dialects: Aeolian (Thessaly, Magnesia, Boeotia, Thebes), Achaean 
(Arcadians, Cyproits); Ionian (Athenians, Euboeans, Milesians), and Dorian (Sparta, 
Macedonia, Crete, Rhodes, Epirotes, Aetolians, Locrians). Within this context, much of 
the Greek settlements in the eastern Aegean and Asia Minor became defined by the 
colonizing group’s ethnē: Aeolic settlements in the Aegean north-east and Asia Minor, 
Ionian settlements in much of the eastern coast of Asia Minor and Cyclades, and Dorian 
settlements in south-east of the Aegean and Asia Minor (Cook 1975, 776-796). 
Concomitantly, ethnē relations gave way to two general phenomena: the tendency of 
nascent city-states with the same ethnē and dialect to ally together (Thomas and Gognat 
1999, 83-84), and the consolidation of regional power based on such structurations.  
850 BC – 750 BC Continuation of Nonpolar Structure 
 While the Mediterranean System continued its nonpolar epoch, important regional 
consolidations, or sub-system hegemonic conflict for regional hegemony, took place in 
many parts of the Greek world. This, in turn, was supplemented by the continued 
colonization of rising sub-system actors seeking system-wide status. Within this context, 
three general developments gave way to increased concentration of power within the 
system: nascent city-states began establishing both regional and system-wide presence; 
Greek colonization, initially eastward, now turned west, primarily to the Italian Peninsula 
and the Western Mediterranean, thus expanding the Mediterranean System; and, the 
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Phoenicians displayed their presence in the Western Mediterranean and North Africa by 
establishing trading posts and nascent cities, thus further expanding the Mediterranean 
System (Freeman 2004, 147-156).  Concomitantly, relative consolidation during this 
period created observable centers of power that were non-existent during the initial 
nonpolar epoch: however, since the centers of power remain numerically high, the 
structure of the system continues to be defined as nonpolar, since multipolar structural 
attributes remain absent. The centers of power during this period constituted the 
following sub-system actors: Argos and Sparta in the Peloponnese; Elis west of Arcadia; 
Corinth and Megara on the land-bridge connecting the Peloponnese to central Greece; 
Athens in Attica; Orchomenus and Thebes in Boeotia; Phocis north of Boeotia; Thessaly 
in northern Greece; Eretria and Chalcis in Euboea; and Miletus in Asia Minor (Sealey 
1976, 15-18).    
750 BC – 690 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure 
 The consolidation of regional spheres of influence during the latter stages of the 
previous nonpolar period gave way to the development of sub-system hegemons 
competing for system-wide dominance. Two general events reify this process: the First 
Messenian War and the Lelantine War. The First Messenian War between Sparta (with 
allies Elis and Corinth) and Messenia (with allies Argos and Arcadia), was part of 
Sparta’s endeavor to attain system-wide status, as expansion to the west and north 
solidified Sparta’s dominance of much of Peloponnese. This, in turn, gave way to the 
weakening of Argos as potential system-wide actor, along with the attainment of Spartan 
suzerainty over the region (Coldstream 2003, 142-143). The Lelantine War was between 
the two power states of Euboea, Erteria and Chalcis, with Corinth, Samos, and Pharsalos 
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(Thessaly) siding with the latter, while Megara and Miletus sided with the former 
(Freeman 2004, 156-158). The outcome was an unclear victory for Chalcis, but 
nonetheless, both actors were exhausted and severely weakened by the war. 
Consequently, the allies of the given sides attained further relative power in relation to 
such developments (Coldstream 2003, 181-182). The power configurations of the system, 
then, appeared to be as followed: Spartan dominance of southern Greece; Corinthian 
dominance of central Greece, along with the presence of Megara; Chalcis and Erteria as 
weakened yet centers of power in Euboea; and Thessaly in northern Greece. Chalcis and 
Erteria after the war may be reduced to sub-system hegemons, joining Elis, Argos, 
Athens, and Thebes in the mainland, along with various powerful sub-system commercial 
island-states such as Aegina.  
690 BC – 650 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The Second Messenian War altered the Mediterranean System from a multipolar 
configuration to unipolarity, as the Peloponnese became engulfed in a war that 
temporarily weakened all parties involved, while much of mainland Greece lost relative 
strength to Corinth, which managed to position itself as the singular system-wide 
hegemon. The Messenian revolt against Spartan suzerainty was coupled by revisionist 
Argos, which sought to re-establish itself as a system-wide actor, thus challenging both 
Sparta and Corinth by supporting the latter’s enemy Megara. Thus, the Messanian pole 
(Argos, Sicyon, Arcadia, and Elis) clashed with Sparta (who received assistance from 
Corinth), giving way to a twenty year conflict that resulted in Spartan victory, yet a much 
weakened Peloponnese. Concomitantly, Corinthian dominance over central Greece 
became a reality, as Megara was reduced to sub-system status, while much of Attica, 
198 
 
Boeotia, and Thessaly remained incapable of challenging or counter-balancing Corinthian 
unipoalrity. In this context, the Lelantine War made Corinth the “leading city of Greece” 
(Freeman 2004, 156), and while the Second Messenian War reduced previous system-
wide hegemons to sub-system status, Corinth had “become the foremost commercial 
power in Greece” (Coldstram 2003, 147), hence re-structuring the Mediterranean System 
into a unipolar configuration (Sealey 1976, 43-44). Corinthian unipolarity, however, was 
supplemented by the presence of several sub-system hegemons, one of which expanded 
the Mediterranean System into north Italy. Sparta and Argos remained competitive 
regionally, with Sparta eventually gaining the upper hand; Megara, Athens, Thebes, 
Thessaly, and the usual mainland players remained at the sub-system level; colonies in 
Ionian Asia Minor and Euboean Balkans preserved the status quo; while Spartan 
Tarentum, Achean Croton, Corinthian Syracuse, and Euboean settlements in Italy came 
into contact with the two new sub-system hegemons of the region: the Etruscans of North 
Italy (Ridgeway 1988, 667-675) and the Carthaginians of North Africa.       
650 BC – 490 BC Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 The resurgence of Sparta, after the Second Messenian War, as the most powerful 
system-wide hegemon, altered the Mediterranean System into a multipolar power 
constellation, as Corinth also maintained its system-wide status, along with an aggressive 
Argos, a rising Athens, and a powerful Carthage that had not only recently established 
suzerainty over Phoenician settlements, but also had established its system-wide 
hegemonic status by dominating North Africa, much of the Western Mediterranean, the 
Mediterranean coast of the Iberian peninsula, and the islands of Sardinia and, for a 
limited time, Sicily. This multipolar period, then, may be best organized into five 
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overarching themes. First, the balancing, counter-balancing, and inter-hegemonic 
competition in the Greek mainland over system-wide positioning had important 
implications. Second, process of polarization and alliance formation that took place 
between system-wide hegemons and sub-system hegemons, thus contributing to much 
instability. Third, the developing conflict between Carthage and Greek colonies in the 
West Mediterranean proved to have important consequences upon both the structure of 
the system and its unitary actors. Fourth, rise of Rome as sub-system challenger to a 
declining Etruria for sub-system hegemony in Italy magnified the importance of this sub-
system. And fifth, the incursion of the Persian Empire into the Mediterranean System via 
conquest of Ionian Asia Minor laid the groundwork and the potential incentive for the 
Mediterranean System to absorb the Near East-Middle Eastern System. 
 The conquest of Messenia gave Sparta control of all the southern part of the 
Peloponnese and most of the territories up north not controlled by Elis, Arcadia, and 
Argos (Sealey 1976, 61). By 590 BC, however, Sparta turned its attention north, seeking 
to conquer Arcadia and subdue Argos. The Tegean War lasted until 560 BC, which pretty 
much brought the entire Peloponnese under Spartan control (with the exception of 
Argos), but this control was no so much based on conquest, but rather through alliance 
and loose polarization: the Peloponnesian League. Headed by Sparta, the League 
included all of the sub-system hegemons of Peloponnese (Elis included), with the 
exception of Argos and Achaea. Corinth, Sicyon, Tegea, and eventually Megara would 
also join the League, thus making this the most powerful alliance in the system, with 
Sparta recognized as leader, hegemon. The League itself, however, was not a tight pole, 
but rather, a loose pole dominated by Sparta, and within this sense, it cannot be 
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categorized as a single pole. In-fighting between the allies, for example, did occur, since 
the alliance revolved around loyalty to Sparta, not each other (Jeffery 1988, 352-353) 
Furthermore, Corinth, for example, was the most important and perhaps powerful 
member after Sparta, yet it was, itself, a system-wide hegemon, and while recognition of 
Spartan superiority in the alliance was noted, Corinth still remained powerful in its own 
right, as it openly voiced its disagreement with Sparta by counter-balancing and checking 
Spartan policies if it deemed necessary (e.g., refusing to attack Athens in 507, rejecting 
Sparta’s proposal to invade Athens in 504; serving as arbitrator for Athens-Megara 
conflict, as well as the Thebes-Athens disputes) (Sealey 1976, 148; Jeffery 1988, 360). 
 Athens’ rise to system-wide hegemon began with a methodical domination of 
Attica, with a continuous attempt at extending its sphere of influence north to Boeotia, 
west to Megara, and the surrounding islands of Salamis, Aegina, and the wealthy 
Cycladic island-states of Naxos and Samos. This, in turn, brought Athens into 
consecutive conflicts with Megara over Salamis (which Corinth arbitrated in favor of 
Athens), Thebes over Plataea (over which it defeated a Theban attack), and a naval war 
with Aegina (which it was able to win with Corinthian assistance) (Jeffrey 1988, 360-
366). In the meantime, Sparta sought to establish a sphere of influence over Attica and 
central Greece as well, as it invaded Athenian ally Samos (unsuccessfully) for 
undertaking a regime change, overthrew Naxos (another Athenian ally), wrestled Megara 
from Athens’ sphere of influence, and even intervened in the internal politics of Athens 
itself. The attempt at installing a puppet tyrant in Athens, however, failed, and Sparta led 
the Peloponnesian League, along with Boeotia and Chalcis, to invade Athens. Corinth’s 
refusal to commit withheld the invasion by the League, which allowed Athens to soundly 
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defeat Boeotia and Chalcis (Sealey 1976,147-150; Jeffrey 1988, 361-362; Freeman 2003, 
177-181).  
 In the Western Mediterranean, especially in Sicily, Carthage came into serious 
conflict with two of the more powerful Greek colonies, Gela and then Syracuse. From 
approximately 650 BC to 510 BC, Carthage had established complete dominance of 
Sicily, and while it had initially tolerated Greek colonization, it defeated several Greek 
expeditions in 580 BC, 540 BC and 510 BC. The rise of Gela as a sub-system challenger 
to Carthaginian hegemony, followed by transfer of Greek power to Syracuse, brought 
about the Greco-Punic Wars. Within this context, Carthage’s system-wide hegemonic 
status was not necessarily challenged, but rather, its dominance of Sicily was only 
challenged by rising sub-system actors Gela and Syracuse. While Gela and Syracuse 
were Doric states, their expansive growth threatened Rhegion and Himera, Ionian states 
who joined Carthage to counter-balance the Doric threat (Asheri 1988, 748-775). As 
such, Carthage attained system-wide status by sustaining a commercial and naval empire 
that stretched the entire Western Mediterranean, but at the same time, it had to deal with 
rising sub-system hegemons that threatened its strategic interests in Sicily.      
 In the eastern periphery of the system, the Persian Empire made an incursion into 
the Mediterranean System by conquering much of northern Thrace and Anatolia/Asia 
Minor, thus reaching the coasts of the Black Sea and of the Aegean, hence assuming 
suzerainty over Ionian Asia Minor around 540 BC. In 499 BC, however, the Ionian Greek 
cities revolted against Persian rule, hence opening a clash between the system-wide 
hegemon of the Near East-Middle Eastern System and the various system-wide and sub-
system actors of the Mediterranean System. Athens, Miletus, Erteria, and other Ionian 
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Greek city-states sent assistance to the revolt, hence creating a venue for a much larger 
conflict (Gray and Cary 1926, 214-225). By 493 BC, however, the Persians had crushed 
the Ionian Revolt: but the clash between the two world political systems was about to get 
more severe, as Persia sought to expand its empire and absorb the Mediterranean System 
into the Near East-Middle Eastern System (Murray 1988, 465-490). 
 In sum, the polar structure of the Mediterranean System during this period may be 
classified as followed: Spartan system-wide hegemony and leadership of the 
Peloponnesian League; Corinthian system-wide hegemony through allying and also 
counter-balancing Sparta, thus preserving the balance of power within the Greek 
mainland; Athenian system-wide hegemony in its dominance of Attica and expansion of 
its sphere of influence into Euboea and the Cycladic islands; Theban system-wide 
hegemony in Boeotia and the north; Carthaginian system-wide hegemony in the Western 
Mediterranean; and Persian system-wide presence in the eastern periphery. This, in turn, 
is supplemented by the presence of a high number of sub-system hegemons, ranging from 
Argos to Elis to Chalcis in the mainland, to Aegina, Miletus, Samos and Naxos in the 
Cyclades, to Syracuse and Gela in Sicily, to finally Rome and the Etruscans in central 
and north Italy.  
490 BC – 465 BC Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 By 493 BC Persia had suppressed the Ionian Revolt, which was soon followed by 
an invasion of European Greece, as the Persians crossed the Bosporus, overwhelmed 
much of Thrace, subjugated Macedonia, and would soon bring Thessaly and, more 
importantly, Thebes, under its control(Hammond 1988a, 493-496). Subsequently, the 
Greek world united under the leadership of Sparta, thus created a bipolar power 
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constellation in the system, with the Persians and their Greek allies as one pole and the 
united Greek opposition, soon to be formed as the Hellenic League of 481, as the other. 
Persia’s initial attempt at attacking mainland Greece began in 490 BC with its naval 
conquest of several Cycladic islands, southern Euboea, and Eretria. This initial success, 
however, was met with a devastating defeat at hands of the Athenians at the Battle of 
Marathon (Munro 1926a, 229-254; Hammond 1988a, 502-517). This initial repulsion 
gave way to a much larger expedition by the Persians, which, in turn, led the Greek cities 
to form the Hellenic League in 481 (Sealey 1976, 195-196). As the leading power in the 
Mediterranean System, Sparta also became the leading state in the Hellenic League, 
followed by the system-wide hegemons Athens and Corinth. Polarization, then, took the 
form of Sparta and the entire Peloponnesian League, Athens, Plataea, Thespia, Euboea, 
Aegina, Megara, Locria, Pharsalus, and the various dependencies and colonies of the 
system-wide hegemons of the League (Sealey 1976, 205-207). The League also invited 
Syracuse, Gelon, and Crete to join in the effort against Persia, but conflict with Carthage 
limited Syracuse and Gela to Sicily, while Crete chose neutrality. The only 
Peloponnesian city-state to not join the League was Argo, whose animosity with Sparta 
drove it into alliance with the Persians.  
 In 481 BC Persia began its second, and much larger, invasion of mainland Greece, 
with the first main battle taking place at Thermopylae, as the Hellenic League sent a force 
headed by Sparta stop the Persian advance. The naval forces of the League engaged the 
Persian fleet at the Battle of Artemisium (Munro 1926b, 284-301). While Persia overran 
the Greek contingent at Thermopylae, its losses were severe, only to be supplemented by 
an indecisive outcome at Artemisium. Central Greece remained open for advance, as the 
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Persians headed to Attica and destroyed an evacuated Athens (Hammond 1988b, 546-
591). The evacuation of Athens was a collective success of the Hellenic League, as the 
population was temporarily settled in Aegina and Salamis, while the navy of the League 
offered Persia an unexpected and decisive defeat at the Battle of Salamis (Munro 1926b, 
303-314). The naval defeats of Persia, and its pyrrhic victory at Thermopylae, forced the 
Persians to retreat back to their base in the north, while its entire naval force, heavily 
damaged, retreated to Asia Minor. In 479 BC, the remaining Persian forces unleashed 
another massive attack against the Hellenic League from the north, only to be crushed in 
the Battle of Plataea (Munro 1926c, 331-340), hence ending Persia’s incursion into 
European Greece. The League pushed across the Aegean, with powerful island-cities of 
Samos, Chia, and Lesbia joining the alliance (Sealey 1976, 226-227). At Mycale the 
Persian forces in Asia Minor faced off against the League, to be, once again, defeated, 
with the Ionian states also joining against Persia (Munro 1926c, 341-344). The outcome, 
then, was the expulsion of Persia from the Mediterranean System, which, in turn, gave 
way to two developments: the rise of Athens as a superpower in the system, and the 
dissolution of the Hellenic League, with Sparta returning to its leadership of the 
Peloponnesian League, while Athens forming its own pole: the Delian League.  
460 BC – 405 BC Continuation of Bipolar Structure 
 In the Hellenic League Sparta had command, while Athens was one of the 
members within the pole; but this relationship, once the Persians were repelled, no longer 
reflected the actual balance of power. In 478 BC, Athenian naval power had positioned 
the city-state as a system-wide hegemon, and to continue Greek activities against the 
Persian Empire, the Delian League was formed under Athenian leadership. Sparta 
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considered this development consistent with its policy, since the Persian threat had been 
alleviated and the Delian League would serve as a buffer between Persia and mainland 
Greece. Within this context, the bipolar system was complementary and mutually 
reinforcing: the Peloponnesian League, under Spartan suzerainty, dominated the 
mainland, while the Delian League, under Athenian suzerainty, dominated the Aegean, 
the Cyclades, the coast of Asia Minor, and cities on the coast of Thrace (Walker 1927, 
40-45; Sealey 1976, 248-252). The structure of these two alliances were rather distinct: 
the Peloponnesian League revolved around a congress, where member states would 
assemble and vote, and while Sparta was the recognized leader, members of the pole had 
the authority to question, debate, and propose courses of action; the Delian League, 
however, became more autocratic, as Athenian dominance was absolute, with tributes 
stipulated upon all members, and Athenians reserving the right to interfere in the internal 
affairs of member states who questioned, challenged, or sought to leave the League. 
Analogously, then, the Peloponnesian League resembled Cold War NATO, while the 
Delian League the Warsaw Pact.   
 In the Peloponnese, sub-system hegemon Argos, in its defiance of Sparta, sought 
regional expansion against Spartan allies Tiryns and Mycenae, while founding an alliance 
with the newly-formed Arcadian League. Sparta’s capacity to suppress this challeng 
proved fruitful, but it also demonstrated the revisionist tendencies of regional actors. In 
460 BC the Messenian Revolt broke out, as the entire sub-region, traditionally under 
complete Spartan dominance, revolted (possibly through Argive-Arcadian assistance). 
Sparta appealed to its Peloponnesian allies, with Aegina, Mantinea, Plataea, and other 
core members quickly responding. Demonstrative of the complementary nature of this 
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bipolar structure, Sparta also appealed to Athens, who, complying with the precepts of 
the Hellenic League, also agreed to help (Walker 1927b, 69-72). Sparta’s refusal of this 
initially requested assistance, however, deeply offended Athens, thus altering the 
relations of the system-wide hegemons into one of hostility. Athens abrogated its 
obligations under the Hellenic League and formed an alliance with Argos (along with 
Thessaly and Megara), thus placing itself in a state of war with Sparta: the First 
Peloponnesian War was underway (Sealey 1976, 258-263).  
 Athenian naval success is noted at the beginning, as Corinth and Aegina, the two 
biggest naval powers in the Peloponnesian League, where no match for Athens. Sparta 
reacted by displaying its superiority on land, as it invaded central Greece, confronting 
Athens, Boeotia, Argos, and Thessaly at the Battle of Tanagra, only to come out 
victorious (Walker 1927b, 78-83). Around 451 BC the Five Years’ Treaty was made 
between the warring parties, reasons for which are two-fold: relative Spartan exhaustion, 
and dissention within the Delian League (Sealey 1976, 272). Miletus, Erythrae, Chalcis, 
Erteria, Histiaea, Styra, Cythnos, Siphnos, Tenos, Paros, and Naxos (all important and 
strategic Aegean island-states) sought to secede from the Delian League. The Athenian 
response was swift, as given states that did not meet Athens’ ultimatum were sieged, 
overcome, and placed directly under Athenian control, with confiscations of territory and 
wealth being coupled with the settlement of Athenian citizens and the installation of 
satellite governments (Walker 1927b, 86-88; Sealey 1976, 277). In this sense, the Delian 
League had pretty much become the Athenian Empire.  
 Around 447 BC the Five Years’ Treaty was broken, as conflict in Boeotia, along 
with Euboea’s and Megara’s rebellion against Athens, gave way to Corinth’s 
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involvement in the conflict. Thus, the Peloponnesian League was once again at war with 
Athens, with the former invading Attica and devastating much of the western region. The 
robust show of strength by the Spartans, along with Athens’ chronic problems in the 
Delian League, gave way to the Thirty Year Peace between the parties, hence ending the 
first stage of the Peloponnesian War (Walker 1927b, 88-93). The terms of the treaty 
preserved the relative power of both system-wide actors, as Sparta maintained dominance 
of mainland Greece while Athens retained the Delian League (Sealey 1976, 291-292).     
 In 430 BC conflict between Corinth and its former colony Corcyra culminated in 
the former’s defeat at the Battle of Leucimme: Corinth’s refusal to concede drove 
Corcyra to an alliance with Athens, thus setting the stage for renewal of hostilities 
between the Peloponnesian League and the Delian League. Athenian-Corinthian 
animosities were also projected in a conflict over Poteidaea, a former Corinthian colony: 
Athens had given Poteidaea an ultimatum for submission, yet Poteidaea refused, appealed 
to Corinth, who, in turn, appealed to Sparta: the Peloponnesian League prepared for war  
(Adcock 1927, 171-193). The Second Peloponnesian War thus began, with the first 
period of this conflict being designated as the Archimadian War. The struggle between 
the two poles resembled the same pattern from the first Peloponnesian War: Spartan 
dominance on land, Athenian dominance on sea. Two important developments, however, 
are to be noted. First, Thebes became a powerful player during this stage, allying with 
Sparta and positioning itself as a sub-system power with system-wide aspiration. Second, 
Sicily became part of the conflict, as Syracuse remained a staunch supporter of Sparta, 
while Athens meddled into the sub-system by allying with Leontini and Rhegium 
(Syracuse’s enemies) (Sealey 1976, 328-331; Adcock 1927b, 193-248). Around 421 BC, 
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however, both parties sought cessation of hostilities with the Peace of Nicias, a one year 
armistice, hence bringing an end to the Archimadian War.   
 The Peace of Nicias was clearly made to be broken, as Sparta established an 
alliance with Boeotia (presumed Athenian sphere of influence), while Athens concluded 
an alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Elis (presumed Spartan sphere of influence), what 
came to be known as the Quadruple Alliance. These arrangements gave way to three 
important outcomes: 1) alliances were no longer about polarization, but rather relatively 
equal and mutual assistance; 2) both system-wide hegemons sought positioning at the 
doorstep of the other, hence suggesting the intensification of conflict; and 3) sub-system 
hegemons became important actors, thus creating the structural basis for a potential 
multipolar configuration. The Quadruple Alliance invaded Arcadia, with Sparta 
responding to this invasion in the renowned Battle of Mantinea: the result was a 
devastating defeat of the Quadruple Alliance and its dissolution (Ferguson 1927, 261-
275). This appears to have been the initial turning point in the war. In response, Athenian 
strategy resorted to the sea, demonstrated in the famous destruction of Melos in 416 BC 
followed by the failed expedition to Sicily. Athens had demonstrated initial plans to 
conquer Sicily, and a conflict in 416 BC between Selinus, a Syracusean ally, and Egesta, 
an Athenian ally, provided the opening. Athenian forces in 415 BC began their attack of 
Syracuse, the regional hegemon, while the Syracusans received assistance from Corinth, 
Boeotia, Sicyon, and Sparta. The outcome changed the course of the Peloponnesian War: 
the entire Athenian expeditionary force was destroyed (Sealey 1976, 353-355; Ferguson 
1927b, 285-311). Sparta capitalized on these developments by invading Argos and 
devastating the Athenian ally, only to be followed by an invasion of Attica itself. 
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Concomitantly, the weakening of Athens gave way to a large number of Aegean island-
states, along with subject Ionian city-states in Asia Minor, to rebel against the Delian 
League.  
 Athens’ loss of influence in the Aegean offered Sparta the opportunity to move in 
and establish satellite governments among former Delian League members. This was 
coupled by the Peloponnesian League advancing to the doorsteps of Athens, thus 
blockading Athens by land and sea. The Athenians sued for peace and the Peloponnesian 
War was over. The terms of peace ended the Athenian Empire, as Athens gave up claims 
over its Aegean and overseas possessions, surrendered its fleet to Sparta, and recognized 
Sparta’s preponderance over the system. In return, Athens was permitted to keep its 
territories in Attica, thus being reduced to its former size (Ferguson 1927c, 359-365).   
 Elsewhere in the Mediterranean System, two regional structural changes are 
observed. First, Carthage’s defeat by Syracuse in 480 BC had reduced the former system-
wide hegemon to sub-system status, as it exited from Sicily as a power player, and 
remained to its regional sphere of influence in North Africa and its commercial interests 
west of Sicily (Miles 2011, 115-117). As such, the most powerful actor in Sicily became 
Syracuse, whose status as sub-system hegemon remained unquestioned for much of the 
century (Hackforth 1927, 162-164). Second, the macropolitical developments on the 
Italian Peninsula remained specific to that region, as Rome sought expansion northward 
at the expense of Erturia, thus solidifying its status as sub-system hegemon. At the 
system-wide level, however, Rome remained a non-actor, for it lacked influence even in 
the south of the Peninsula, as Syracuse’s sphere of influence checked nascent Rome to its 
central and northern borders.   
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405 BC – 385 BC Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 Spartan positioning after achieving victory in the Peloponnesian War was not an 
attempt at unipolar preponderance, but rather, a multipolar balance of power with 
relatively weaker system-wide hegemons. The rational for this appears to be three-fold. 
First, considering the revisionist tendencies of sub-system hegemons in the 
Mediterranean System, the preservation of a unipolar structure would be extremely 
difficult. Second, should unipolar preponderance be the objective, Sparta would have to 
subjugate all relevant sub-system hegemons, thus, undertake continuous warfare until it 
remains unmatched and unchallenged. Third, the structure of the Mediterranean System 
presents a more diffused system with respect to power, and in this sense, concentration of 
power was utilized via alliances, for no single actor possessed the resources to singularly 
concentrate sufficient power to position itself as unchallenged system-wide hegemon that 
cannot be counter-balanced. For these reasons, Sparta’s system-wide positioning created 
a multipolar system that would balance itself out, and as such, preserve Sparta’s system-
wide status. 
 This is best observed during the formation of the peace treaty with Athens. Allies 
Corinth and Thebes staunchly demanded the destruction of Athens, for they viewed 
Athens as a potential challenge even after having been defeated. Sparta’s refusal is quite 
telling: since Athens was no longer a rival, Sparta had to position itself in relation to its 
powerful allies, and in this sense, Athens must be preserved as a check to Corinthian and 
Theban system-wide ascendance. Strategically, Sparta remained the most powerful actor 
in Greece with its Peloponnesian League, and in order for this position to remain safe, a 
multipolar system was instituted to balance out revisionist system-wide actors. This was 
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played out in the Corinthian War, were former Spartan allies turned against their once 
recognized hegemon. 
 Conflict between Phocis and Locris led to Theban involvement on the Locrian 
side, which, in turn, led Phocis to appeal to Sparta. Sparta gathered the Peloponnesian 
League and sought to humble revisionist Thebes, while Thebes turned to Athens (the 
same Athens whose destruction it had sought few years back) and formed an alliance. 
The outcome was an initial defeat leveled against Sparta, followed by inconclusive 
engagements (Cary 1927a, 44-48). Presumed Spartan unipolarity, then, appears to never 
have had a chance. This was followed by a quadruple alliance between Boeotia (led by 
Thebes), Athens, Argos, and Corinth (who had left the Peloponnesian League). The 
objective was to confine Sparta to the Peloponnese and thus counter-balance its system-
wide presence (Sealey 1976, 388-391). Chalcidice, Euboea, and Acarnania also switched 
to the newly-formed quadruple alliance. Sparta, in turn, showed up with its contingent of 
allies: Mantinea, Tegea, Elis, Achea, Sicyon, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, Halieis, and 
parts of Arcadia. The engagement occurred in two confrontations, Battles of Nemea and 
Coroneia, out of which Sparta emerged victorious. Inconclusive and intermittent fighting, 
however, continued in the Corinthiad and at sea for several more years. The balance of 
power struggle reinforced the impasse.  
 Fearing possible Spartan envelopment of the Mediterranean System, Persia once 
again interfered, hoping to preserve the Ionian coast of Asia Minor as buffer against 
presumed Spartan/Greek incursions. A joint Persian-Athenian naval expedition defeated 
the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean, thus removing Sparta’s initial dominance of the 
Aegean that it had wrestled from Athens. This, in turn, provided Athens the opportunity 
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to re-establish its loss of sphere of influence in the Aegean, and as such, the multipolar 
structure became shaped as followed: Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Persia. Persia, 
in turn, wanted the multipolar structure in the Mediterranean System to be preserved, for 
a balance of power struggle between system-wide hegemons would divert attention from 
any Greek incursions into the Near East-Middle Eastern System. For this reason, Persia 
switched sides and sought peace with Sparta, fearing a weakened Sparta would give way 
to a resurgent Athens. Collectively, then, the multipolar struggle continued until the 
Peace of Antalcidas was reached in 386 BC (Cary 1927a, 52-54), thus seeking to preserve 
the status quo, as Corinth was forced to return to the Peloponnesian League and Persia 
retired from the Mediterranean System.        
385 BC – 360 BC Continuation of Multipolar Structure 
 The outcome from the previous epoch was the restructuring of the power players 
in the multipolar power configuration, with Sparta, Athens, Theban Boeotian Federation, 
and Syracuse as system-wide hegemons. As the stronger of the system-wide hegemons, 
Sparta sought to reassert itself, targeting several of its allies and forcing them to harsh 
terms in service to Sparta. In 382 BC it decided to become involved in the complications 
of the Chalcidian federation in the east of Macedonia, and on its march north, Sparta also 
managed to occupy Cadmea, the citadel of Thebes. This act of hubris greatly shook the 
peace terms under which the balance of power was sustained. However, Spartan forces 
continued north, defeated and subdued much of Chalcidice, bringing it into an alliance 
that recognized Spartan preponderance (Sealey 1976, 405-407). In 379 BC Thebes 
attacked the Spartan garrison at Cadmea, with Sparta responding by sending an 
expedition against Thebes. Athens remained neutral, thus preserving the status quo, while 
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Thebes managed to wrest Cadmea away from three years of Spartan occupation. 
Diplomatic relations between Athens and Sparta, however, had turned sore, and when 
Sparta sent another expedition against Thebes in 378 BC, the Athenians sent forces in 
support of the latter. The Spartan forces were soundly defeated, and Thebes reasserted 
itself in Boeotia, thus counter-balancing Spartan irredentism (Cary 1927b, 55-69). To 
placate further Spartan aggression, however, Thebes sent an embassy to Sparta asking for 
terms.  
 This led the Athenians to fear isolation, and so in order to counter-balance Sparta 
on its own, it formed the Second Athenian Sea League, consisting of Chios, Byzantium, 
Rhodes, Mytilene, Chalcis, Erteria, and other island-states (Sealy 1976, 410). But it soon 
managed to also bring Thebes into the alliance, to both neutralize Thebes as an 
unmatched center of power in Boeotia, as well as to strengthen a counter-balance against 
Sparta. Sparta responded by sending several expeditions against Thebes, and a united 
Theban-Athenian presence induced Sparta to extend the conflict into the sea, only to be 
defeated by Athens at the Battle of Naxos. The next year the Athenian Sea League 
convinced Corcyra, on the coast of the Peloponnese, to join the League, inciting another 
naval battle with Sparta, with the latter being defeated again (Cary 1927b, 64-78). By this 
point, Sparta’s relative strength was weakened, while Athens had established superiority 
over the seas surrounding the Greek Peninsula, while Thebes, after destroying Plataea 
and absorbing Thespiae in 372 BC, had become a powerful system-wide hegemon by 
forming the Boeotian Federations. The growing power of Thebes greatly alarmed Athens 
and by 371 BC Sparta and Athens where ready to make peace. But Theban conflict with 
sub-system hegemon Phocis (allies of both Sparta and Athens), brought the Spartan army 
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into battle against the Theban led federation, resulting in the famous Battle of Leuctra, 
where Sparta was thoroughly defeated and its system-wide hegemonic status reduced 
(Cary 1927c, 80-84).    
     During this period, Syracuse had also positioned itself as a system-wide hegemon, for 
after having reducing Carthage to a sub-system actor, it had previously repulsed and 
destroyed the Athenian expedition to Sicily, while having also expanded from Sicily to 
southern Italy, hence dominating both the island of Sicily and the entire region of the 
Italian Peninsula south of Tarentum. In the mainland of Greece, it allied itself with 
Athens after the fall of Sparta, while having good relations with Epirus and much of 
northern Greece (Bury 1927, 108-132). In this sense, Syracusean influence was extensive 
at the system-wide level, as was its military and economic power. 
360 BC – 345 BC Transition from Multipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 The “collapse of Athenian and Spartan hegemony left a world of small scattered 
Greek communities,” as years of warfare had sapped the resources of the Greek world, 
while many cities experienced civil unrest (Freeman 2004, 305-306), along with 
extensive warfare between sub-system hegemons failing to attain system-wide status. 
Within this context, the centers of power in the Mediterranean System were numerically 
high, with concentration of power quickly shifting from one alliance to the next, while no 
single or set of actors were capable of attaining positioning at the system-wide level. 
 Leuctra put an end to Spartan system-wide hegemony, reducing it to sub-system 
status, as Sparta became embroiled in conflict with other sub-system hegemons of the 
Peloponnese: the Arcadian League, Argos, and Elis. A Theban contingent, with Phocian, 
Locrian, Euboean, Acarnanian, and Thessalonian allies marched into Peloponnese to aid 
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the anti-Spartan forces, and not only did they defeat Sparta, but also freed Messenia from 
Spartan control and established it as an independent city. Sparta was now relegated to a 
weak sub-system actor: the Peloponnesian League was disbanded, and many of its 
member concluded separate peace (Cary 1927c, 87-95). Presumed Theban ascendency 
realigned the power configurations of the system by drawing the Athenians to the Spartan 
cause in an attempt to counter-balance Thebes as sub-system hegemon limited to Boeotia 
(Sealey 1976, 424-426). In this sense, conflicts primarily consisted of sub-system powers 
struggling for regional hegemony, which, in turn, led to shifting alliances with other sub-
system hegemons, hence creating a diffused power structure in the system, where centers 
of power remained dispersed and, generally, inchoate.   
 In 362 BC, conflict in the Arcadian League led to a split between Tegea and 
Mantinea, as the former allied with Thebes, while the latter aligned with Athens and 
Sparta. The Boeotian Federation under Thebes brought its allies Argos, Messenia, and 
Megalopolis to face off against Mantinea, Elis, Achaea, Sparta, and Athens. The outcome 
was indecisive, and the two coalitions dispersed (Cary 1927c, 97-102), as the power 
constellations of the system remained unchanged: no single state was able to dominate, 
and as such, dominant sub-system hegemons, like Thebes and Athens, failed to attain 
system-wide positioning. At the same time, Macedonia entered the picture by established 
suzerainty over much of northern Greece by invading Illyria, expanding to Thrace by 
winning the Olynthian War, wresting Ampipolis from Athens (Pickard-Cambridge 1927, 
200-212), and thus consolidating regional power and positioning itself as sub-system 
hegemon.  
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 In 357 BC the Second Athenian Sea League disintegrated, as Athens’ loss of 
system-wide positioning led Chios, Rhodes, Cos, Byzantium, Euboea, and other 
important allies to succeed. Athens’ attempt to overcome this disintegration led to the so-
called Social War, where the Athenian fleet was consecutively defeated in two major 
battles. Athens recognized its loss of system-wide influence through set of treaties that 
ended the Social War (Cary 1927c, 103-107), hence assuming sub-system status within 
its regional sphere of influence. The Third Sacred War further elucidated the inchoate 
power structure of this nonpolar period, as what was initially a religious conflict decreed 
by the Amphictyonic League
12
 led to a wider war between several sub-system hegemons 
over influence in central Greece. Phocis, the condemned state, refused the ruling of the 
League, which led the Locrians, Thessalonians, and Thebes to declare war. 
Concomitantly, Athens, Sparta and several Peloponnesian states offered support to 
Phocis. While initially being defeated in battle, the Phocians refused submission and 
continued their defiance, while the ephemeral alliances shifted or disintegrated. At the 
same time, internal conflict in Thessaly led to one party appealing to Phocis for 
assistance, while the other party appealed to Macedonia, thus adding another center of 
power to an oversaturated sub-system struggle. While Macedonia initially proved 
successful, it was soon defeated in two consecutive battles, thus retreating back to the 
north. Phocis then turned against Thebes and defeated the sub-system hegemon at 
Coroneia, only to face a returning Macedonia, which decisively defeated Phocis (Pickard-
Cambridge 1927, 213-220). Within this larger framework, three general attributes of this 
nonpolar epoch stand out: 1) well-organized, hegemon-led Leagues became replaced with 
                                                          
12
 Pan-Greek religious council comprised of member states that determined and shaped policies pertaining 
to religious shrines, sanctuaries, and sacred land, with the power to sanction punishments against states for 
violations 
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ephemeral, shifting alliances; 2) sub-system hegemons primarily remained active within 
their regional theatres, thus demonstrating continued need to solidify regional power in 
relation to other sub-system challenges; and 3) no actor remained relatively powerful 
enough to sustain dominance for a given period of time, as the ebb and flow of victory 
and defeat, ephemeral expansion and immediate retreat, and the overall inability of any 
single actor to elevate beyond regional dominance to the system-wide level attests to 
degree of power diffusion and inchoateness characterizing the Mediterranean System.        
345 BC – 320 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure 
 By 346 BC Macedonia’s ascendancy is noted, for after having attained sub-
system hegemony in the north, it proceeded south to challenge Thebes and Athens, 
assumed control over strategic Thermopylae, and arbitrated the end of the Third Sacred 
War (233-243). Macedonia next proceeded west, establishing spheres of influence in 
Epirus and Ambracia, only to head east toward the Aegean coast of Thrace and all the 
way to the border of Chersonese. Developments in Euboea provided Macedon with 
another opportunity for expansion of its sphere of influence, as Erteria requested 
assistance, which led to the installment of pro-Macedonian governments in Erteria and 
Oreus. Macedonia’s positioning as system-wide hegemon greatly concerned Athens, 
especially the former’s infiltration of Euboea, followed by aggression toward Perinthus 
and Byzantium (Pickard-Cambridge 1927b, 244-255). Unable to counter-balance 
Macedonia, Athens opened negotiations with Persia, since the sub-system hegemon also 
recognized Persia’s ambivalence toward the idea of the Mediterranean System being 
unipolar. During this time Macedonia, for all practical purposes, had assumed dominance 
of the Amphictyonic League, which allowed it to declare sacred war as a pretext for 
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expansion. Athens and Thebes, the only sub-system hegemons in central Greece capable 
of mustering an alliance to stop the Macedonians, brought together Boeotia, Euboea, 
Achaea, Corinth, Megara, Leucas, and Corcyra (Sealey 1976, 490). At the battle of 
Chaeronea, Macedonia’s victory was absolute: it subsequently forced the disbanding of 
the Boeotian Confederacy, installment of Macedonian troops in the Cadmea, and the 
disbanding of the Athenian Sea League. Having secured northern and central Greece, 
Macedonia proceeded south into the Peloponnese, taking territories from Sparta and 
distributing them among Tegea, Messene, Meglapolis, and Argos (Pickard-Cambridge 
1927b, 256-267). Macedonia’s dominance of the Mediterranean System had become 
absolute, and this was cemented with the League of Corinth: an alliance of Greek states 
south of Macedon (except for Sparta), headed and dominated by Macedonia, allowing the 
system-wide hegemon to not only control Greece, but also to draw on Greek manpower 
for military purposes (Sealy 1976, 491).   
 Macedonia quickly turned north to placate the Balkans and much of Illyria, which 
provided Thebes the opportunity to engage in revisionist behavior: attaining assistance 
from Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Sparta, and Aetolia, Thebes sought to challenge Macedonian 
suzerainty of central Greece. The outcome was a complete destruction of Thebes and the 
reification of Macedonian unipolar preponderance, as “every Greek state hastened to 
submit” (Tarn 1927a, 355-356). In 334 BC Macedonia crossed the Aegean into Anatolia, 
taking the first step of what would lead to two major developments: the destruction of the 
Persian Empire and the absorption of the Near East-Middle Eastern System into the 
Mediterranean System.  
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 Macedonia secured mucho of Aegean Asia Minor after the Battle of Granicus, 
managing to move into central Turkey, and assume dominance of Cappadocia and down 
south to Cilicia (Dodge 1890, 234-284). The Persian Empire sought to placate the 
Macedonian advance at the Battle of Issus, resulting in the severe defeat of the former 
and the continued expansion of the latter. This was followed by Macedonia’s seizing of 
much of Syro-Palestine, the destruction of Tyre, and the absorption of Egypt (Tarn 
1927a, 361-383; Dodge 1890, 295-353). Macedonia’s preponderance now stretched from 
mainland Greece, across the entire eastern Mediterranean, and included almost every 
political unit west of Babylonia. The Battle of Gaugamela marked the end of the Persian 
Empire, as Macedonia’s victory gave way to its absorption of Babylonia, Susa, 
Persepolis, and all the way to the periphery of the Near East-Middle Eastern System: 
Bactria and Sogdiana. Macedonia’s incursion into the Indic System was ephemeral, for 
after its seizure of Bactria, Sogdiana, and various Indian kingdoms of the Hindu Kush, 
the unipole retreated and exited the Indic System (Tarn 1927b, 390-417; Dodge 1890, 
387-591). The absorption of the Near East-Middle Eastern System into the Mediterranean 
System, however, was now complete, with Bactria and Sogdiana serving as the peripheral 
buffer between the newly expanded Mediterranean System and the Indic System. 
Concomitantly, Macedonia’s hegemony over the Mediterranean System covered the 
entire system with the exception of sub-system actors in the regions west of Greece: 
Italian Peninsula, North Africa, Sicily, and Iberian Peninsula.          
320 BC – 270 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure 
 Macedonia’s unipolar preponderance of the Mediterranean System swiftly 
disintegrated after the death of Alexander the Great, as the concentration of power in the 
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system was thoroughly diffused to numerous centers of power due to the so-called 
Partition of Babylon, with sets of military-political leaders struggling for dominance over 
these centers of power, thus re-structuring the system from a unipolar configuration to a 
nonpolar structure. The centers of power were as followed: Macedon (much of mainland 
Greece and Illyria), Thrace (along with Chersonese), Greater Phrygia (much of central 
Anatolia, including Lycia and Pamphylia), Hellespontine Phrygia, Cappadocia (including 
Paphlagonia), Lydia, Cilicia, Caria, Syria (including Phoenicia and south Mesopotamia), 
Babylonia, North Mesopotamia, Parthia, and Persia (Tarn 1927d, 464-504; Will 1984, 
23-61; Will 1984b, 101-117). These would also be supplemented by the following centers 
of power west of mainland Greece: Epirus, Sicily, Rome, and Carthage. The extensive 
dispersion of power reified the nonpolar configuration of the Mediterranean System by 
virtue of four specific aspects: 1) the system was defined by an inchoate power structure, 
as the multitude of centers of power engaged in nearly 50 years of warfare in order to 
consolidate some form of system-wide positioning; 2) no single actor managed to attain 
system-side positioning, as the high number of sub-system actors consistently switched 
alliances and re-altered the probability of a single actor attaining system-wide status; 3) 
consistent fusion of various centers of power and then the disintegration of this attempted 
consolidation further contributed to the inchoate diffused structure; and 4) the chronic 
revisionist policies of almost every political actor within this Hellenistic world, which 
had come to define the Mediterranean System, made system-wide positioning impossible. 
 This systemic diffusion of power initially led to the disintegration of the League 
of Corinth, as Athens immediately broke off and orchestrated a counter league, the 
Hellenic League, with sub-system actors Thessaly and Aetolia. The direct challenge was 
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against Macedon’s sub-system dominance of Greece, giving way to the Lamian War. 
While Macedon managed to defeat the revisionist aspirations of the Hellenic League, it, 
nonetheless, relied on other sub-system hegemons that the new nonpolar structure had 
created (Tarn 1927c, 454-460). In this sense, even powerful sub-system actors remained 
limited in their capacity to solidify regional hegemony. This became indicative of the 
internecine warfare that engulfed the entire Mediterranean System, which came to be 
known as the War of the Diadochi. From 322 BC to approximately 275 BC, endless 
warfare defined the power struggle between the various centers of power that had formed 
after the disintegration of Macedonian unipolarity, as sub-system hegemons sought 
consolidated of their respected regions, only to come into consistent and destructive 
conflict with neighboring sub-system hegemons. The overly complex nature of this 
inchoate system may be reduced to four general theaters of conflict for the sake of 
simplification: much of Mainland Greece, Thrace, and the Hellespont; Aegean Coast of 
Asia Minor and Central Anatolia; eastern Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia; and, Egypt, 
Syro-Palestine, and Cyprus (eastern Mediterranean) (Tarn 1928, 75-107). In each of these 
theatres of conflict, complex internecine warfare, alliances and counter-alliances, and 
shifting victories and losses slowly gave way to some form of regional consolidation. By 
270 BC, the outcome from the War of the Diadochi had given way to relative 
concentration of power, with the former Macedonian Empire being replaced by 3 system-
wide hegemons and a powerful sub-system hegemon: Egypt under the Ptolemies 
(Rostovtzeff 1928, 109-129; Turner 1984, 119-123); Macedonia under the Antigonids 
(Tarn 1928b, 197-223); the Seleucid Empire covering much of Mesopotamia, Persia, 
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Syria, Cilicia, and Cappadocia (Rostovtzeff 1928b, 155-196); and western Asia Minor 
under sub-system hegemon the Kingdom of Pergamum.   
 Elsewhere in the system, four sub-system hegemons further compounded the 
diffused power structure of this nonpolar epoch. Rome had established itself as a sub-
system hegemon by 340 BC, having expanded its sphere of influence from the Tiber to 
the bay of Naples. Its sub-system hegemonic status was regionally challenged by an 
alliance of the Samnites, Etruscans, Celts, and Umbrians, which Rome managed to defeat 
and subdue by 295 BC (Adcock 1928, 581-616; Cornell 1989, 351-377). Having 
solidified its sphere of influence over central and northern Italy, Rome turned south 
toward the Greek cities, most powerful of which was Tarentum. Tarentum appealed to 
Epirus, sub-system hegemon across the Adriatic Sea in north-western Greece. The inter 
sub-system hegemonic conflict between Rome and Epirus resulted in consecutive defeats 
leveled against the former: but the result was a pyrrhic victory for the latter (Franke 1989, 
456-472). In 275 BC Epirus withdrew from the Italian Peninsula, and by 272 BC Rome 
had conquered Tarentum and assumed complete dominance of the Italian Peninsula, thus 
assuming positioning as system-wide hegemon (Frank 1928, 638-657). Epirus, on the 
other hand, had demonstrated its sub-system dominance by not only consolidating 
regional power, but also assuming an important role in the quagmire that was the War of 
the Diadochi: Epirus served as temporary ally of Macedon, during one point its King 
Pyrrhus even assumed lordship, only to be soon driven out and once again embroiled in 
inter sub-hegemonic conflict (Walbank 1984, 221-231). This was further supplemented 
by Epirus’ involvement in Sicily prior to its conflict with Rome: seeking suzerainty over 
Sicily, it had invaded and challenged Carthage for sub-system dominance. While initially 
223 
 
successful, it nonetheless had to abandon Sicily and thus content itself as a sub-system 
actor (Franke 1989, 479-485). Epirus’ conflict with Carthage also brought to light the 
latter’s positioning as powerful sub-system hegemon: it had absorbed much of northern 
Africa, maintained a foothold in Sicily, extended into the Iberian Peninsula, and 
functioned as a thalassocracy in much of the western Mediterranean (Schulten 1928, 769-
784). Sicily, during this nonpolar period, also attained sub-system status under 
Syracusean dominance, and until 289 BC, it had acted as a regional power that 
consistently clashed and limited Carthaginian influence within its sphere (Cary 1928, 
617-637; Meister 1984, 384-411). Within this context, between the dispersion of power 
and the inter sub-system hegemonic conflict that defined much of the Hellenistic world, 
and the multitude of rising sub-system actors west of the Hellenistic world, the 
Mediterranean System during this period witnessed an extraordinarily high number of 
sub-system actors, with no single actors possessing the resources and the capability to 
assume system-wide status, thus classifying the power configurations of this period as 
nonpolar.              
270 BC – 170 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure  
 The newly expanded Mediterranean System had now transitioned from a nonpolar 
structure to a multipolar power constellation, with three theatres of conflict primarily 
defined through counter-balancing, balance of power, and expansionism. The first theater 
was mainland Greece, with Macedonian system-wide hegemony being challenged by 
revisionist sub-system actors in a set of proxy conflicts supported by Egypt. The second 
theater was in Asia Minor, the entire eastern Mediterranean, Syro-Palestine (hereafter 
referred to as Coele-Syria), and Egypt: a balance of power struggle was initiated between 
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system-wide hegemons Egypt and Seleucid, with Macedonia selectively siding with the 
latter (primarily due to Egypt’s infringement against Macedonian interests in the first 
theater of conflict). The third theater of conflict was in the western Mediterranean, as 
system-wide hegemons Rome and Carthage came to clash over Sicily and suzerainty over 
the western half of the entire system. The system-wide hegemons during this multipolar 
period are as followed (with each theater that the given superpowers operated also having 
several sets of sub-system actors): Macedonia, Seleucia, Egypt, Rome, and Carthage. 
 Of the three theaters, the situation in the Greek mainland was perhaps the most 
complex:  Macedonia’s system-wide status remained absolute within its sphere of 
influence, yet this sphere consistently shifted due to the aspirations of revisionist sub-
system hegemons, along with Egypt’s endeavor of counter-balancing Macedon through 
diplomacy, proxy wars, and continuous support for anti-Macedonian sub-system actors. 
In 267 BC Egypt incited an anti-Macedonian alliance of Greek city-states headed by sub-
system actors Athens and Sparta, who sought to limit the hegemon’s presence to the 
north, and thus establish regional autonomy in what came to be known as the 
Chremonidean War. The outcome reinforced Macedonia’s system-wide positioning: 
Athens was reduced to a dependency, Sparta thoroughly humbled, and Egyptian 
objectives repulsed (Tarn 1928b, 218-220; Walbank 1984, 236-242). During this period 
two powerful sub-system hegemons had consolidated power: the Aetolian League in 
central Greece and the Achaean League in the northern Peloponnese.  
 In 245 BC inter sub-system hegemonic conflict between the two became a reality, 
as Aetolia allied with Macedon while Achaea received Egyptian assistance: the latter 
reigned victories. This was followed by Achaea’s revisionist endeavor of directly 
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challenging Macedonia by taking Corinth, a crucial interest of the system-wide hegemon, 
and incorporating it into its League. Egypt’s objective of creating a weaker Macedon 
through sub-system buffers was beginning to prove fruitful, especially when Aetolia and 
Achaea formed an alliance to check Macedonian suzerainty of central and southern 
Greece in 238 BC. By 233 BC Macedonia managed to humble the revisionist actors, thus 
limiting their positioning at the sub-system level and demonstrating their inability to 
counter-balance Macedonian hegemony (Tarn 1928c, 733-746; Walbank 1984, 243-256). 
Around 229 BC semi-barbarian tribes from the north made incursions into Macedonia, 
occupying the hegemon’s attention, which in turn allowed Aetolia to capitalize by taking 
Thessaly and thus dominating central Greece, while Achaea also took advantage and 
assumed dominance of the Peloponnese. Achaea’s sub-system status was soon challenged 
by a resurgent Sparta, who managed to defeat and reduce Achaea’s regional status. 
Achaea appealed to Macedonia, and the system-wide hegemon responded, while Aetolia 
remained neutral due to its agreement with Macedonia. The outcome was the defeat of 
Sparta, reification of Macedonian system-wide hegemony, and the imposition of limits on 
the revisionist aspirations of the sub-system actors. In 219 BC a relatively powerful 
Aetolia attempted to challenge this status quo, in what came to be known as the Social 
War, with Sparta and Elis joining Aetolia: the latter was once again humbled, and 
Macedonian system-wide status preserved (Tarn 1928c, 747-768). Macedonia’s system-
wide positioning, however, would soon bring about a conflict with the rising system-wide 
hegemon to its west: Rome. In a set of conflict, the so-called Macedonian Wars, Rome 
would succeed in reducing Macedonia to a sub-system hegemon subject to Roman 
policy, that is, an ally of Rome, but on unequal terms.  
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 In the second theater, four general observations may be made. First, Egypt’s 
ambitions as system-wide hegemon brought about a conflict with both Seleucia and 
Macedonia, as the former sought to preserve dominance of the Aegean against 
Macedonia, while establishing suzerainty over Coele-Syria, Phoenicia, and the coast of 
Asia Minor against Seleucid. Second, while Macedonian presence was selective, much of 
the hegemonic conflict was between Egypt and Seleucid, taking over 100 years in six sets 
of conflicts known as the Syrian Wars. Third, while the system-wide struggle was 
primarily defined by the given hegemons, rising sub-system hegemons also played a 
crucial role in this multipolar structure. Fourth, the continued inter-Hellenistic conflict 
led to the weakening of both system-wide hegemons, thus providing Rome the 
opportunity to eventually transition the Mediterranean System into a unipolar structure.  
 The First Syrian War began in 274 BC between Egypt and the Seleucids over 
parts of Syria and western Asia Minor, with the outcome being a success for Egypt, who 
managed to conquer much of Asia Minor, the Aegean, parts of Syria, and all of Phoenicia 
(Tarn 1928d, 702-704). In 263 BC, Egypt helped Pergamum establish its independence 
from Seleucid in the so-called War of Eumenes, thus creating a powerful sub-system 
actor and ally (709-710). In 260 BC Seleucid and Macedonia initiated conflict with 
Egypt, beginning the Second Syrian War, with the objective of counter-balancing 
continued Egyptian gains. The result was favorable to the aggressors, as Egyptian naval 
power was thoroughly weakened in the Battle of Cos, thus strengthening Macedonia, 
while the Seleucids managed to take Cilicia, Pamphylia, and much of Ionia (Heinen 
1984, 418-420; Tarn 1928d, 710-715). The Third Syrian War (also known as the 
Laodicean War) began in 246 BC, with extensive success for the Egyptians, as Seleucid 
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power was thoroughly weakened both in Anatolia and Syria. This, however, was 
supplemented by Macedonia’s continued involvement against Egyptian naval presence in 
the Aegean: in the Battle of Andros Macedonia seized the Cyclades from the Egyptians 
(Heinen 1984, 420-421; Tarn 1928d, 715-719). While the tripartite system-wide 
hegemonic conflict continued in this theater, it is crucial to note the presence of several 
important sub-system hegemons that helped shaped the system: Galatia in northern 
Phrygia (the Celts had invaded into Thraco-Macedonia, crossed the Hellenspont, and 
established themselves in central Anatolia, selectively serving as important military ally 
to given system-wide actors); Bithynia in the north coast of Asia Minor (consistently 
allied with Egypt against Seleucid due to its fears of the latter’s western expansion); 
Pontus (Seleucid ally that counter-balanced sub-system actors Bithynia and Pergamum); 
Pergamum (the more powerful of the sub-system actors, Egyptian ally, and regional 
challenger to Seleucid) (Rostovtzeff 1930a, 590-612); Cappadocia (traditional Seleucid 
ally, important strategic player); Rhodes (economically powerful with one of the more 
powerful navies in the Aegean, it was respected by the system-wide hegemons for its 
neutrality and important role in trade) (Rostovtzeff 1930b, 619-641; Heinen 1984, 421-
432); and Parthia (expelled Seleucid presence from its region and positioned as the most 
powerful sub-system actor in the east). 
 The Fourth Syrian War broke out in 219 BC, as a rejuvenated Seleucid sought to 
reclaim Syria from a relatively weakened Egypt, capturing much of Phoenicia, including 
Tyre. At the Battle of Raphia, however, Egypt emerged victorious, thus preserving its 
control over Coele-Syria: but Seleucid kept much of its previous gains. The status quo 
was reified (Heinen 1984, 433-440; Tarn 1928d, 728-731). The Fifth and Sixth Syrian 
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Wars are primarily defined by one variable: Rome’s influence in the east of the system. 
In 202 BC, internal decay in Egypt provided Seleucid another opportunity to reduce 
Egypt to sub-system status, with Macedonia joining along to share the spoils. The joint 
endeavor proved rather successful, as Egypt was handed a crippling defeat at the Battle of 
Panium, thus leaving the entire kingdom open for invasion. Roman diplomatic 
intervention, however, stopped this development: Rome was fundamentally reliant on 
Egyptian grain, and any disruption would create severe complications, and as such, both 
Macedonia and Seleucid were warned not to invade Egypt. The two system-wide actors 
complied, but Seleucid had already assumed control of Coele-Syria, along with Caria and 
Cilicia: Egypt was no longer a system-wide hegemon, but rather, a sub-system actor. 
 The third theater, initially defined by the Roman-Punic hegemonic conflict, would 
soon give way to Roman intrusion into both the first and second theaters, thus explaining 
Rome’s restructuring of the Mediterranean System into a unipolar configuration. In 265 
BC, conflict over the city of Messana in Sicily offered room for Roman intervention, 
which wass immediately challenged by Carthage and sub-system hegemon Syracuse. The 
First Punic War was underway, and lasting until 241 BC. Carthage’s system-wide 
presence stretched from parts of Sicily to Sardinia to the rest of the western 
Mediterranean, reaching the Iberian Peninsula, while North Africa remained its base. Its 
primary interest was the preservation of its commercial empire. In 260 BC and 256 BC 
Rome shocked Carthaginian naval power with two victories, followed by landing of 
troops in Africa. The latter endeavor proves fruitless, and in 249 BC Rome is handed a 
serious defeat at the Battle of Drepana. By 242 BC, however, the First Punic War had 
become a war of attrition, with both system-wide hegemons reaching exhaustion. In a 
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final sea battle, around 241 BC, Rome destroys much of the Carthaginian navy, thus 
ending the first Punic War (Scullard 1989a, 539-565). Sicily became an independent ally 
of Rome, thus entering Rome’s sphere of influence: in few more years, Sardinia and 
Corsica will also follow the same path (Frank 1928b, 804-805). After the First Punic War 
relations between the two system-wide hegemon became rather cordial: Carthage turned 
its attention away from maritime commercial expansion (the primary cause of its 
continued conflict with both the Greeks and Rome) and instituted a new policy of 
acquiring a land empire in Africa and Spain. The imposition of this policy, and the re-
conquest of resource-rich Spain, preserved Carthage’s status as system-wide hegemon 
(Frank 1928b, 786-789; Scullard 1989b, 17-31). 
 Two developments in the 220’s BC allowed Carthage to reposition its policy 
against Rome: the Gallic invasions from the north preoccupied Rome, and, Rome’s 
absorption of Illyria into its sphere of influence. These two developments allowed 
Carthage, under Hannibal, to undertake the conquest of Rome. By 230 BC Illyria had 
established itself as sub-system hegemon by proceeding south, subjugating Epirus, and 
counter-balancing Aetolia and Achaea. Concomitantly, it had also begun to infringe upon 
Rome’s sphere of influence in the Adriatic. In the First Illyrian War, Rome took action, 
thus submitting Illyria and assuming control of the Adriatic coast of the Balkans. Rome’s 
foothold on the Greek Peninsula also set the stage for a new conflict: Macedonia 
suspected a threat to its traditional sphere of influence. Seeking to diplomatically counter-
balance Rome, Macedonia formed an alliance with Illyria, and 10 years after the first 
conflict, Illyria, once again bolstered, became a concern for Rome. In the Second Illyrian 
War in 219 BC Rome quickly and methodically defeated the Illyrians (Holleaux 1928, 
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831-851). The Illyrian Wars, however, in reality, had become more of a proxy conflict 
between Rome and Macedonia (Errington 1989a, 85-106). But Rome had to turn its 
attention west, for Carthage had attacked Rome’s ally Seguntum in Spain, and by 218 
BC, the Second Punic War was under way (Briscoe 1989, 44-61). The Carthaginians 
approached Rome from the north, heading in from northern Spain, crossing southern 
France, and entering the Italian Peninsula. Rome, in turn, sent forces into Spain to 
counter-balance Carthaginian ambitions. Initially, Carthage handed Rome three severe 
defeats: Battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae (Hallward 1930a, 36-56). 
Carthage, however, was not able to capitalize, as Rome methodically turned the tide of 
war, and by 212 BC Carthage was on the defensive. A large Carthaginian relief force 
marching from Spain was met and defeated at the Battle of Metaurus in 207 BC. At the 
same time, Rome also opened a theater of war in Spain: from 209 BC to 206 BC, Rome 
removed Carthaginian suzerainty from Spain. In 204 BC Rome opened a third theater of 
war by directly invading Africa. Carthaginian forces evacuated Italy to meet the Roman 
threat: at the Battle of Zama in 202 BC Rome crushed Carthage, and the Second Punic 
War was over (Hallward 1930b, 83-106). Also over was Carthage’s position as system-
wide hegemon: it had now been reduced to sub-system status. By 200 BC, Roman power 
extended from the Italian Peninsula all the way to Spain, dominating the western 
Mediterranean. 
 While the inter-hegemonic conflict of the Second Punic War was playing out, 
Macedonia, seeking to capitalize on an overwhelmed Rome, formed an alliance with 
Carthage in 215 BC, thus siding the two system-wide hegemons against Rome and 
initiating the First Macedonian War. Rome, in turn, allied itself with sub-system 
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hegemon Aetolia to counter-balance the Macedonia threat from the east (Holleaux 1930a, 
116-126). Further, Rome formed an alliance with Pergamum and Rhodes, two powerful 
sub-system hegemons who were leveraged against Macedonia, while Macedonia 
maintained its alliance with the Achaean League. Within this context, Rome was fighting 
a hegemonic war with Carthage on one hand, and another hegemonic war with 
Macedonia, yet also utilizing its sub-system allies on the other hand. While the outcome 
of the conflict was indecisive, it served the Roman objective of curbing Macedonian 
assistance to Carthage. Upon its defeat of Carthage, Roman system-wide dominance 
sought out Macedonia, whose aggression toward Roman allies Pergamum and Rhodes 
were cause for concern.   
 The Second Macedonian War broke out in 205 BC, resulting in a crushing defeat 
for the Macedonians at the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC (Holleaux 1930b, 155-
178; Errington 1989b, 244-273), with the result being two-fold: Macedonia was no longer 
a system-wide hegemon, but reduced to a regional actor in northern Greece; and, with 
Macedonia, Egypt, and Carthage, by this time, being reduced to sub-system status, 
Seleucid remained the only system-wide hegemon standing in the way of Roman unipolar 
preponderance. Roman intrusion and terms of ultimatum during the Fifth Syrian War had 
created much discomfort among Seleucid, and with the conclusion of the Second 
Macedonian War, a cold war of sorts had developed between the two remaining system-
wide actors. Seleucid expansion westward, after having reduced Egypt, had made the 
system-wide hegemon an extensive power, covering territories from Thrace, across Asia 
Minor, and the entire east of the system up to Parthia. In this sense, Rome controlled the 
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entire west of the Mediterranean System, while Seleucid dominated the east, with wide 
array of sub-system actors strategically contributing to this balance.  
 The Aetolian League’s break from Rome offered Seleucid the presumed 
opportunity to upset the balance, as the former invaded Greece in alliance with Aetolia, 
hoping to bring Macedonia and the Achaean League to its side. The two sub-system 
hegemons refused, while Rome sent an invasion force against Seleucid: the so-called 
Roman-Syrian War had begun. A defeat at the Battle of Thermopylae forced the 
Seleucids to retreat from Greece, only to be followed by Rome across the Aegean, where 
at the Battle of Magnesia Seleucid was soundly defeated. Seleucid lost all of its territory 
west of the Taurus Mountains, that is, most of Anatolia, thus being limited to Syria and 
Mesopotamia: it too had been reduced to sub-system status (Holleaux 1930c, 1999-233). 
Pergamum and Rhodes assumed much of the Seleucids’ territory, thus serving as 
powerful buffers and reliable allies of Rome. By 170 BC Roman unipolar dominance of 
the Mediterranean System had been established: Macedonia was reduced to a Roman 
province after the Third Macedonian War (Benecke 1930a, 259-275), while Seleucid and 
Egypt conceded Roman dominance by abiding Rome’s demands during the Sixth Syrian 
War. The Mediterranean System, then, was defined by a single unipole that was neither 
challenged nor counter-balanced, with several powerful sub-system actors that were 
either allied with the unipole, thus bandwagoning, or conceded the unipole’s suzerainty.     
170 BC - 395 Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The macropolitical attributes of the Mediterranean System during the initial 
period of Roman unipolarity were primarily defined by Rome’s direct control over Spain, 
western Mediterranean, and the Italian Peninsula. Much of North Africa, the Greek 
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world, Asia Minor, Seleucid east, and Egypt, while not under direct Roman control, 
nonetheless recognized Roman suzerainty. While sets of powerful sub-system hegemons 
remained in the system, none possessed the relative capabilities to either challenge or 
counter-balance Roman preponderance: these actors were either allied with Rome or 
assumed neutral, non-aligned policies. In instances where sub-system hegemons engaged 
in revisionist behavior, Roman response was severe: Roman unipolarity did not tolerate 
any challenges to its singular dominance of the Mediterranean System. This was evident 
in 146 BC, when a challenge by the Achaean League led to its swift defeat and the 
complete destruction of Corinth; while a perceived threat from Carthage led to the Third 
Punic War and the complete destruction of Carthage as well (Derow 1989, 303-323; 
Benecke 1930b, 296-305; Hallward and Charlesworth 1930, 479-484). 
  In 133 BC Rome inherited Pergamum, thus expanding its direct control into Asia 
Minor after having done the same a decade before in Greece. From 111 BC to 104 BC 
Rome pacified North Africa after defeating revisionist Numidia whose sub-system 
positioning had attempted to challenge Roman dominance of the region. By 90 BC 
Pontus had become the most powerful sub-system hegemon in Anatolia, and its 
aspirations of system-wide status led to the Three Mithridatic Wars, which Rome soundly 
won by 63 BC, thus ending Pontus as sub-system actor. This expansion eastward also 
resulted in absorbing the already decaying Seleucid state, while at the same time forming 
an alliance (vassalage?) with Armenia (Freeman 2004, 405-415). Rome’s preponderance 
of the system had reached new heights: it extended from the Iberian Peninsula all the way 
to Mesopotamia, with sub-system hegemon Parthia at its eastern-most periphery. It 
exercised dominance over the entire Mediterranean civilization, North Africa, Egypt, 
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Anatolia, Syria, and the Levant: Rome had absorbed the Hellenic Kingdoms. From 59 BC 
to 50 BC much of Gaul was also conquered and absorbed, thus expanding Roman 
dominance up north all the way to the British Island.  
 Rome’s internal conflicts, ranging from the Social Wars, to the Civil Wars 
(Charlesworth 1952a, 13-30; Tarn 1952, 43-65), to the ending of the republic (Tarn and 
Charlesworth 1952, 90-111) and the formation of the empire (Jones 1952, 127-158), are 
excluded from analysis, for these developments did not affect systemic outcomes at the 
macro level: Roman system-wide hegemony remained unchallenged. For the next 450 
years, no single sub-system actor managed to position itself at the system-wide level and 
challenge Roman unipolarity. This is primarily due to two general factors: Rome’s policy 
of aggressive expansion, and, Rome’s intolerance of any challenges to its perceived 
spheres of influence, which, in essence, included the entire Mediterranean System with 
the exception of Persia.  
 Within this context, Rome came into conflict with Germanic political units to the 
north due to its expansionist policies (Syme 1952, 358-368), or, it came into conflict with 
Parthia due to its irredentist aspirations. As such, neither of these actors sought to 
challenge Roman system-wide dominance, but rather, especially for Parthia, to preserve 
its own regional positioning. This is best attested by Rome’s continuous conflict with 
Parthia over Armenia, which Parthia considered to be in its sphere of influence as 
neighbor, while Rome sought to control Armenia as a client kingdom (Anderson 1952a, 
254-278; Anderson 1952b, 747-772). For nearly 400 years, Rome consistently infringed 
upon Parthia’s sphere, usually getting the upper hand in battle, but stopping short of 
absorbing the sub-system actor, but rather, keeping it just that. Concomitantly, Parthia, 
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and then Sassanid Persia, never sought system-wide dominance or expansion beyond 
their regional sphere: the objective appears to merely curtail Roman infringement. In this 
sense, the Roman-Parthian/Persian Wars were not system-wide conflicts, but rather, a 
struggle over a regional sphere of influence between an expansionist system-wide 
hegemon and a defensive sub-system hegemon.  
 By 60 AD Rome had continued its expansion by annexing Thrace, Noricum 
(modern-day Austria), Pamphylia, Lycia, Judea, and Mauretania (modern-day Morocco) 
(Charlesworth 1952b, 674-679). This was topped off by the conquest of Britain (Syme 
and Collingwood 1952, 794-802). The next several decades were defined by revolts, 
suppression of such revolts, conflicts over succession, and re-solidification of imperial 
policies (Stevenson and Momigliano 1952, 842-865). Within this context, Rome was 
preoccupied with preserving its direct control and expansive sphere of influence, as 
opposed to expanding or facing challenges at the system-wide level. Macropolitically, the 
Mediterranean System remained stagnant.  
 By 100 AD, Rome sought expansion into Dacia (Syme 1954, 168-177), 
conquering much of modern-day Eastern Europe. By 116 it had expanded into Parthia, 
taking Babylon, Susa, and the capital of Ctesiphon, followed by the absorption of 
Mesopotamia as a Roman province (Longden 1954, 226-252). The Roman Empire had 
reached its maximum peak, extending from Britain all the way to the Persian Gulf. By 
160 Rome had returned to its previous boundaries in the east, returning much of 
Mesopotamia back to Parthia and thus sustaining the sub-system hegemons sphere of 
influence. Between this period and 180 Rome fought the Marcomannic Wars against 
invading German tribes from the north: similar to setting the eastern periphery at the 
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border with Parthia, Rome had also set its north eastern periphery in Europe at the 
Danube River (Weber 1954, 349-364). The outcome was Rome’s successful defense of 
this border and an acceptance of the limitations of its expansion.  
 The greatest threat to Roman unipolarity came around 260, but this was not due to 
external invasions, but rather, to internal decay: the Empire was temporarily divided into 
three, in what became known as the Crisis of the Third Century. In the north the Gallic 
Empire was formed, which included the provinces of Britain, Gaul, and for a brief period, 
Hispania. In the East the Palmyrene Empire was formed, which primarily included 
eastern Anatolia, Syro-Palestine, and Egypt (Alfoldi 1961, 169-192.). With the exception 
of these breakaway regions, the rest of the Empire remained centered on Rome. By 275, 
however, the breakaway empires had been subdued and reincorporated into Rome 
(Mattingly 1961, 297-308), and as such, the ephemeral period during which these 
developments occurred do not constitute a restructuration of the power configurations of 
the system. Between this period and the mid-400s, Roman unipolarity was under serious 
decline.  
 Multitude of factors, ranging from overexpansion, internal decay, splitting of the 
empire (East and West), wars of succession, conflict with Persia, and endless incursions 
from the north by Germanic tribes, were incrementally decaying the only system-wide 
hegemon. In 395 the Roman Empire was officially partitioned into two centers of power, 
Rome and Constantinople, with the outcome being the decline and fall of Western Rome 
by 476, while the Eastern Empire continued on in history as the Byzantine Empire. 
Within this framework, Rome ceased to exist as the unipole after 395, for the 
development of two centers of power introduced two sub-system actors, which, in turn, 
237 
 
was supplemented by the presence of a high number of sub-system actors that would give 
way to the end of Roman unipolarity and the end of the Mediterranean System. A new 
period of nonpolarity was in the horizon.      
 
Analysis 
     The collection of data for the Mediterranean World Political System produces a 
sequence of 15 codings that provide configuration observations of polar structures. The 
collected data offer non-obvious information on the transitional attributes of polar 
structures and the formulation of modes of polarity. Consistent with the study of previous 
world political systems provided in this work, four schemes of evaluation are provided: 
1) distribution of polar structures; 2) transitional patterns after unipolar periods; 3) 
durability of polar epochs; and 4) probabilistic outcomes of power constellations after 
unipolar transitions. Five assumptions may be culled from the collected data at the outset. 
First, the traditional conception prominent in Western-centric scholarship that 
multipolarity is the system’s norm is refuted. Second, unipolarity is not only more 
prevalent, but also displays longevity and sustained durability, thus limiting the 
multipolarity-versus-bipolarity-stability-debate common among International Relations 
scholars (see Chapters 1 and 2). Third, tripolarity appears to be unfit for the 
Mediterranean System, as the system displayed tendencies of unipolar bandwagoning, 
bipolar polarization, or multipolar diffusion and balance. Fourth, nonpolar power 
configurations are not only common in this system, but they also tend to form after 
transitions from unipolar periods. And fifth, multipolarity is the least stable polar 
structure with respect to system’s durability.    
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 In relation to other world political systems, the Mediterranean System has a 
relatively equal distribution, as the system displays a balanced development between the 
modalities of polar structures. As Figure 7.1 displays, the distribution of the 15 
observation points demonstrate unipolarity as the most occurring polar structure, as 5 out 
of the 15 polar periods in the dataset are coded as unipolar. Multipolarity is the second 
most occurring power configuration, being the system’s structure 4 out of 15 data points. 
Bipolarity and nonpolarity, respectively, defined the polar periods of the system 3 times 
each, while tripolarity never became a system’s structure. Cumulatively, for the 2,395 
years that the Mediterranean System existed, 33 percent of the time the system’s structure 
assumed a unipolar power constellations, followed by multipolarity with 27 percent of 
the time, bipolarity with 20 percent, and nonpolarity defining the polar epochs with 20 
percent of the time.  
 The relatively equal distribution of the polar periods is quite telling: concentration 
of power in the Mediterranean System was relatively weaker in relation to other world 
political systems, since 47 percent of the time (multipolar and nonpolar periods 
combined) the concentration of power in the system was quite diffused, while in the 
bipolar periods (20 percent of the time), power was relatively more concentrated, yet 
reliant on polarization and alliances/leagues. Concomitantly, in instances of unipolar 
preponderance, the system still possessed a consistently high number of sub-system 
hegemons, which may perhaps explain the absence of complete system-wide hegemony 
(with the exception of Rome for a given period of time).    
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FIGURE 7.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES OF MEDITERRANEAN 
SYSTEM 
 
 
 The longevity and durability of polar periods demonstrate the coherence of 
fittidness as it pertains to structural power hierarchies within a system: the longer a power 
configuration lasts in a system, on average, the more stable the system’s structure 
remains. Within this context, while the distribution of occurrence offers interesting 
insight into polar structures, just as important is the measurement of longevity for such 
polar occurrences. Due to the extraordinarily long period of Roman unipolarity (565), 
unipolarity, on average, remains the most durable polar structure with 216 years. The 
second most durable structure is bipolarity, averaging 177 years, followed by nonpolarity 
with an average of 138 years. The least durable polar structure is multipolarity, which 
averages 91 years. Within this context, as Figure 7.2 shows, at the macro level, the 
systemically most stable power configuration is unipolarity, for it takes approximately 
216 years for a structural transition to take place.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
UNIPOLAR
BIPOLAR
TRIPOLAR
MULTIPOLAR
NONPOLAR
240 
 
FIGURE 7.2 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR PERIODS 
 
 
 The relative instability of the multipolar structure is also quite telling, for its 
average lifespan of 91 years suggests weak longevity in relation to a relatively more 
concentrated structure found in bipolarity (lasting 177 years), or in relation to a relatively 
more diffused power structure found in nonpolarity (lasting 138 years). For this reason, 
multipolarity is not only refuted as the distributive norm within the Mediterranean 
System, but also, the least durable: of the 2,395 years of this world political system, 
multipolarity existed for only 365 years, that is, only 15% of the historic space. This is 
quite limited in relation to unipolarity with 1,080 years (45% of historic space), bipolarity 
with 530 years (22% of historic space), and nonpolarity with 415 years (18%). 
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FIGURE 7.3 HISTORIC SPACE OF MEDITERRANEAN SYSTEM 
 
 
 The structural transformations following unipolar periods offer important 
observational patterns in forming probabilistic assessments with respect to outcome. 
Since the dataset coded 5 unipolar periods, this allows for similar number of post-
unipolar structural transitions. After unipolarity, as Figure 7.4 demonstrates, the 
distribution is as followed: one period of bipolarity, one period of multipolarity, and three 
periods of nonpolarity. Interpreting the post-unipolar data probabilistically, the 
Mediterranean system displayed a 20% chance of transitioning to a bipolar structure after 
unipolar periods, a 20% chance of transitioning to a multipolar structure, and a 60% 
probability of transitioning to a nonpolar configuration after unipolarity. 
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FIGURE 7.4 POST-UNIPOLAR OUTCOMES 
 
 
 The post-unipolar transitions may be better situated through two analytical 
frameworks: in cases where the concentration of power within the system was relatively 
limited with respect to the system-wide hegemon’s preponderance, the system 
transitioned into either bipolar or multipolar configurations; while in cases where the 
concentration of power within the system was relatively extensive with respect to the 
system-wide hegemon’s preponderance, the system transitioned into a diffused nonpolar 
configuration. The cases of the former are rather obvious: Cretan system-wide hegemonic 
status was not as concentrated, allowing revisionist Mycenae to restructure the system 
into a bipolar constellations; similarly, Corinthian unipolarity (650 BC-690 BC) was 
supplemented by the presence of several powerful sub-system hegemons, and within this 
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context, concentration of power within the unipole was limited, thus giving way to a 
multipolar structure after Corinthian unipolarity. With respect to the second analytical 
framework, the relationship between power concentration and subsequent diffusion has 
the inverse effect. During Mycenaean system-wide hegemonic preponderance, 
concentration of power was quite extensive, and as such, the transition after Mycenaean 
unipolarity gave way to a highly diffused, nonpolar structure. The pattern appears to be 
the same with both Macedonian unipolarity, after absorbing the Near East-Middle 
Eastern System, and Roman unipolarity. In both instances, the concentration of power 
was rather extensive with both system-wide hegemons, thus creating a severe vacuum 
after the unipolar period, which gave way to a diffused, nonpolar configuration.     
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CHAPTER 8 
THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 The Global Political System encompasses the political interactions, inter and intra 
civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between 
political units/entities/actors throughout the globe. The conceptualization of the Global 
Political System is better explained through three developments. First, as the world 
political systems absorbed or fused into one another, a more integrated, globalizing 
political system defined the macropolitical landscape. Second, the Global Political 
System is the byproduct and the outcome of the growth and expansion of the European 
System, as this world political system expanded and absorbed much of the known world, 
thus allowing for the fusion and integration of political actors within a single, global 
system. Third, data collection and analytic legitimations for criteria-designation begin 
around the 1500’s, as the European Age of Exploration and immediate colonization 
provides the historical demarcation point where a world political system expands into 
other world political systems and brings about the integration of separate world political 
systems into a single global system. The European “discovery” and colonization of the 
Western Hemisphere, expansion into the African continent, establishment of sustained 
and non-ephemeral relations with political actors of the civilizations of Asia (for the 
inclusion of the Indic System and Far East System into the Global Political System, see 
chapters 5 and 6), and extension into Oceana and South East Asia (East Indies) gave way 
to an international political system that integrated and encompassed the entire globe. As 
such, power configurations of polar periods no longer remained confined, generally 
speaking, to specific, relatively isolated world political systems, since system-wide 
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hegemons started functioning at the wider global level, thus altering the macropolitical 
composition of the entire globe.  
 Four general attributes also appear quite unique to the Global Political System. 
First, whereas in the specific world political systems of the previous historic space 
economic considerations were extremely important in the expansion and positioning of 
system-wide actors, economic attributes, however, remained secondary to military might. 
Nonetheless, this attribute underwent a form of evolutionary development in the Global 
Political System, as economic power came to serve as an important mechanism in 
challenging and counter-balancing other system-wide actors. Simply put, relative to 
previous historic periods, due to the interactions, interdependence, and the globalization 
of the world economy, economic power came to matter even more in the new global 
system: this relevance, however, did not usurp the role of military power, but rather, 
complemented and reinforced it (example of Venice of the 16
th
 century is a case in point: 
perhaps the richest of European states, yet militarily limited, it failed to attain sub-system 
hegemony). Second, military power no longer became defined so much by size, but 
rather, through the intense technological advancements that allowed smaller, better-
trained, efficient, and well-equipped armies to defeat or challenge much larger, yet 
technologically deficient armies. Third, this being the case, designations of system-wide 
hegemonic status, in the Global Political System, does not seem much concerned with 
physical control of territories, but rather, with spheres of influence, where relatively 
smaller territorial states, with powerful economic and military attributes, can exercise 
extensive influence through their spheres: the success of the Dutch and the British, for 
example, in relation to Russia or the Ottomans. And fourth, diplomacy became a source 
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of power in and of itself, as the quality and strength of state policy and diplomacy played 
a crucial role in observing the behavior and distinction between system-wide and sub-
system actors: Austrian perseverance, for example, in comparison to Russian stagnation 
and eventual decline. Collectively, then, the new Global Political System gave birth to a 
evolved form of system-wide hegemonic behavior, where dominance and preponderance 
was not merely about controlling vast territories, peoples, and their economies, but also, 
about regulating a world order that served and reinforced the interests of the said system-
wide hegemon(s). In this sense, technological advancement, robust economic growth, and 
well-refined diplomacy became extraordinarily important to the ability of actors to attain 
positioning at the system-wide level, or, for revisionist states, to challenge and counter-
balance the existing system-wide hegemon(s), that is, the existing regulated world order.  
1500 AD – 1590 AD Unipolar Structure 
 The Global Political System during this unipolar period may be defined as 
followed: a single system-wide actor, and a set of relatively powerful sub-system actors 
that were in the process of consolidating power. France and Britain had recently 
concluded a near century of internecine warfare over regional preponderance, and as 
such, their sub-system conflict had equally weakened both actors, and by the 1500’s, both 
were recovering from exhaustion. At the system-wide level, then, both actors remained 
absent, as Britain was in the nascent stages of establishing a maritime presence and 
recuperating, while France, after having secured its northern borders against Britain, was 
preparing to counter-balance an ambitious Spain. The Ottomans, in the east, were in the 
process of consolidating sub-system status, as their regional conflict with Safavid Persia 
over Mesopotamia limited its capacity to attain positioning at the system-wide level. At 
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the same time, it remained limited to the eastern Mediterranean after having been 
repulsed by Venice, while attempting to conquer Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula in the 
Near East. Spain remained the more ambitious of the sub-system hegemons, a revisionist 
actor that had begun its colonial expansion into the Americas, while on the European 
continent, jockeying with a recovering France over influence in northern Italy. Due to 
these developments, the unchallenged system-wide actor remained Portugal, who had 
initiated the European Age of Exploration and had established an impressive reach across 
much of the globe. Thus, while the sub-system hegemons were seeking regional 
positioning, Portugal had attained system-wide status as a global actor.  
 By the 1500’s Portugal had established a presence on the Indian subcontinent, 
thus assuming dominance of the Indian Ocean and making inroads into the Red Sea. 
From Calcutta to Goa to Ceylon (Sri Lanka) to Macau, Portuguese preponderance was 
established. This was followed by controlling the entire coast of the Arabian Peninsula, 
from modern-day Yemen to Oman to Bahrain. The African coast was also fortified, from 
Mozambique to Mombasa: Portuguese system-wide dominance was unmatched. In 1509 
the Ottomans attempted to challenge the system-wide hegemon’s position in the Indian 
Ocean, resulting in the latter’s defeat. The Ottoman-Portuguese Naval Wars resumed 
intermittently, with the latter consistently preserving its spheres of influence (Padfield 
1979, 48-51). Portugal continued its expansion into Southeast Asia, establishing presence 
in Malaysia, Indonesia, Timor, and New Guinea (Boxer 1969). This was supplemented 
by its colonization in South America, with Brazil becoming an important source of 
wealth for the system-wide hegemon. Portuguese system-wide hegemony, then, may be 
attributed to several factors: expansive reach throughout the globe, from South America 
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all the way to Southeast Asia; its dominance of the Indian Ocean, along with its presence 
in Africa, India, China, and the Arabian Peninsula; accumulation of immense economic 
might by dominating the spice trade, along with the strategic routes connecting trade 
between the East and Europe; and, its South American colonies (Diffie and Winius, 
1977).  
 By 1530, however, revisionist Spain had assumed status of system-wide 
hegemon, thus eclipsing Portugal and reducing the latter to sub-system status: while 
Spain came to control vast territories both on the European Continent and throughout its 
overseas colonies, Portugal remained limited to its overseas colonies, displaying no 
relevance with respect to the power politics in Europe. Thus, as the sub-system hegemons 
during Portugal’s unipolar period consolidated power and came to potentially act at the 
system-wide level, Portugal lacked the resources to exercise system-wide preponderance, 
nor did it seek to curtail the behavior of revisionist states. As such, it found itself reduced 
to sub-system status. Spain stood out as the preeminent power in Europe, and by 
extension, in the global system, as it controlled, by 1530, primarily through dynastic 
inheritance, Austria, Burgundy, Netherlands, Sardinia, Sicily, Naples, and of course, 
much of the Americas (Kennedy 1987, 33-35). It possessed a formidable army and navy, 
along with a growing mercantilist wealth flowing from its colonies. During this early 
period of Spanish unipolarity Britain remained in the same position as it had during 
Portuguese unipolarity: developing a maritime presence and consolidating its sub-system 
hegemonic status (Wernham 1968, 209-233). France, on the other hand, had grown both 
suspicious and uncomfortable with Spain’s rise to system-wide dominance, and fearing 
its encirclement, with Spain dominant to its west and to its east, it sought to preserve its 
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sphere of influence in Northern Italy (primarily over Burgundy and Milan), thus bringing 
about war with the unipole. Lacking the capability to singularly challenge Spain, France 
allied with the Ottoman Empire, but to no avail. In 1559, the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis 
brought the Franco-Spanish conflict to an end (Braudel 1995, 945-948), as France 
remained content as sub-system hegemon, while Spain granted Austria independence (but 
the two remained extremely close allies) (Mamatey 1978, 8-12), in order to turn its 
attention against the Ottomans. In the conflicts over Djerba (1560), Malta (1565), 
Lepanto (1571), and Tunis (1974), Ottomans were kept limited to their eastern and North 
African spheres, hence failing to dislodge Spain’s preponderance over the western 
Mediterranean (Braudel 1995, 973-1103), nor present a challenge at the system-wide 
level. The containment of Ottoman Turkey, from that point, became the responsibility of 
Austria, as continuous victories by the latter methodically weakened the Ottoman’s 
capacity to attain system-wide status (Parry 1968, 360-363). In 1580, in the so-called 
Iberian Union, Spain assumed dynastic control of Portugal, thus annexing all of 
Portugal’s overseas territories: Spain had reached the apogee of its system-wide 
dominance.  
 Spain’s decline from system-wide hegemonic status came about with the revolt of 
the Netherlands, as the Dutch sought independence from Spanish control. A presumed 
local conflict, it now assumed international dynamics, especially as Britain came to the 
aid of the rebels. This was coupled by Spain’s involvement in France’s religious civil 
wars, which had further weakened France and limited its capacity for system-wide 
positioning. In 1588 and 1590, Spain unsuccessfully attempted the invasion of England 
itself, resulting in the former’s defeat: Spain’s unipolar system-wide preponderance was 
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over (Koenigsberger 1968, 234-318). Britain had elevated itself to system-wide status by 
both expanding its colonies as well as being an important actor in the power politics of 
Europe: it had successfully counter-balanced Spain and was now its equal at the system-
wide level. France’s recovery after the civil wars also elevated France to system-wide 
status, as it also sought colonization overseas, while attaining Spain’s recognition of its 
new importance in Europe in the Treaty of Vervins (Braudel 1995, 1204-1221). The 
success of the Dutch against Spain would soon bring about the United Provinces of 
Netherlands, an economic and naval power that would also become one of the more 
powerful system-wide hegemons. Austria, in the meantime, would remain a sub-system 
actor, as it merely sought domination of the German states, while closely allying itself 
with Spain, thus allocating system-wide policies to the Spanish (Ramsay 1968, 326-334). 
Ottoman Turkey’s potential for system-wide status was also curtailed, for its defeat by 
the Spanish and Austrians was compounded by the sub-system challenges brought forth 
by Safavid Persian (Parry 1968, 357-360), forcing Turkey to turn its resources from 
system-wide positioning to consolidating regional dominance. Within this context, by 
1590, the Global Political System had transitioned to a multipolar configuration.   
1590 AD – 1660 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 The considerations of this multipolar period are three-fold. First, the system 
witnessed four system-wide hegemons and a high number of relatively powerful sub-
system hegemons. Second, a sub-system hegemonic conflict, The Thirty Year’s War, 
turned into an international system-wide conflict, with potential consequences to the 
structure of the system. Third, the outcome of The Thirty Year’s War would give way to 
a potential restructuring of the Global Political System, as France would capitalize on the 
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relative weakness of the other system-wide actors brought about by the conflict, thus 
reducing these actors to sub-system status and assuming unipolar preponderance.  
 By 1605 a set of peace treaties had established a balanced, multipolar structure in 
the Global System: Spain, United Provinces, England, and France serving as system-wide 
hegemons, with the Ottoman Empire (embroiled in regional conflicts), Austria (seeking 
regional consolidation of the German states), Russia (rising and expanding), the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth (covering the Baltics and north east-central Europe, while 
countering Russia to the east) and Sweden (dominating Scandinavia and displaying 
revisionist tendencies) functioning as sub-system hegemons. Spain remained a 
formidable power, both on the continent and at the global scale, and while other system-
wide actors were now able to counter-balance and check Spanish aspirations, it 
nonetheless remained one of the more powerful global actors (Trevor-Roper 1970, 265-
282). Britain had assumed system-wide positioning by establishing one of the more 
powerful navies in the globe, as well as successfully challenging Spanish unipolarity, 
while at the same time beginning the process of establishing a massive colonial empire. 
France’s entrance into the club of superpowers is also quite telling: possessing perhaps 
the biggest army, it competently counter-balanced any threat to its system-wide position, 
while at the same time formulating its own colonial empire throughout the globe. By 
1610 the United Provinces of Netherlands had pretty much established their 
independence from Spain, and in the process, had grown into a global power. Its most 
unique attribute was that the basis of its strength was primarily hinged on trade (its 
overseas expansion ranged from South America to the East Indies), industry (it 
established factories and trading posts throughout the Indian Ocean), and finance (it 
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served as the center of international finance, functioning as Europe’s leading shipper, 
exchanger, and commodity dealer): it was an economic powerhouse. At the same, it had 
perhaps the most powerful navy in the world, one which eclipsed the British during this 
earlier period (Kennedy 1987, 66-69; Wilson 1968, 26-35).    
 In 1618 the estates of Bohemia revolted against Austrian sub-system dominance, 
ushering in The Thirty Years War (Tapie 1970, 513-523), as Spain came to the aid of its 
ally Austria, while the Dutch, Danes, and Sweden came to challenge Austria’s dominance 
of Germany (Beller 1970, 306-356). France interjected itself into the conflict as well, 
finding the opportunity to further weaken Spain, as the Dutch and the Danes invaded 
Germany from the north, only to be followed by the powerful Swedish army in 1630, 
with France offering financial and diplomatic support (Wedgwood 1938, 269-330). This 
was followed by a direct French invasion in 1635: Swedish and German troops were 
pressing Austria from the north, while the Dutch and French were confronting the 
Spanish presence (335-461). This was supplemented by the Dutch attacking Spanish 
colonies overseas, especially in Brazil, Angola, and Ceylon (Parker 1979, 54-73). Over-
exhaustion, depletion of resources, and a general impasse gave way to secret negotiations 
to a final peace settlement: The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Economically, the situation 
had become dire: Germany had been destroyed, Austria and Spain were at the verge of 
bankruptcy, with the Dutch also suffering severe restraints on their enormous economy, 
while sub-system hegemons such as Sweden where in an even worse situation. System-
wide hegemons were quickly learning that prolonged warfare was inherently 
incompatible with the growing nature of globalized economics: some form of a balance 
was necessary. By virtue of such developments and the Treaty of Westphalia, Spain fully 
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recognized the independence of the Dutch, while the Austrians accepted the regional 
status quo and thus brought tranquility to Germany (Wedgwood 1938, 505-528). While 
The Thirty Years War had come to an end, the conflict between the French and the 
Spanish, however, continued: with a weakened Dutch ally, an absentee Britain going 
through civil conflict, an exhausted Austria, along with much weakened sub-system 
actors who had partaken in the war, France sought the opportunity to further press and 
weaken Spain. Concomitantly, in 1640, the Portuguese revolted against Spanish 
suzerainty, thus beginning the War of Portuguese Independence (1640-1688) (Elliott 
1970, 468-472), which further weakened an already over-stretched Spain (Stoye 2000, 
74-86).  
 Two further developments in the 1650s set the stage for French ascendancy. First, 
from 1652 to 1654, the First Anglo-Dutch War broke out, as the two most powerful 
maritime powers undertook a commercial war (Wilson 1978, 61-126). The outcome was 
mutual exhaustion, with Britain failing to overtake the Dutch as the preeminent maritime 
power with respect to trade and commerce. Second, France’s continued war with Spain 
led to a Franco-British alliance, which severely beat the Spaniards, forcing the latter to 
sue for peace, with the conflict being resolved in the Treaty of Pyrenees in 1659 
(Kennedy 1987, 40-41; Stoye 2000, 88-91). Spain recognized all of French gains from 
the Treaty of Westphalia, thus expanding French influence throughout the continent, 
while cutting of Spain at the Pyrenees; France agreed to stop aiding the Portuguese War 
of Independence, which France indirectly continued, thus making France a powerful 
arbiter of continental politics (Livet 1970, 412-434). In sum, the Thirty Years War and its 
consequences thoroughly exhausted and weakened all of the parties involved, with the 
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exception of France, which walked out of that period as the most powerful country on the 
globe.  
1660 AD – 1715 AD Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The restructuring of the power constellations from multipolar to a unipolar 
configuration may be attributed to one specific factor: the previous system-wide 
hegemons, by virtue of collective weakness and relative decay, found themselves reduced 
to sub-system status, while France, which had grown relatively more powerful, 
positioned itself as the only system-wide hegemon. Austria’s capacity to possibly rise up 
to system-wide status was thoroughly curtailed by the devastation it underwent through 
the Thirty Years War, which was soon, in turn, augmented by intermittent warfare against 
a decaying Ottoman Turkey: from 1663-1791, inter sub-system hegemonic conflict over 
Hungary, Croatia, and the Balkans continued between the two actors (Betts 1961, 487-
499; Kurat 1961, 508-516). Spain found itself profoundly exhausted and weakened, as it 
lost its possession of Portugal, remained weak in relation to France on both the European 
continent and in global affairs, and thoroughly struggled to rebuild an economy that 
became even more reliant on exploitation of resources from its colonies (Coleman 1961, 
26-27): Spain had been reduced to a sub-system hegemon (Regla 1961, 369-382). 
Britain’s position was also quite limited with respect to the macropolitics of this period: 
having recovered from its civil wars, it competed with the Dutch for dominance of the 
global sea trade (losing the Second War of 1665-1667, and starting the Third War 1672-
1674 to assist France, but only to disappoint), failing to attain maritime dominance, thus 
undertaking a process of consolidation and growth, while choosing a position of 
neutrality toward the unipole, as opposed to seeking positioning at the system-wide level 
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(Ogg 1961, 306-329). The Anglo-Dutch Wars, although giving way to Dutch success, 
nonetheless had a detrimental effect on its capacity to position at the system-wide level 
(Kossmann 1961, 281-300), that is, to challenge and counter-balance France. Primarily a 
maritime power, the Dutch lacked the capability to challenge France’s unipolar 
positioning, but rather, only assumed a defensive posture, as sub-system hegemon, 
against French infringements upon its territory (McKay and Scott 1983). As Paul 
Kennedy (1987) summarizes: 
 To the south, Spain was still exhausting itself in the futile attempt to  
 recover Portugal. Across the Channel, a restored monarchy under  
 Charles II was trying to find its feet, and in English commercial 
 circles great jealousy of the Dutch existed. In the north, a recent  
 war had left both Denmark and Sweden weakened. In Germany,  
 the Protestant princes watched suspiciously for any fresh Habsburg 
 attempt to improve its position, but the imperial government in Vienna 
 had problems enough in Hungary and Transylvania, and slightly  
 later with a revival of Ottoman power. Poland was already wilting  
 under the effort of fending off Swedish and Muscovite predators.  
 Thus, French diplomacy…could easily take advantage of these  
 circumstances, playing off the Portuguese against Spain, the Magyars, 
  Turks, and German princes against Austria, and English against the  
 Dutch—while buttressing France’s own geographic position” (100-101). 
 
 In 1667 France invaded southern Netherlands, reifying its system-wide 
hegemonic status through irredentism. Fearing France’s new position, England and the 
Dutch quickly made peace, joining Spain and Sweden to check French expansionism. 
The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1668 temporarily stoped the hostilities, which France 
used to further entrench its unipolar status: it diplomatically brought Britain back to its 
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camp, secured Swedish neutrality, and appeased Austria and the German states (Zeller 
1963, 210-213). Within this context, France’s power remained unmatched, and only a 
collection of a multitude of sub-system hegemons remained able to undertake defensive 
posturing against French aggression: but no single actor possessed the capability to either 
challenge or counter-balance France. In 1672 hostilities were re-initiated, with now-allied 
England attacking the United Provinces, only to be defeated and hence exit the war: its 
sub-system limitations became exposed. Unable to meet the French challenge by itself, 
the United Provinces utilize their economic might, via subsidies, to desperately form a 
coalition against France: the German principalities, Austria, Spain, and Denmark joined 
the anti-French coalition (214-218). This “coalition of states,” however, “was not strong 
enough to overwhelm France,” but rather, merely to stop France’s expansionist endeavors 
(Kennedy 1987, 102). France further displayed its global power by not only having the 
largest and most powerful land force, but also a navy that fully challenged the Dutch: the 
French navy had established control of the Mediterranean, with the Dutch and Danish 
navies holding the Baltics, while neither side was able to prevail in the West Indies. The 
maritime theater of the war greatly harmed the commerce and trade of both France and 
the Dutch, which, indirectly, would come to serve the benefits of Britain. In 1679 the set 
of Nymegen peace treaties brought the open fighting to an end, but France continued as 
the “arbiter of Europe,” neither being challenged nor confronted by Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, or England (McKay and Scott 1983, 32-34; Kennedy 1987, 101-102).  
 In 1688 France invaded Germany, which, once again, brought together a 
defensive anti-French coalition of all the sub-system hegemons in Europe: A Grand 
Alliance of England, United Provinces, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Savoy, and the 
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German states. The land battles created, as previously, an impasse, as the coalition of 
sub-system hegemons limited France’s objectives, while the battle at sea turned into a 
mutually ruinous war against trade: France sought to raid and harm the commerce of the 
opponent states, while the Anglo-Dutch navy sought to weaken the French economy by 
instituting a commercial blockade. By 1697 both sides agreed to end the conflict, 
bringing about the Treaty of Ryswick, which allowed France to keep some of its gains, 
but generally maintain the initial geopolitical structure (Clark 1970, 225-253).  
 In 1700, conflict rose anew which would come to be known as the War of the 
Spanish Succession: France made dynastic claims over Spain, thus assuming exclusive 
concession from Spain’s large overseas empire. Spain, by itself, capitulated, but Britain, 
the Dutch, Portugal, German principalities, and a resurgent Austria, after having defeated 
the Ottomans, once again joined the anti-French alliance. Until 1714 the conflict 
continued both on land and at sea, with the anti-French alliance first making headways, 
only to be followed by sets of retreats, thus making it a war of attrition (Veenendaal 
1970, 410-445). As powerful as France was, it had basically assumed a policy of pretty 
much fighting the world, that is, with the exception of the sub-system hegemons of the 
east, almost every actor in Europe. This continuous policy of expansionism and warfare 
created two conditions that ended French unipolarity: first, it had profoundly harmed 
France’s economy, while diminishing its once unmatched military (Meuvret 1970, 320-
325); second, the war had played to the advantage of Britain, for it now found itself in a 
position to challenge a relatively weaker France at the system-wide level. Thus, the 
treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt proved rather beneficial for Britain: it gained Gibraltar, 
Minorca, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Hudson Bay, while securing that Spain and 
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France will remain two separate kingdoms (Pitt 1970, 446-479; McKay and Scott 1983, 
63-66). The final outcome of the French unipolar period is as followed: a thoroughly 
weakened United Provinces lost its maritime dominance to Britain, hence remaining a 
sub-system actor; Britain rose to the system-wide level, being the unchallenged power of 
the seas; and Austria positioned itself as a powerful sub-system hegemon, exercising 
control in northern Italy, Naples, and Sardinia (Stoye 1970, 590-598).    
1715 AD – 1740 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 The power constellations of the Global Political System during this period is one 
of bipolarity, as a resurgent Britain established itself the most powerful maritime nation 
in the world, while France had already established itself as a system-wide hegemon. The 
Anglo-French dominance of the system was augmented by the presence of the usual sub-
system hegemons: a declining United Provinces; a rising, yet non-revisionist Austria; a 
growing Russia that recently defeated Sweden and assumed control of the Baltics 
(Anderson 1970, 719-739); Spain with its overseas empire, yet too weakened and limited 
to function at the system-wide level; and a recently defeated Ottoman Turkey that 
sustained its sphere of influence in the Near East (Kurat 1970, 632-643). A period of 
relative peace, as the system-wide hegemons undertook a policy of détente, the global 
system remained balanced between Britain’s naval power and overseas colonies on one 
hand, and France’s powerful land force (with also a formidable navy) and its own 
overseas colonies on the other. The first two decades of this period demonstrated a 
concerted effort by the system-wide hegemons to preserve the status quo, as the two 
displayed a coherent tendency to cooperate on multitude of policies and issues (Lindsay 
1957, 191-204). Further, a consensus appears to have been reached between the two vis-
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à-vis spheres of influence: Britain’s continued dominance of the sea, while France’s 
dominance of continental politics, with each, respectively, not interfering in the colonial 
interests of the other. This was best demonstrated by France’s aggressive policies within 
Europe by the 1730’s: unlike the previous epoch where anti-French alliances were 
formed to check its advances, when France attacked Lorrain and Milan, Austrian 
possessions, and further moved into the Rhineland, Britain remained indifferent and non-
reactive. Within this context, the sub-system hegemons recognized the suzerainty of 
France on the continent: Spain formed an alliance, the Dutch showed deference, and 
Austria complied (as evident in the Peace of 1738) (Kennedy 1987, 108). France’s 
diplomatic superiority was further recognized when it negotiated an end to the Austro-
Russian sub-hegemonic conflict against the Ottomans.  
 The dynamics of the Franco-British bipolar structure, however, changed as 
France’s expansion in overseas trade became a concern and a perceived challenge to 
British maritime suzerainty. This, in turn, was further compounded by the conflict 
between Britain and French ally Spain over colonial possessions, trade, and expansionism 
in the western hemisphere (Savelle 1974, 124-134). This gave way to the Anglo-Spanish 
war in 1739, with France choosing to support the efforts of its ally in the colonial 
struggle. The conflict, however, did not escalate into an inter-hegemonic war, as Britain 
lacked the capability to conquer the Spanish colonies, while Spain, even with the aid of 
France, remained far too weak to challenge Britain’s system-wide hegemonic status. By 
1740, however, the developing dynamics in Europe will come to change the power 
configurations of the system, as rising sub-system hegemons will attain system-wide 
status, thus giving way to a multipolar period.    
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1740 AD – 1790 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 By 1740, as apparent with Britain’s war with Spain, the former’s system-wide 
hegemonic status was not as strong, while on the European continent, with France in the 
previous epoch succeeding in succumbing such sub-system hegemons as Austria and the 
Dutch Republic, its preponderance was now challenged and counter-balanced by the 
positioning of the sub-system hegemons at the system-wide level. Britain and France 
were joined by the following actors at the system-wide level: a rising Spain, a resurgent 
Austria, an ambitious Russia, and a revisionist Prussia. In 1740 Prussia seized Silesia 
from Austria, thus bringing about conflict within the continent, as Britain immediately 
allied itself with the latter, while France (along with Spain) offered support to the former, 
only to soon involve formal and direct hostilities between all the parties. The continental 
war also spread to the colonies of the respective actors, as naval conflicts and commercial 
clashes were observed from the West Indies to the eastern Mediterranean (Thomson 
1957, 416-435). Russia also joined the conflict on the Anglo-Austrian side, as Britain’s 
growing wealth offered immense subsidies to its allies, while the Dutch remained reliant 
on British assistance against an advancing France (Horn 1957, 446-461). The relative 
stalemate of the conflict gave way to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, which 
temporarily halted the hostilities and sought to preserve the status quo: Austrian 
conquests in Italy were given to Spain; France gave its conquests back to the Dutch in 
return for given colonies taken by the British, while France also returned captured 
colonies to Britain (especially Madras in India); and Prussia kept Silesia, while the 
remaining conquests were returned to Austria (Thomson 1957, 437-439). 
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 In 1755 hostilities resumed, in what would become a global conflict between the 
system-wide hegemons: the so-called Seven Years’ War. Theaters of war ranged from 
North America (French and Indian War) to Central America, India (Third Carnatic War), 
Philippines, West Africa, and, of course, the European continent (Pomeranian War and 
Third Silesian War) (Robson 1957, 465-477). After the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, both 
France and Britain had bolstered their armed forces in preparation for prolonged conflict, 
which was also complemented by similar measures taken by Austria, Prussia, and Russia: 
each of the actors had built considerably powerful armies, which, in turn, was 
supplemented by the growing economies of all actors. The global powers were utilizing 
their resources to basically restructure the Global Political System. The strategic 
partnerships and alliances had also shifted: Prussia and various German states now 
aligned with Britain, while Austria sided with France, with Russia also joining the latter 
(only to switch sides in 1762): Spain and Netherlands initially sought to maintain 
positions of neutrality, but this would also not hold. The Franco-Austrian alliance proved 
quite successful at the outset, as advances against the Anglo-German alliance reified 
Austria’s system-wide positioning, while France’s gains overseas against the British 
presented the possibility of structural shift in the system. 
 By 1761, however, the tide was turning, as Britain’s naval power proved to be too 
much for the French, giving way to continuous British conquests of French colonies, 
while Prussia’s land forces on the continent systematically defeated the Franco-Prussian 
forces. The biggest game changer, however, was Russia’s switch, as it aligned itself with 
the Anglo-German group in 1762, bringing much relief to an over-pressed Prussia (479-
480). Spain’s involvement in the war in that same year did not produce favorable results: 
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unable to match British naval power, it fell victim to British conquests of its colonies. By 
1763 three developments brought the global conflict to an end: Austria was bankrupt and 
at the verge of collapse; Prussia’s successes were matched by its own exhaustion, only to 
be coupled by Russia switching sides again in 1763; and France, faced with continued 
British success, sought to limit its loses as Britain itself faced concern with the situation 
of its continental allies. Similar to the previous continental conflicts, the Treaty of Paris 
preserved the status quo ante (483-486); but the results overseas were not a return to the 
status quo. While a great deal of conquered territories were returned back and forth, 
Britain, however, came out of the conflict as the beneficiary. It kept most of what it took 
from the French in North America, made headways in West Indies and West Africa, 
eliminated French influence in India, while gaining Florida from Spain. While low-
intensity, intermittent conflict between Britain and France will continue over colonial and 
commercial competition, the status quo would nonetheless be preserved until the French 
Revolution, after which a resurgent and revisionist France will seek to restructure the 
system’s polar configurations. In sum, the end of this multipolar period may be 
summarized as follows: Britain’s overseas success solidifying its system-wide status, 
while France, still a hegemon, losing relative strength and influence both overseas and in 
Europe; exhausted and broke, Prussia, Spain, and Austria were reduced to sub-system 
status, while Russia, regardless of its ambitions, lacked the capability to sustain a system-
wide presence.        
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1790 AD – 1815 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 The structural transition from a multipolar to bipolar power constellation may be 
attributed to four general explanations. First, a powerful Britain continued its dominance 
of the seas, while advancing and strengthening its colonial possessions, which, in turn, 
led to a policy of limited engagement within Europe itself. Second, a France recovering 
from the Revolution of 1789 proved to be far more revisionist and ambitious than 
expected, thus creating a serious counter-challenge to British system-wide hegemonic 
positioning. Third, France’s endeavor to alter the polar structure of the system into a 
unipolar constellation further intensified the bipolar struggle between the two system-
wide hegemons. And fourth, due to the developments in the third case, most of the sub-
system hegemons sided with Britain to curtail French ambitions. What came to be known 
as the First Coalition, lasting from 1793 to 1795, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Russia, and 
Britain aligned to curtail France’s attempt at ascendency, only to fail in this objective 
(Kennedy 1987, 121). By 1796 Prussia had sued for peace, leaving much of Germany in a 
state of vulnerable neutrality that favored France; the Netherlands was conquered; Spain 
forced to re-align with France in its traditional anti-British posturing; and Piedmont-
Sardinia, along with ally Austria, defeated, thus removing Italy from the latter’s sphere of 
influence (Bruun 1969, 254-255). Britain remained incapable of checking France’s 
expansionism, as it was overwhelmed by the subsidies it had to provide its sub-system 
allies on the continent, while lacking the resources to challenge the new French 
hegemony in Europe. This bipolar system, then, was caught between two general 
strategic dilemmas: Britain’s dominance’s of the seas was not sufficient to defeat or 
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curtail French hegemony of Europe, while France’s unmatched power on land remained 
incapable of reducing Britain to sub-system status. 
 A failed invasion of Egypt by the French, and an attempt to remove the 
Mediterranean and the Levant from British sphere of influence, gave way to a Second 
Coalition of sub-system hegemons joining Britain to curtail French successes (Markham 
1969, 309-311). The outcome, again, was rather unsatisfactory: by 1800 Russia, Demark, 
Sweden, and Prussia had been forced into an Armed Neutrality League, while Austria 
had recognized, through suing for peace, France suzerainty (Bruun 1969, 256-260). 
Britain managed to defeat the French incursion into Egypt, while taking much of French 
and Dutch possessions in the West Indies. In this sense, French advances on the continent 
were matched by British advances overseas. Between 1805 to 1808, a resurgent French 
navy sought to challenge Britain’s maritime preponderance, only to be soundly defeated; 
while Britain’s subsidization of massive Austro-Russian armies to challenge France 
resulted in the complete defeat of the former by the latter (264-269). France’s hegemony 
over all of continental Europe, with the exception of British allies Portugal (Carr 1969, 
444-445) at one end and Sweden (Derry 1969, 489-490) on the other, gave way to the 
Continental System, where a continent-wide embargo was placed against British trade: 
British economic ties with all of Europe was severed (at least in policy) (Markham 1969, 
326-330). Two policy moves by the French would bring about the structural transition of 
the Global Political System: an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, which would give way 
to a war of attrition and severe weakening of French resources, and France’s failed 
invasion of Russia, which would bring about the decimation of France’s army. By 1815 
France would be thoroughly defeated by the continental sub-system hegemons and 
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Britain, thus bringing about the Treaty of Vienna and the multipolar structure that came 
to be known as the Concert of Europe (Gulick 1969, 639-667).  
1815 AD – 1840 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 The continuous growth and inclusive nature of transcontinental trade provided a 
hospitable environment for the rise of an integrated global economy, drawing both 
system-wide and sub-system hegemons into larger world-wide trading and financial 
networks. This was further coupled with immense growth in manufacturing, 
technological innovation, and the general erosion of tariff barriers. Encouraged to 
formulate a more harmonious global order following the Napoleonic Wars, system-wide 
hegemons, supplemented by powerful sub-system actors, sought long-term commercial 
and industrial relations, thus giving way to a more integrated global economy and the 
assumption that this will bring about peace and stability, that is, the absence of system-
wide wars. The underlying structure which sought to preserve these developments at the 
macropolitical level was the so-called Concert of Europe, a multipolar power 
constellation that prioritized the preservation of the status quo over relative power or 
inter-hegemonic conflict: the collective desire for stability sought to usurp and curtail 
revisionism at the system-wide level (Crawley 1969, 669-690). At its inception, it 
included the five Great Powers: Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France. While 
Britain, in relative terms, was perhaps the more powerful system-wide hegemon, it did 
not, at this stage, seek system-wide dominance, but rather, reified the multipolar 
structure. In this sense, Britain’s behavior, during this period, was more consistent with 
being an important pillar of the Concert System, as opposed to utilizing its relative 
strength to alter the power configurations of the system into a unipolar constellation 
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(Thomson 1960, 323-349). By 1840, however, its growth into an unmatched global 
power would change the polar structure of the global system. Until that point, however, 
Britain endeavored to partake in the Concert of Europe as a mechanism of stability that 
preserved the new Global Political System. 
 One of the more defining attributes of this multipolar period was the level of 
attention applied by the system-wide hegemons to internal issues, and as such, inter-
hegemonic relations fundamentally sought to preserve the relative strength of each 
system-wide hegemon: revisionist behavior remained limited (Craig 1960, 246-266). The 
spheres of influence for each of the system-wide hegemons, which was strictly preserved 
through extensive and highly-refined diplomacy, may be gauged as followed: Prussian 
dominance of Northern Germany and the Rhineland; Russia’s preponderance of pretty 
much everything east of Austria, with Poland and the Balkans under its watch; Austria 
stretched across east-central Europe, with much of the Italian Peninsula also under its 
sphere of influence; France maintained its traditional position in the continent (with Spain 
selectively part of its sphere of influence), with its system-wide status being further 
reinforced through its extensive colonies; and Britain’s positioning remained similar to 
Frances, as it extended from the British Isles in Europe (with Portugal consistently in its 
sphere of influence) and across much of the globe through its growing colonies. By the 
1840’s, however, social upheavals and growing complications between the continental 
powers would deem the Concert System obsolete (Pouthas 1960, 389-409; Craig 1960, 
269-273). This would give way to a structural transformation: Britain’s global power 
would maintain and elevate its system-wide status, while the former system-wide actors 
will be reduced to regional preeminence, thus serving as sub-system hegemons. Simply 
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put, once the preservation of the status quo became incoherent, Britain assumed the 
mantle of unmatched unipole: the Pax Britania was under way. 
1840 AD – 1890 AD Transition Multipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 As defined in this work, what constitutes the designation of unipole, vis-à-vis a 
singular system-wide hegemon, is the absence of challenges or a counter-balance to the 
unipole’s positioning at the system-wide level. The extensive balancing mechanisms of 
the previous multipolar period had limited the capacity of any single actor to remain 
unchallenged, for the very nature of the Concert System presupposed balancing and 
counter-balancing. Two developments allowed for the alteration of the Concert System, 
thus giving way to a unipolar restructuring: 1) previous system-wide hegemons reduced 
themselves to sub-system status by becoming embroiled in regional conflict, thus 
neglecting system-wide positioning and hence becoming primarily preoccupied with the 
European Continent; and 2) this first development allowed Britain to further expand its 
global reach, thus functioning at the global level, for as the previous powers mainly 
functioned at the regional, this left British system-wide dominance without a challenge or 
a counter-balance. Britain’s system-wide hegemonic status, then, was a byproduct of both 
its growing power (especially economic and colonial might) and the fact that inter sub-
system hegemonic conflict hindered the presence of any revisionist actors. As such, 
neither challenged nor counter-balanced, British unipolarity dominated the Global 
Political System.  
 Within this context, British unipolarity may be categorized by the following 
attributes: naval mastery, financial credit, commercial expertise, successful diplomacy, 
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and shirking. Its financial, commercial, and economic might is best summed up as 
followed: 
 [T]he United Kingdom produced 53 percent of the world’s iron and  
 50 percent of its coal and lignite, and consumed just under half of the 
 raw cotton output of the globe…It’s energy consumption from modern  
 sources (coal, lignite, oil) in 1860 was five times that of either the United 
 States or Prussia/Germany, six times that of France, and 155 times that of 
 Russia! It alone was responsible for one-fifth of the world’s commerce,  
 but for two-fifths of the trade in manufactured goods. Over one-third of the 
 world’s merchant marine flew under the British flag (Kennedy 1987, 151).   
 
 Diplomatically, Britain assumed a position that invited shirking: sub-system 
hegemons neither engaged in revisionist behavior nor did they seek to challenge British 
unipolarity, but rather, relied on Britain’s prolific ability to regulate the global political 
and economic system. Concomitantly, Britain either played arbiter when sub-system 
hegemonic conflicts took place, or refrained from any involvement, thus leaving regional 
powers to appeal for British assistance or diplomatic influence. Three important sub-
system wars demonstrate the unipolar structure during this period: Crimean War, War of 
Italian Unification, and the War of German Unification. In all three of these regional 
conflicts, Britain’s role was both selective and limited, yet the outcome was the same: the 
weakening of the given sub-system actors and the continued strengthening of British 
preponderance.  
 The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a sub-system conflict between Russia and a 
much weakened Ottoman Empire, with France, Austria, and Britain getting involved to 
curtail Russian expansionism (Curtiss 1979; Seaton 1977). A Russian victory in the 
Crimean War, and thus its assumption of extensive Ottoman territories, could have 
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inevitably elevated Russia to system-wide status, hence challenging British unipolarity. 
In this sense, Britain’s involvement in the Crimean War (with several of its shirking 
allies) was a pre-emptive check on possible Russian revisionism at the system-wide level. 
The outcome of the conflict, then, was profoundly consistent with British objectives: a 
thoroughly weakened Russia and a more balanced distribution of power among the sub-
system actors (Ramm 1960, 469-492).   
 The Wars of Italian Unification (1848, 1859, 1866-1871) were set of complex 
conflicts that involved the objective of Sardinia-Piedmont to unify the Italian peninsula 
into a single kingdom, which was, in turn, curtailed by Austria’s dominance of the 
Peninsula, along with continuous French intrusion into Italian affairs (Smith 1960, 552-
576; Macartney 1960, 539-540). The struggle of the Italians against Austria’s dominance 
of the region was supplemented by France’s assistance to the former, which, in turn, 
implied one thing: French ambitions over the region. Continued failures by the Italians 
eventually led, however, to success by 1871. Austria had been entirely weakened through 
its wars with Prussia, while also being pressed by France, which allowed the Italians to 
push out much of Austria’s influence from the Peninsula. Similarly, French ambitions in 
the region were curtailed by France’s involvement in the Franco-Prussian war, which 
allowed Sardinia-Piedmont to seize the opportunity and establish a unified Italian state. 
The outcome of these sub-system wars was three-fold: Austria (became Austro-
Hungarian Empire in 1867) was undermined and kicked out of Italy, its traditional sphere 
of influence; France was also weakened and removed from establishing a sphere in Italy; 
and a new sub-system hegemon was added to the macropolitical structure, as a united 
Italy became an important actor in European, and eventually, global politics. Within this 
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context, these sub-system conflicts led to both the weakening of existing regional actors 
as well as to the increase of an actor, which, in turn, provided Britain further room for 
diplomatic influence as potential arbiter.   
 Of the three major regional conflicts addressed in this section, the War of German 
Unification is perhaps the most important, for the outcome would be a powerful German 
state that would give way to a restructuring of the system’s power constellations. The 
German Wars of Unification were a set of three wars fought by Prussia against Denmark 
(1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870), with the result being an unquestioned victory 
for Prussia and the establishment of the German Empire (Foot 1960, 577-602). While the 
Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War had important impacts on the Italian 
Wars of Unification, the intertwining nature of regional conflict pretty much came to an 
end with the establishment of Germany as the most powerful sub-system hegemon in the 
continent (Taylor 1954). After having lost Italy and its influence among the German 
states, Austria was reduced to weak sub-system status, soon to accept German suzerainty. 
While initially a continental powerhouse at the beginning of this polar period, France was 
also reduced to a much weaker position, as Germany’s methodical defeat and even 
conquest of Paris signified the presence of a new, and regionally unmatched, power 
(Howard 2001). At the macropolitical level, then, Germany had consolidated regional 
power by defeating all of the continent’s sub-system actors, and hence positioning itself 
as a potential challenger to British unipolarity.  
 With the limited exception of the Crimean War, Britain did not intervene directly 
in the sub-system wars during this epoch, and as such, it did not view Germany, at this 
stage, as a revisionist actor. The reasons for this are three-fold: 1) after unification, 
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Germany’s policy was one of preserving the status quo; 2) Germany did not display any 
attempts at challenging or counter-balancing Britain, but rather, assumed a policy of 
shirking; and 3) Germany’s role as honest broker in the Congress of Berlin in 1876 
proved its commitment to the status quo and the preservation of stability (Kennedy 1987, 
188-191). All of these developments were supplemented by Germany’s refusal to 
challenge Britain, and more explicitly, not to contradict or upset British policies: 
Germany’s possible designs against France in 1875 were immediately stopped by Berlin 
when London issued a warning. Heeding to London’s warning displayed Germany’s 
refusal, at this stage, to challenge British system-wide hegemony. By 1890, however, the 
dynamics would be quite different, as Germany’s military-industrial growth, and its 
endeavor to question the existing global order, would bring about a bipolar power 
configuration.     
1890 AD – 1915 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 By 1890 the power constellations of the Global Political System had transitioned 
into a bipolar structure, supplemented by the usual set of powerful European sub-system 
hegemons, along with the presence of two new sub-system hegemons: the United States 
(establishing sphere of influence in much of the Western Hemisphere and proceeding to 
push out the Spanish) and Japan (defeating the Chinese and Russia and establishing 
regional dominance in East Asia and expanding into Southeast Asia) (Davidson 1968, 
329-337). Germany’s extraordinary growth, coupled with its extensive positioning 
throughout the globe, elevated the former sub-system power to system-wide status, as it 
sought to both solidify its global positioning and challenge British suzerainty (Bury 1960, 
300-302). Germany’s approach at the outset appeared to have been three-fold: its 
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merchant and naval buildup strategically targeted British weaknesses; its banking and 
finance both challenged and undercut British endeavors in Asia, Africa, and the Near 
East; and, German industry, along with scientific and technological advances, threatened 
Britain’s continued global superiority in proliferating its industry and culture (Frederick 
1999, 307). By 1900 German naval and territorial expansion threatened British interests 
in the North Sea, the African Cape, the Mediterranean, and the land routes to India. 
Globally, Germany expanded to every prosperous market in the commercial sphere where 
which Britain had dominance, thus directly challenging British commercial interests. The 
policy of shirking, which had given Britain a piece of mind during Pax Britania, was now 
over, as Germany challenged Britain in every aspect: industry, finance, commerce, 
technology, science, transportation, and military capability. Concomitantly, German 
advances methodically diminished British relative power, an inherent attack upon the 
global British system.  
 In the Far East, Germany made inroads into China and Singapore, traditional 
British spheres of influence, as it opened ports and entered markets at the expense of 
British interest. In the Near East-Middle Eastern region, Germany managed to squeeze 
out British dominance of the Turkish markets, establishing itself as the most prominent 
European influence in the Ottoman Empire (Bury 1960, 604-306). This German advance 
was viewed with great suspicion by Russia, France, and Britain, thus setting the stage for 
anti-German alliance formations. In the African continent, Germany challenged British 
political and commercial interests in South Africa, further infringing upon traditional 
British sphere of influence (306-307). Collectively, Germany’s rise to system-wide 
status, and its direct counter-balance to Britain’s position, suggests a two-pronged 
273 
 
approach: methodical challenge to the British economic/commercial/trade system 
throughout the globe, and, an arms race in the form of a naval buildup to establish 
superiority over the seas.   
 During this bipolar period three important sub-system hegemonic conflicts took 
place: the Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish-American War, and the Russo-Japanese War. 
The Boar War, which included Britain’s attempt to maintain control over its South 
African colony (Bury 1968, 118-119), was relevant to the extent that the Germans 
displayed sympathy with the Boers, thus reifying its continued counter-balance of 
Britain. The Moroccan Crisis of 1906-1907 further intensified the split between German 
interests and those of the British (with French interests also being harmed by the 
Germans) (Bury 1960, 317-327). What all these conflicts led to, in essence, was the 
development of rigid alliances, possible modes of polarization: the Triple Alliance 
comprised of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy (the Ottomans will also partake in the 
near future), and the Triple Entente, comprised of Great Britain, France, and Russia. The 
stage for World War One was set (Vyvyan 1960, 329-354).  
1915 AD – 1945 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure 
 The outbreak of World War One, and its subsequent outcome, thoroughly altered 
the polar structure of the Global System, as the German-British bipolar system 
transitioned into a complex multipolar system, with system-wide hegemons at times 
being reduced to sub-system status, but soon recuperating and thus altering the dynamics 
of multipolarity. The Triple Alliance was primarily centralized on Germany’s unflinching 
support for Austria-Hungary, while at the same time obstructing and curtailing the 
interests of British allies France and Russia of the Triple Entente. While the specific 
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causes of WWI are not relevant to the analysis at hand, three important factors must be 
considered.  
 First, Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war against Serbia, and Russia’s 
subsequent declaration of war against Austria-Hungary suggested the initial 
restructuration of the polar system. Second, Germany’s recognition of the alliance 
structure, or the level of polarization between the alliances, led it to immediately unleash 
war against France, since France’s involvement to support its ally Russia was a foregone 
conclusion, as was Germany’s swift involvement in support of Austria-Hungary. Third, 
British involvement also became inevitable with Germany’s invasion of France, since 
Britain, regardless of alliance obligations, cannot stand by and allow an extraordinarily 
powerful Germany the chance to dominate the continent (Atkinson 1960, 359-382). 
These three developments, in turn, were supplemented by the actions of important sub-
system actors: Italy switched its allegiance to the Triple Entente and primarily maintained 
neutrality; Japan, because of its Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, offered support to the 
Triple Entente in the Far East (Davidson 1960, 416-419); and the United States, in its rise 
to system-wide status, joined against the Central Powers in support of Britain and France.  
 The macropolitical outcome of the war, for approximately the next 20 years, may 
be gauged as followed: Britain, while relatively weakened due to the exhaustion and 
attrition of war, maintains its system-wide status; France, victorious with Britain, elevates 
itself to system-wide status, both enjoying regional and global prominence; United States, 
similar to the victorious states, assumes system-wide status, regardless of lingering 
policies of isolationism; Germany, while profoundly weakened, and symbolically 
reduced to tributary status based on the indemnities it must pay under the Treaty of 
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Versailles (Butler 1960, 448-455), nonetheless remains a system-wide force to reckon 
with, possessing not only a powerful army, but also much technological and economic 
global reach (although Britain, France, and Japan did assume most of its overseas 
colonies); Russia’s military losses and early exit from the war, followed by internal 
revolution, reduced it to sub-system status (Deutscher 1968, 403-431); the defeat of the 
Ottomans and the subsequent collapse of its empire reduced Turkey from a relevant sub-
system actor to a minor regional player (Kedourie 1968, 269-272); Italy maintained its 
sub-system status, while possessing revisionist objectives of becoming a system-wide 
actor; the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed after WWI, ending the Habsburg presence 
in Europe and relegating Austria to the status of non-factor; and Japan only found itself 
strengthened as sub-system hegemon in the east, with similar revisionist aspirations, like 
the Italians, of attaining system-wide positioning.  
 By the 1930’s the multipolar structure of the system had not much altered, with 
Britain, France, Germany, and the United States as system-wide hegemons, and Japan, 
Italy, and Russia as sub-system hegemons. The relative power capabilities of the given 
actors, however, had changed: Germany began a massive rearmament and 
industrialization process that would allow it to exceed, in both economic and military 
terms, any other actor on the European continent; the United States had also grown into a 
global economic behemoth, with a growing military might that was yet to be tested; 
Japan also had been undertaking extraordinary economic and military progress through 
industrialization, developing one of the more advanced navies in the world; Italy, while 
economically semi-developed in relation to other world powers, had nonetheless began 
forming a massive army and one of the bigger navies in the Mediterranean, thus seeking 
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system-wide positioning; Britain, meanwhile, had maintained its economic might, while 
its military capabilities had remained stagnant, as the British had sought a global policy 
of preserving the status quo; and France, on the other hand, had generally remained 
dormant, lacking the level of industrial and economic growth observed in other rising 
powers. Collectively, then, the macropolitical structure of the Global Political System, 
until World War Two, remained reified by the existing actors, with the only difference 
being the continued strengthening of revisionist actors whose potential objective was to 
alter the polar structure of the system. 
 Similar to the analysis provided for WWI, the causes and stages of the Second 
World War are not relevant to the macropolitical assessments at hand. The relevant 
factors, however, may be gauged in five general developments. First, the formation of the 
Axis Powers and Japan’s rise to system-wide actor altered the dynamics of the multipolar 
system, while Italy’s incompetence and continued reliance on Germany negated its 
endeavor of being a global power. Second, France’s swift capitulation demonstrated its 
growing weakness during the inter-war period, and France found itself reduced to a sub-
system status. Third, the involvement of the Soviet Union in the conflict introduced a 
new system-wide actor, as the previously weakened Russian state had resurged into a 
global actor under the new Soviet state. Fourth, hesitant system-wide hegemon America 
overcame its isolationist tendencies and reasserted itself as one of the more powerful 
system-wide hegemons. And fifth, Britain reified its position as system-wide hegemon by 
countering the Axis Powers even when France had been occupied and the United States 
had not yet entered the war: Britain’s extraordinary military and economic might was 
singularly displayed at its best. In this context, the multipolar structure during the Second 
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World War possessed five system-wide hegemons: Germany, Japan, Britain, United 
States, and the Soviet Union. The outcome of WWII, however, ended the multipolar 
epoch, as the defeated Axis Powers were reduced to sub-system status, while the 
victorious allies found themselves split into two dominant poles. The United States 
assumed the leadership of one pole, while the Soviet Union of the other, and while 
polarization took place in the forms of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Global Political 
System, in essence, was defined by the counter-balancing behaviors of the United States 
and the Soviet Union, with respective allied states acting accordingly. The bipolar 
structure, defined by the Cold War, was under way. 
1945 AD – 1990 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure 
 The end of the Second World War restructured the polar configurations of the 
Global Political System, as the traditional great powers who had maintained system-wide 
status during the previous multipolar period were reduced to sub-system status, while two 
relative newcomers to the macropolitics at the system-wide level, historically speaking, 
reinforced the bipolar structure. Germany was initially reduced to a political non-factor, 
as the Allies divided the country initially into four occupation zones, and then during the 
Cold War, into two zones, hence creating two countries. Concomitantly, much of German 
industry came under Allied control, while stringent regulations were enforced upon its 
capacity for rearmament. While West Germany would undertake impressive economic 
growth in the next 30 years, the German state, as a global actor, would not attain relevant 
sub-system status until its unification at the end of the Cold War. Within this context, 
(West) German relevance, at the macropolitical level, remained defined by three 
variables: it was either an extension of the European Community, remained reliant on 
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US/NATO military protection, or assumed status of prestige second to Britain and France 
at the sub-system level. Similarly, Japan was stripped of its overseas acquisitions, 
reduced to control and dominance by the United States, limited in its capacity for 
armament, and until its impressive economic growth within a 30 year time span, 
remained a sub-system actor heavily reliant on American military protection.  
 France initially sought to position itself as a system-wide hegemon, accepting an 
occupation zone in Germany, receiving permanent membership in the UN Security 
Council, and reinforcing its dominance of such overseas colonies/protectorates as 
Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and minor islands in the Pacific (Smith 1981, 85-
137). France’s grand strategy, however, was untenable: it lacked the economic 
capabilities of functioning at the system-wide level; it heavily depended not only on 
American economic aid but as well as military assistance; and finally, its capacity to hold 
on to its colonies proved to be a failure, as it already had lost its mandates in Syria and 
Lebanon, while Indochina was not only lost but became a nightmare for the US in the 
form of the Vietnam War, and not to mention the horrors of the Algerian War which 
eventually supplemented the losses of Tunisia and Morocco. France had become a sub-
system actor with dreams of being a great power, yet it lacked the capability to either 
challenge or counter-balance the two existing poles, instead choosing to engage in either 
shirking or bandwagoning with the United States as an important NATO member.  
 Analytically, the case of Britain remains the most difficult in the initial stages of 
the Cold War with respect to taxonomical considerations of macropolitical status. In 
Europe it remained the most powerful country, both economically and militarily, having 
played a most important role in winning the war and reifying its global status. 
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Furthermore, its global reach remained immense, since the structure of its empire had 
sustained itself, and British status was respected by both the United States and the 
Soviets. The problems, however, were several: it was over-extended and exhausted after 
having won the war; its gold and dollar reserves were almost diminished, while its 
domestic economic situation was immensely dire; it continued to rely upon American 
assistance both during and after the war (e.g., Marshall Plan); and, it realized its empire 
was no longer maintainable, as it slowly withdrew from India and the Middle East. 
Within this context, Britain became a sub-system hegemon, but perhaps the most 
powerful of the sub-system actors, becoming both dependent on the United States for 
security and yet also serving as its most useful ally (Kennedy 1987, 387-388). In this 
sense, British policy selected shirking and bandwagoning at the sub-system level instead 
of challenging and counter-balancing at the system-wide level: that is, while it had the 
capabilities to possibly function at the system-wide level, it nonetheless made the 
decision to bandwagon as a NATO member, thus placing much of the burden on the 
United States.     
 That the European age had been eclipsed in terms of economic and military power 
was not open to debate. By 1950 the total gross national product of the United States was 
$381 billion, while the Soviet Union’s was $126 billion: each thoroughly surpassed the 
$71 billion of Britain, the $50 billion of France, and $48 billion of Germany. Militarily 
the numbers were also telling: United States spent $14.5 billion with 1.38 million military 
personnel, the USSR with $15.5 billion for whopping 4.23 million military personnel, 
while Britain ($2.3 billion for 680,000 military personnel) and France ($1.4 billion for 
590,000 military personnel), respectively, remained far behind (Kennedy 1987, 369). By 
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1970, in terms of military spending, it is quite obvious that the European states had truly 
assumed a position of bandwagoning: US defense expenditure was $77.8 billion, USSR’s 
was $72 billion, while France, West Germany, and Britain, respectively, only spent $5.9 
billion, $6.1 billion, and $5.8 billion (384).          
 Important to note during the bipolar balance of power was the possible 
consideration of China as a third pole, suggested through three general developments: 
Sino-Russian tensions and border disputes; policy of détente and US attempt to introduce 
China at the system-wide level as an extra counter-balance to the Soviets; and, China’s 
growing military expenditure ($23.7 billion by 1970), military size, and perceived 
potential. These considerations, however, were countered by four important limitations. 
First, economically, China was not only underdeveloped, but trailed much of the 
developed world, and as such, its capability to function at the system-wide level was not 
tenable; second, militarily, while it had size and potential, it lacked the technology and 
the ability to coherently challenge either of the poles in the system; third, considerations 
of Chinese system-wide hegemonic status appears to have been inherently premature, 
since China had not even established regional sub-system hegemony; and fourth, China’s 
own policy never sought system-wide positioning, and as such, its position was one of 
neutrality and shirking, refusing to either bandwagon or engage in revisionism.     
 The development and continuation of the Cold War not only further polarized the 
Global Political System, but also created a complex web of counter-balancing between 
the two poles, ranging from arms race, to ideological expansionism, to proxy wars. 
America’s endeavors in the Korean War and the Vietnam War proved to be relatively 
fruitless and quite damaging to its capabilities, yet it neither weakened nor limited 
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America’s positioning as system-wide hegemon. Meanwhile, with the exception of the 
Afghanistan invasion in the 1980’s, the Soviets did not embroil themselves in external 
wars like the Americans; but, rather, had to deal with internal turmoil: the Hungarian 
uprising in 1956, Prague Spring in 1968, and the Velvet Revolutions of the 1980’s. By 
1980 America’s gross national product doubled that of the USSR, while Japan and West 
Germany nearly matched the latter. Militarily, US spending had also thoroughly eclipsed 
Soviet spending, yet the Soviet bloc remained more than capable to counter-balance and 
preserve the bipolar structure. The attributes giving way to the collapse of the USSR is 
beyond the scope of this work, but the outcome remains unchallenged and singular: US 
unipolarity. Thus, by 1990 the Soviet Union existed in all but name, as the Warsaw Pact 
collapsed with the Velvet Revolutions and the attainment of political independence for 
the Eastern and Central European countries, while the 16 republics within the Soviet 
Union itself had also begun the process of succeeding. The Cold War, along with the 
bipolar epoch, had come to an end.  
1990 AD – Present  Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure 
 The transition of the Global Political System into a unipolar structure brought 
about three unique outcomes. First, the United States, as the unipole, was not only 
unmatched nor challenged, but also attained friendly relations with all the political units 
that had opposed the American pole during the Cold War. Second, as a consequence, all 
Warsaw Pact satellite states formed alliances with the unipole (joined NATO), while 
former Soviet states, Russia included, either assumed a position of friendly neutrality, or 
sought closer relations. Third, with previous challengers to American system-wide 
hegemony now on friendly terms, the Global Political System remained absent of any 
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revisionist actors that sought to either challenge or counter-balance the United States. 
Concomitantly, the only actors during this early period capable of engaging in such 
behavior where in fact the unipole’s close allies: the Europeans (primarily Britain, 
France, and Germany). To this end, American suzerainty was not a subject of debate. 
 The current unipolar system may be defined by American preponderance (Layne 
1993), where potentially rising powers, instead of engaging in revisionist behavior, are 
persuaded to bandwagon (Schweller 1994). Many of these states, however, at the same 
time engage in “leash-slipping,” where they do not fear the superpower and build their 
own capabilities to conduct their own policies (Layne 2006). The policies of France, 
Germany, China, Russia, and Brazil are examples among many. Within this context, none 
of these states seek system-wide positioning nor do they pose a counter-balance to the 
unipole, but rather, they selectively refrain from bandwagoning, and in cases of China 
and Russia, seek regional, sub-system consolidation. This assumption is consistent with 
the claims of Nye (2002), Walt (2005) and Ikenberry (2011a), who contend that the 
preponderance of the unipole is not temporary, that contingent on its international 
obligations, alliances, and institutional arrangements, its system-wide hegemonic status 
may be preserved. As such, the lack of counterbalancing, continued international 
cooperation, and absence of any foreseeable hegemonic rivalry suggests the reification of 
the American unipolar system (Wohlforth 1999).  
 Furthermore, the strength of American unipolarity is not only dependent on 
material capabilities, but also on the social system that the unipole constructs, where its 
values and hegemonic status are legitimated (Finnemore 2011). This is somewhat 
consistent with the treatment of the contemporary unipolar system as being 
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cosmopolitanized (Held 1996; Cabrera 2004; Appiah 2007), legalistic (Goldstein et al 
2001), constitutionalist, and defined by liberal values (Ikenberry 2011a), where the 
system-wide hegemon engages in strategic restraint as opposed to overt aggression 
(2001). This strategic restraint, however, assumes that revisionist actors are absent from 
the system, and as such, powerful sub-system actors either shirk, as is the case with China 
or Russia, or bandwagon, as is the case with European and Asian actors, such as South 
Korea and Japan. Concomitantly, opposition to the policies of the unipole does not 
constitute a challenge or a counter-balance, since no sub-system actor has managed to 
challenge the United States at the global level.  
 Whether considering Russia’s current complications with Ukraine, Iran’s 
positioning in the Middle East, China’s behavior in the Far East, or leash-slipping in 
Latin America: none of these are challenges or acts of counter-balance against American 
system-wide positioning, but rather, the endeavors of regional actors seeking 
consolidation as sub-system hegemons. To this end, until powerful sub-system hegemons 
refrain from shirking and/or bandwagoning and seek to challenge the United States at the 
system-wide level, the current Global Political System is likely to maintain its unipolar 
structure. The more interesting question, of course, is what will happen if the existing 
system-wide hegemon’s decline is not initiated by any challengers, but rather, of its own 
making? What would be the structural consequences for the Global Political System after 
the end of American unipolarity?  
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Analysis 
 The Global Political System provides 12 observation points of polar periods 
within a timespan of approximately 500 years of world history. The collected data 
provide sufficient information for gauging four general analytical considerations: the 
distribution of polar structures, assessment of the formation of polar structures after 
transitions from unipolarity, calculating the duration and longevity of the polar periods 
within the data, and computing the probabilistic outcomes of polar structures after 
unipolar periods. Five general comments may be made with respect to the data at hand. 
First, tripolarity remains absent from the Global Political System, as the power 
configurations of the system either assumed bipolar configurations or multipolar 
configurations, with the system failing to observe the presence of three system-wide 
hegemons. Second, none of the polar periods are designated as nonpolar, with the number 
of actors in multipolar structures never surpassing 5, hence the system consistently 
observing the presence of one, two, four, or five system-wide hegemons during their 
respective polar periods. Three, there is an equal distribution between unipolar, bipolar, 
and multipolar periods, indicating that the Global Political System, regardless of 
structural transitions, consistently observed the presence of several and continuously 
active system-wide actors. Fourth, unipolar preponderance within the Global Political 
System never demonstrates extensive concentration of power as observed in previous 
world political systems, that is, even in cases of unipolarity, powerful sub-system 
hegemons always remained present in the system, hence the tendency of the system to 
assume post-unipolar structures that are either bipolar or multipolar. And fifth, the 
absence of nonpolarity may be attributed to this factor, for the Global Political System 
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never observed extreme concentration of power within a single actor, or an extensive 
diffusion of power without any system-wide actors. Within this context, periods of 
nonpolarity, primarily after unipolar periods in other world political systems, usually 
formed when extraordinarily powerful unipoles, with extensive concentration of power, 
collapsed, hence leading to a similar extensive diffusion of power with no sub-system 
actors having sufficient power to assume system-wide positioning. To this end, since the 
distribution of power, vis-à-vis concentration, remained within several European actors, 
with shifts in relative power reducing or raising an actor from sub-system to system-wide 
positioning, the system never underwent extensive concentration or diffusion of power. 
The equal distribution of polar structures between unipolarity, bipolarity, and 
multipolarity is consistent with such observations.    
 The distribution of polar structures within the Global Political System is as 
followed: four periods of unipolarity, four periods of bipolarity, and four periods of 
multipolarity. As such, unlike other world political systems, the Global Political System 
presents a unique phenomenon of exact and equal distribution of polar periods. Within 
this context, of the 500 years that the system consumed historic space, each of the three 
polar structures defined the system 33% of the time, respectively.   
 Considering the system’s structural stability, the longevity of the polar period is 
quite telling. Stability, however, pertains to the maintenance of a single power 
configuration for a given duration, as opposed to treatments of stability and instability 
being gauged by conflict and war. On average, the most durable polar structure within the 
Global Political System is unipolarity, lasting approximately 56 years. The second most 
durable polar structure is multipolarity, with an average longevity of 42.5 years. The least 
286 
 
durable of the three configurations is bipolarity, with an average lifespan of 30 years. 
Unipolarity, then, remains the most stable polar structure within the system, with a total 
lifespan of 225 years between 4 polar epoch, followed by multipolarity with 170 years for 
4 polar epochs, and bipolarity with 120 years for 4 polar epochs. The analytical 
considerations here are quite obvious: bipolar periods simply do not last for a very long 
time, as a 30 year average within a 500 year timespan is quite short, while unipolarity is 
quite stable with an average lifespan of 56 years, clearly suggesting that bipolar and 
multipolar structures transition far quicker than unipolar structures. The relative longevity 
of unipolarity is quite interesting, considering the fact that power concentration within the 
Global Political System remains rather limited, yet the unipole succeeds in having a 
longer presence as a singular actor as opposed to being a system-wide hegemon sharing 
the macropolitical scene with other actors.  
 The transitional patterns of the system after unipolar transitions remain 
analytically limited, since the number of observations is quite low at 4, with the final 
unipolar period being in its current form, hence lacking data on what its post-polar 
structure would be. As such, 3 observations are left from the dataset, with the system 
transitioning to a bipolar system after unipolarity twice, and transitioning to a multipolar 
system once. Probabilistically speaking, then, after unipolar periods in the World Political 
System, there is a 50 percent chance that the system will assume a bipolar configuration, 
while a 25% chance of multipolarity, with the remaining 25 percent still to be seen. With 
a limited time span of only 500 years, as opposed to the 2800 years of the Far Eastern 
System, or the 2400 years of the Mediterranean System, for example, the existing data 
remains relatively limited when attempting to gauge the post-unipolar probabilities. To 
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this end, it becomes rather imperative to rely on the cumulative data and patterns 
ascertained from the other world political systems to be able to cogently engage in 
calculative predictions and analysis of the structural form that the post-American unipolar 
period might possibly take.    
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CHAPTER 9 
After Polarity: Findings and Aftermath  
 If modesty was a scholarly virtue, complacency would usurp innovative ideas, 
original constructs, and unprecedented challenges to the stagnation and repetitiousness 
that defines the field of International Relations as it pertains to the study of great powers, 
hegemonic behavior, and polar structures. The endeavor at hand, then, is not a homage to 
modesty, but rather, is an attempt, at its most basic level, to neutralize two general and 
severe deficiencies within the field: chronic ahistoricism and the givenness of 
Eurocentrism (Teschke 1998; Buzan and Little 2000; Zhang 2001). Within this 
framework, the study of hegemonic states and polar formations cannot be limited to the 
post-Westphalia system or the myopic historical space of the Greco-Roman world. By 
formulating and applying the concept of world political systems, the project at hand has 
attempted to broaden and advance the study of great powers and polarity, offering novel 
theorization coupled with empirical data collection that allows for hypothesis testing, 
probabilistic predictions, and knowledge-accumulation through the unearthing of non-
obvious facts. 
  Each of the world political systems, as presented in their respective chapters, 
demonstrates the following features: an anarchic system comprised of hegemonic actors 
(or absence of hegemonic actors), that is, a system encompassing autonomous, 
territorially-based political units that interact and seek positioning within the power 
structure of the system; a spatial and territorial designation of the system’s parameters; 
explanatory considerations of the shifts, transitions, and the formations of polar 
structures; and, accountability for the behavior of system-wide hegemonic or sub-system 
289 
 
hegemonic actors in shaping and transforming the power constellations of the system. 
The aggregate data of the findings suggest potential breakthroughs in gauging systemic 
transitions, post-transitional predictions, accountability for structural shifts, hegemonic 
behavior vis-à-vis unipolar configurations, structural longevity vis-à-vis system’s 
maintenance, and an analytical and probabilistic treatment of nonpolarity as a polar 
configuration.   
 The scientific study of polarity began with the hope and assumed promise that the 
accumulation of data and historical evidence and its systemic analysis would give way to 
a more robust and conclusive understanding of the overarching factors associated with 
hegemonic state behavior, polarity formation, and observable transitional patterns. 
Having utilized, collectively, some 10,200 years of political history, this project seeks to 
present perhaps the most complete treatment of designating, classifying, and qualifying 
the criteria of historical time and space in assessing and analyzing the formation of polar 
structures and transitions. What is of greater significance is the consideration that the 
critical mass of evidence procured may constitute and provide the basis for a conceivable 
paradigmatic shift in how polarity is conceptualized, spatial-temporally categorized, and 
systemically analyzed. Since the great body of research on polarity has been fixated on 
the post-Westphalian European system, observational data points have been inherently 
limited and simply confined to a 500 year history, offering very little data collection and 
documented information with respect to polar periods and transitional patterns. 
Concomitantly, power configurations have been confined to either considerations of 
bipolarity or multipolarity, since the limited data of the post-Westphalian European 
system offers no other alternatives or body of evidence to suggest otherwise (until 
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American unipolarity). By broadening the breath and scope of polarity research to the 
wider historical process through the inclusion of several world political systems, the 
myopism of Eurocentrism and the problem of data limitation have been attenuated.      
 The research at hand is not simply preoccupied with data collection, where which 
data analysis has been delayed or marginalized; rather, the methodological approach has 
been mutually complimentary, as data analysis has proceeded in close association with 
data collection. To this end, this project has concentrated on conducting empirical 
research as opposed to merely formulating a data set for polarity studies. While the case 
of the latter is nonetheless true, the objective is much greater than that, for the given data 
has been collected to address specific research questions and puzzles that International 
Relations scholars have not attempted to answer in the study on polarity. This, in turn, 
brings about another objective of this project: the marriage of the theoretical with the 
empirical. Propositions and research questions must have well-developed, robust 
theoretical and explanatory foundations before they are tested, otherwise the results will 
primarily be a mass of disconnected findings that are deficient in theoretical quality and 
explanatory strength. Thus, accumulating data, formulating research questions, and 
testing these questions with the goal of solving important puzzles remains a uni-
dimensional and insufficient approach. This is most prevalent in the measurement and 
quantification of state behavior within intra-polar research, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Namely, the findings produce quantified results, but very little explanatory capabilities, 
thus contributing to more confusion and controversy: knowledge-accumulation remains 
stagnant. At the same time, robust theoretical models and concise propositions, attained 
through deduction and dense analysis, also do not suffice. That is, regardless of how 
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powerful and appealing a theory is, or how though-provoking its propositions may be, 
they remain just that: untested propositions. The objective, then, necessitates the marriage 
of the two approaches: a robust theory with explanatory powers, and empirical research 
that produces data and evidence which allow for the testing and analysis of the given 
theory and its propositions. As such, if the scientific study of polarity is to be vindicated, 
and thus escape the controversy and stagnation that surrounds it, a set of empirical 
generalizations must be produced that are verifiable and corroborated, which, in turn, 
may be justified by the explanatory strength of its underlying theoretical model.   
 At the outset of this work, the following sets of research questions were posed. 
After each unipolar period, what power configuration does the structure of a system take?  
Does the system become bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or nonpolar? Which polar structure 
has numerical advantage of becoming formed after unipolarity? What are the 
probabilistic relations between each possible mode of polarity after unipolar periods? Can 
consistent patterns be observed that produce non-obvious facts and observations into the 
historic process of polar structuration after unipolarity? Based on the potential quantified 
results, can it be predicted, even probabilistically, how long US unipolarity will last, or, 
what the post-American global system will look like? Prior to the research at hand, these 
questions could not have been answered because the body of evidence and the necessary 
data that may allow for the investigation of such questions remained absent. As such, the 
field of International Relations lacked both the necessary data and the theoretical models 
to even address such questions and propositions. Simply put, the knowledge was lacking, 
and for this reason, the puzzle remained unanswered.  
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 That this project proposes to answer such questions suggests three things. First, by 
expanding the universe of observations, and thus engaging in extensive data collection, a 
body of evidence is produced that allows for important probabilistic and analytical 
conclusions. Second, the scope and depth of such an expansion necessitated a well-
refined theoretical model, for criteria, designation, and conceptual categorizations must 
first be legitimated before the endeavor may be undertaken. Third, by formulating such a 
theoretical model and utilizing paradigm-building, not only is an explanatory theory 
developed, but also the necessary paradigmatic tools are formulated to help acquire the 
empirical data in order to substantiate the theory. As such, the introduction of the concept 
of world political systems, for example, allowed for the expansion of the universe of 
observations, since scholarship was no longer limited to the stagnant treatments of 
polarity that strictly have been confined to the post-Westphalia European system.  
 In this sense, by covering the macropolitical developments of various systems 
throughout world history, a more inclusive and robust body of data was ascertained. This, 
in turn, was supplemented by the utilization of such conceptual tools as system-wide and 
sub-system hegemons, along with the designation of polar structures defined and 
legitimated by the theoretical model at hand, including, of course, the application of 
nonpolarity. To this end, whereas traditional studies of polarity rely on approximately 12 
observation points (polar periods from the 1600’s to the present), with inconclusive, 
controversial results that defy consensus (see chapter 3 for a discussion of the 
measurement trap and the contradictions and general lack of consensus in the study of 
polarity), the project at hand presents 109 observation points, with clearly developed and 
defined criteria of what constitutes the mode of polarity, system-wide hegemon, sub-
293 
 
system hegemon, and world political system. This perhaps explains why the scientific 
study of polarity has primarily been restricted to intra-polar studies: the stability of 
bipolarity in relation to multipolarity, the magnitude of war in relation to alliance 
formation and polarization, and in general, state behavior in relation to systemic 
characteristics and outcomes. With such a limited universe of observations, traditional 
scholars have concentrated on the intra-polar developments, since patterns, shifts, and 
transitions of polar structures cannot be coherently studied, observed, analyzed, or tested 
with so few observations. Simply put, limited to intra-polar considerations, and 
constrained by merely a dozen observations, the existing paradigmatic tools utilized by 
scholars of polarity restricts their ability to address the above posed questions: what do 
we know about observational patterns and probabilistic assessments of polar transitions 
and structural shifts?        
 That hegemonic actors seek to advance their interests and thus engage in behavior 
at the systemic, macropolitical level to reify such aspirations should be accepted as 
axiomatic. In relation to other actors in the system, powerful actors with system-wide 
aspirations seek positioning that either solidifies their relative power or insulates and 
protects their interests from relatively equal powers. The tactics of realpolitik appears to 
be the pervasive norm among system-wide hegemons, as preservation and advancement 
of interest necessitates behavior that is consistent with military build-up, economic 
expansion, alliance formations, establishment of spheres of influence, and the attempt to 
curtail revisionist actors that seek to challenge the established and perceived interests of 
the given hegemon(s). These considerations, however, are not claims that possibly 
suggest whether tactics of realpolitik lead to war or peace, stability or instability, success 
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or failure: these considerations, rather, are empirical observations into the behavior of 
states that seek system-wide preponderance. Within this context, it should not be 
presupposed that the project at hand argues that power politics offers sufficient 
explanations for state behavior. Rather, it is contended that power politics is a type of 
state behavior, and the extent to which given system or sub-system hegemons utilize 
power politics at the macro level is contingent upon the set interests and policies of such 
actors.  
 
Results and Analysis 
 The produced data set contains a total of 109 observation points that generate 
findings which pose important and serious challenges to generally held assumptions, 
hypotheses, and propositions presented by traditional studies of polarity. First, contrary to 
the research espoused by structural realists, along with the quantitative findings of 
behavioralists, neither bipolarity nor multipolarity is the norm in the formation of polar 
structures. Rather, as the evidence suggests, unipolarity is the model power constellation 
in world history, and as such, assumptions that state behavior, shaped by systemic 
attributes, inevitably give way to either bipolar or multipolar structurations is unfounded. 
Unipolarity, it appears, is a perfectly normal and persistent structure for the system to 
assume.  
 Second, while the concepts of balancing and counter-balancing are crucial in 
observing, gauging, and understanding state behavior at the system-wide level, the 
assumption that the balance-of-power doctrine is a truism is inherently challenged by the 
findings of this research. Namely, whereas states challenge, counter, and aspire to 
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balance the relative power or the perceived threat from other actors; they engage in such 
behavior as extensions of policy that reifies their endeavor to preserve their interests at 
the system-wide level. In this sense, states selectively engage in such behavior, as 
opposed to such balancing behavior being an inevitable outcome, a perceived necessity, 
or a deterministic byproduct of the structure of the system itself. This is better explained 
by the fact that since unipolarity is the norm, and not bipolarity or multipolarity, the 
concept of balance-of-power remains a form of state behavior, and not a given.  
 Third, as the first proposition suggests, not only is unipolarity the norm, but it is 
also far more stable, as far as longevity is concerned, than any other power constellation. 
As such, the assumption that American unipolarity is temporary and that the system must, 
inevitably, assume a bipolar or multipolar constellation, is both challenged and 
repudiated. Fourth, not only is the polar structure of nonpolarity empirically substantiated 
as a historical occurrence, but it is also found that nonpolarity is far more common than 
previously assumed. That is, whereas nonpolarity, traditionally, has been considered a 
form of designation for the off-hand chance that it may, conceivably, assume a polar 
structure, it has been generally dismissed as either non-occurring, or should it occur, a 
rare-event and an outlier. And fifth, gauged probabilistically from the data at hand, the 
post-American unipolar system will be neither bipolar nor multipolar, but rather, 
statistically speaking, has a much higher chance of becoming a nonpolar system.    
 The aggregated data from the five world political systems offers a total of 109 
observation points, with 23 polar periods being observed in the Near East-Middle Eastern 
World Political System (Figure 9.1), 15 in the Mediterranean World Political System 
(Figure 9.2), 27 in the Far Eastern World Political System (Figure 9.3), 32 in the Indic 
296 
 
World Political System (Figure 9.4), and 12 in the Global Political System (Figure 9.5). 
These data allow for several sets of evaluations that address the research questions posed 
in this project. Within this framework, categorical demarcations between polar 
structuration and subsequent transitions provide for the four general modes of analysis 
that has been recurrent in this project: the aggregate distribution of polar structures within 
the entire data set; system’s analysis vis-à-vis durability and longevity with respect to 
polar periods; transitional patters of power configurations after unipolar periods; and the 
probabilistic calculations of the possible structural outcomes after unipolar transitions.  
 The distribution of polar periods within the data set demonstrates unipolarity to be 
the most occurring structure, as 39 out of the 109 codings for the power polarity 
configurations are unipolar. This far exceeds any other mode of polarity within the data 
set, suggesting consistency with the initially proposed contention that unipolarity is not 
the exception, but rather, the norm and the most occurring form of polar structuration. 
This is further illuminated by considering the second most common polar structure in the 
data set, which is bipolarity (n=24). The fact that unipolar configurations occurred 15 
times more than bipolar configurations reifies the initial assessment. The third most 
common modes of polarity are nonpolarity and multipolarity, with 19 codings each, 
suggesting that the persistence of nonpolar structures throughout history has been far 
more common than IR scholarship has considered. Further, the fact that periods of 
nonpolarity are just as common as periods of multipolarity poses severe problems to 
contemporary studies of polarity. Multipolarity remains in the third tier of most occurring 
power constellation. The fact that multipolar codings are barely half the codings for 
unipolarity indicates important implications of polar norms and patterns of persistence. 
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The least common polar structure is tripolarity (n=8), which demonstrates much 
consistency with its distribution within the specific world political systems in the data set.  
 
Figure 9.1 Near East-Middle Eastern Political System 
 
1=unipolarity; 2=bipolarity; 3=tripolarity; 4=multipolarity; 5=nonpolarity 
 
Figure 9.2 Mediterranean Political System 
1=unipolarity; 2=bipolarity; 3=tripolarity; 4=multipolarity; 5=nonpolarity 
Figure 9.3 Far Eastern Political System 
1=unipolarity; 2=bipolarity; 3=tripolarity; 4=multipolarity; 5=nonpolarity 
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Figure 9.4 Indic Political System 
1=unipolarity; 2=bipolarity; 3=tripolarity; 4=multipolarity; 5=nonpolarity 
Figure 9.5 Global Political System 
1=unipolarity; 2=bipolarity; 3=tripolarity; 4=multipolarity; 5=nonpolarity 
 
Figure 9.6 AGGREGATE DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES 
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 As Figure 9.7 shows, the data set breaks down as followed: 35.8 percent 
unipolarity, 22 percent bipolarity, 17.4 percent nonpolarity, 17.4 percent multipolarity, 
and 7.3 percent tripolarity. These findings are consistent with the challenges proposed to 
the propositions held by general studies of polarity, that is, our findings indicate that 
neither bipolarity nor multipolarity is the norm in the formation of polar structures. As 
the evidence suggests, unipolarity is the most occurring power constellation in world 
history, for it occurs approximately 13 percent more than bipolarity and some 18 percent 
more than multipolarity.  
 This, in turn, bring under question the underlying assumption that state behavior, 
shaped by systemic attributes, inevitably gives way to either bipolar or multipolar 
structurations. The findings in this research repudiate such claims as unsubstantiated. In 
this sense, unipolarity is a more normal and persistent structure for the system to assume 
than bipolarity or multipolarity. Concomitantly, gauged within the context of 
contemporary American unipolarity, it may be coherently argued that this given unipolar 
period is neither ephemeral, a fluke of history, nor a transition period where which the 
system will inevitably assume a bipolar or multipolar configuration. Thus, at the 
systemic, macropolitical level, the continuation of American unipolarity is both normal 
and compatible with system’s analysis. With unipolar structures having 15 more codings 
than bipolarity and 20 codings more than multipolarity, it becomes rather difficult, in the 
face of such evidence, to argue for the normalness of bipolar and multipolar 
configurations in relation to unipolarity. Accordingly, relative concentration of power 
within a single state cannot be deemed unnatural, that is, the current American unipolar 
structure should neither be considered unanticipated nor historically rare. 
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Figure 9.7 PERCENTILE BREAKDOWN OF POLAR STRUCTURES 
 
 
 The numerical superiority of unipolar configuration observations also challenges 
the presumed givenness of the balance-of-power doctrine: both the behavior of state 
actors and systemic outcomes reject the underlying balance-of-power hypothesis that 
balancing behavior inhibits the development of unipolarity. To the contrary, as 
demonstrated above, singular system-wide hegemonic preponderance is far more 
sustained and prevalent at the macro level than balancing behavior by two or more 
system-wide actors. The evidence seriously undercuts the mainstream paradigmatic 
assumption that balancing is either axiomatic or universal law. The data repudiates this 
by providing the following observations points: 58 codings of polar periods where 
balancing is impossible (39 unipolar structures and 19 nonpolar structures) and 51 
codings of polar periods where balancing behavior is the norm (24 bipolar structures, 8 
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tripolar structures, and 19 multipolar structures). Gauged statistically, balancing behavior 
is prevalent within systems for approximately 47 percent of occurrences, while in 53 
percent of occurrences, balancing is absent or untenable as form of state behavior within 
the system. These findings are inherently problematic for the balance-of-power doctrine, 
since balancing is neither the norm nor an inevitable outcome, but rather, it only occurs 
47 percent of the time, that is, for 53 percent of the polar structures in which state(s) 
function, balancing behavior is nonexistent.  
 The argument presented here by the evidence is not a complete rejection of the 
balance-of-power doctrine, but rather, a rejection of the widespread belief that balancing 
is universally valid behavior that all states engage in, and as such, macro political systems 
must inevitably assume multi-state structures, as opposed to uni-state structures or 
structures without any dominant states (nonpolar). By virtue of this analysis, two 
modifications are suggested to the balance-of-power doctrine. First, balancing behavior is 
neither universal nor inevitable, but rather, it is the norm in only three specific modes of 
structures: bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar. As such, if the doctrine is modified to 
specifications of polar modalities, as opposed to universalistic claims for all modes of 
polarity, the assessments of the doctrine may still preserve its tenability.  
 Second, claims presupposed on deterministic fallacy must be modified in favor of 
propositions made on specific polar structures with applicable and verifiable forms of 
state behavior. Namely, state behavior cannot be gauged by structural determinism or 
claims of inevitability by virtue of the given polar modality. It becomes evident, then, 
that structure does not shape state behavior, and for this reason, balancing, as an 
inevitable and determined mode of state behavior is not substantiated. Rather, balancing 
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is a byproduct of behavior in which the state determines to engage in by virtue of its 
policies, as opposed to behavior in which a state engages in by virtue of the system’s 
structure. If balancing, then, is proposed as a form of state behavior, as opposed to a 
structural outcome, then the tenability of the doctrine remains intact: states selectively 
engage in balancing behavior in specific polar structures to reify their objective of 
preserving their interests at the system-wide level.   
 The observable evidence also rejects the hypothesis that balancing behavior 
inhibits the rise of a single system-wide hegemon, that is, unipolar preponderance. As the 
data demonstrate, of the 39 unipolar epochs, the previous polar structure from which 
unipolarity transitioned into are bipolar (n=13), multipolar (n=8), and tripolar (n=4). As 
such, the 25 previous polar structures that gave way to the formation of a unipolar 
configuration are modes of polarity where which balancing is the norm. This being the 
case, the contentions that balance-of-power, as a structural attribute, shapes state behavior 
that prevents the formation or the transition into a unipolar configuration is undermined. 
Simply put, unipolarity is the transitional byproduct, probabilistically speaking, more of 
balancing behavior than of any other form of state behavior. Consequently, there is a 64 
percent probability that a unipolar structure came into being by transitioning from a 
previous structure where which balance-of-power was the perceived norm. The 
contention, then, that balancing prohibits the formation of a system where a single actor 
dominates is rejected: balancing neither inhibits nor does it demonstrate inevitable 
outcomes contrary to unipolar configurations.   
  The concept of stability is used interchangeably with the concept of durability 
within this project, as specified several times in previous chapters, and within this 
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context, the durability of polar structures allows for important findings that give way to 
knowledge-accumulation with respect to system’s maintenance. Particularly, the longer a 
polar structure demonstrates longevity, the better a system demonstrates fittidness vis-à-
vis structural power configurations as it pertains to concentration or diffusion. Thus, 
when engaging in treatments of systemic stability, the following logic is utilized: the 
duration of polar structures indicates the extent to which the macropolitical conditions of 
the system are favorable to specific modes of polarity. In this sense, the more historic 
space that a given polar structure occupies, on average, the more durable and 
systemically stable it is in relation to other polar structures.  
 Of the nearly 10,200 years of historic space covered in this research, with respect 
to all of the world political systems, the aggregate years for each mode of polarity breaks 
down as followed: tripolarity with 470 years, bipolarity with 1,595 years, multipolarity 
with 1,570 years, nonpolarity with 1,905 years, and unipolarity with 4, 675 years. 
Analyzing these findings based on their respective occurrence vis-à-vis codings, average 
durations are gauged for each polar configuration, suggesting the relative instability of 
tripolarity and bipolarity, while verifying the relative stability of nonpolarity and 
unipolarity. On average, the least durable polar structure is tripolarity, lasting 
approximately 59 years. This is followed by bipolarity, with an average duration of 64 
years, hence making bipolarity the least stable power configuration among the most 
common polar structures. Multipolarity remains the third most durable mode with an 
average of approximately 83 years of longevity. The second most durable configuration 
is nonpolarity, lasting, on average, nearly 100 years. In relation to the remaining modes 
of polarity in the dataset, unipolarity remains the most stable and durable structure with 
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respect to system’s maintenance, displaying an average longevity of approximately 119 
years. Within this context, the second most occurring structure, bipolarity, is also the 
second least durable structure; while the most occurring structure, unipolarity, is also the 
most durable and stable structure. Multipolarity and nonpolarity, on the other hand, have 
the equal number of codings at 19, yet the average duration of nonpolar periods outlast 
multipolar periods by roughly 17 years, demonstrating the latter’s relative systemic 
stability.  
 
 
Figure 9.8 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN THE DATASET 
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Figure 9.9 HISTORIC SPACE OCCUPIED BY POLAR PERIODS 
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more concentrated structure lasts on average for 119 years. This clearly indicates that the 
durability of both unipolar and nonpolar structures cannot be ignored nor deemed outliers 
and historical accidents. Third, the relative instability of bipolar and multipolar structures 
demonstrates that these two modes of polarity have less fittidness than the two more 
stable configurations, nonpolarity and unipolarity. As such, the contention that bipolarity 
and multipolarity are more normal, inevitable, or consistent with macropolitical systems 
is refuted. Rather, it appears to be the opposite: bipolar and multipolar epochs are not the 
norm, but rather, are relatively unfit within macropolitical systems, for they last for much 
shorter periods and thus give way to transitions much quicker. And fourth, the following 
arguments pertaining to American unipolarity may, to some extent, be answered by the 
findings: whether American unipolarity is temporary or not, natural or unnatural, 
consistent with system’s analysis or inconsistent, stable or unstable, durable or inevitably 
short-lived?  
    As the research demonstrates, American unipolarity is neither ephemeral nor 
unnatural, but rather, it is consistent with system’s maintenance and quite durable, hence 
negating propositions that the American unipolar epoch will be short-lived, and due to its 
unfittidness, quickly transition to what have been traditionally deemed more fit 
structures: bipolarity and multipolarity. The argument, rather, may be turned upside-
down on its head and proposed in a different fashion: that American unipolarity is not 
only a norm, but also, that the transition from the bipolarity of the Cold War to a unipolar 
structure was the most probable outcome, since unipolarity demonstrates far more 
fittidness than any other mode of polarity. Consequently, it is argued here that bipolar and 
multipolar structures are, in fact, short-lived and ephemeral, while unipolar structures are 
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far more stable and durable. As far as system’s analysis is concerned, the evidence 
implies that American unipolarity is here to stay, and gauged probabilistically with 
respect to the average duration of unipolar periods, we may suggest, based on the historic 
data, that American unipolarity may well last until the end of this century. Considering 
that the American unipolar period began in 1990, and with unipolar structures lasting, on 
average, 119 years, it may be projected that this unipolar period has a very strong 
possibility of lasting for nearly a century.  
 This probabilistic assessment, of course, must be further argued by presenting two 
important qualifiers. First, while American unipolarity will continue to exist until the end 
of the century, this does not suggest that American concentration of power will increase 
or sustain itself. Rather, it is argue that even as America’s concentration of power 
decreases, and even as the single system-wide hegemon declines, its relative power will 
still continue to be disproportionate to such an extent that it will neither see system-wide 
challenges nor counter-balancing. Second, since American unipolarity has been defined 
far more by shirking and bandwagoning—with respect to sub-system hegemons and other 
potential revisionist actors—as opposed to expansionism and conquest, America’s 
preservation of the existing global system remains preferable for many potential system-
wide challengers. To this end, the stability of the American unipolar epoch, and the 
assessment of its longevity, based on the historic findings, is supplemented by the 
consideration that shirking best explains the behavior of potential revisionist actors, while 
bandwagoning explains the behavior of powerful allies. Within this context, it may be 
predicted based on our findings that the 21
st
 century will be defined by the preponderance 
of a single system-wide hegemon.         
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 One of the more central proposals posed by this project concerns the ability to 
probabilistically answer the following question: what power configuration does the 
structure of the system takes after unipolar transitions, and, based on such calculations, 
can it be predicted what polar structure the post-unipolar American system will assume? 
Simply put, based on the dataset at hand and the findings produced, what happens after 
American unipolarity? To address these questions, the aggregate distribution of post-
unipolar structural transitions is produced below to allow for probabilistic and predictive 
assessments. Of the 39 unipolar codings in the data set, 35 data points offer empirical 
evidence for post-unipolar transitional patterns (four unipolar structures transitioned into 
absorption by another system, hence being disqualified from probabilistic assessments). 
Based on these observable patterns, probabilistic outcomes are gauged with respect to 
post-transitional structural formations. Figure 10.1 displays the aggregate distribution of 
polar structures after unipolar transitions. After unipolar periods, the structure of the 
system transitioned into the following polar structures: bipolarity with 12 codings, 
triplarity with 2 codings, multipolarity with 7, and nonpolarity assuming the post-
unipolar structure 14 times. The considerations here are two-fold. First, after unipolar 
transitions, either the system undergoes intense diffusion of power, or, the system 
undergoes relatively minor diffusion of power. Second, multipolarity, with 7 codings, and 
tripolarity, with 2 codings, demonstrate that post-unipolar structures have a far less 
chance of transitioning to a multi-hegemonic system, thus decreasing the probability that 
the post-American unipolar system will assume a tripolar or multipolar power 
configuration.  
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Figure 10.1 AGGREGATE DISTRIBUTION OF POST-UNIPOLAR STRUCTURES 
 
 
 Analyzing these data probabilistically, the results are quite surprising, offering 
serious challenges to widely-held propositions and hypothesis that predominates the 
study of polarity within International Relations. Figure 10.2 displays the probabilistic 
outcomes of post-unipolar structures. The post-unipolar transitional patterns support the 
following findings: unipolar structures have a 40 percent chance of transitioning into a 
nonpolar structure, 34 percent probability transitioning into a bipolar configuration, 20 
percent likelihood of assuming multipolarity, and 6 percent possibility of formulating into 
a tripolar mode of polarity. Contingent on this data and the historical evidence 
accumulated, it appears that nonpolarity is the most probable post-unipolar structure, 
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allowing for the prediction that there is a 40 percent likelihood that the post-American 
global system will be nonpolar. Following nonpolarity, bipolarity also presents a rather 
high probability, for there is also a 34 percent chance that the post-American global 
system will find two system-wide hegemons exercising preponderance. Thus, 
analytically, it can be expected that the post-American unipolar structure would either be 
a highly diffused system or a relatively highly concentrated system, for there is a 74 
percent probability that the structure of the system would either transition to one or the 
other, but only a 26 percent probability, collectively speaking, of the structure 
transitioning into a multi-hegemonic configuration, whether tripolar or multipolar.  
 The considerations here are four-fold and quite troubling for scholars of polarity 
that expect the post-unipolar structure to either be bipolar or multipolar, that is, the most 
probabilistically tenable polar structure remains unaccounted for. First, the post-
American unipolar structure has the highest probability of transitioning into a nonpolar 
configuration because the contemporary unipolar period has consistently displayed a high 
number of centers of power, even at the regional and sub-regional/local levels. As such, 
these centers of power would have a relatively easy time sustaining their capabilities even 
after the structural removal of the single system-wide hegemon. Consequently, whether 
multitude of centers of power are being considered in North America (U.S., possibly 
Canada), South America (Brazil, Argentina, Chile), Africa (Nigeria, South Africa, 
Kenya), Middle-East and North Africa (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and Egypt), Europe 
(United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Russia), or the entirety of Asia and Oceana 
(Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia), the inchoateness and level of diffusion of 
power within the system remains difficult to deny. 
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Figure 10.2 PROBABILISTIC OUTCOMES OF POST-UNIPOLAR STRUCTURES 
 
 
 Second, while bipolarity presents the second highest probability of what the post-
American structure will look like, the only tenable treatment of a bipolar structure would 
have to presuppose China assuming a system-wide position, and as such, counter-
balancing the US. While such a development has a 34% probability, three-factors must be 
considered: Chinese policy prefers shirking over system-wide positioning; China prefers 
regional preponderance as sub-system hegemon as opposed to accepting the 
responsibilities of a global power; and, the remaining powers in the world, especially in 
Europe, cannot be expected to assume sub-system positioning if the configurations of the 
world order undergoes such transitions. As such, whereas powerful sub-system hegemons 
in Europe and Asia have chosen shirking and bandwagonning by virtue of their 
relationship with the unipole, this mode of behavior cannot be expected to continue if 
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unipolarity ends. The multitude of centers of power from the various continents, specified 
in the initial analysis, will only be reified once American unipolarity comes to an end.           
 Third, the importance of shirking, as a mode of behavior by sub-system actors, 
cannot be analytically underestimated. Meaning, shirking has been an important reality in 
the American unipolar structure, and the fact that states with the potential capability of 
engaging in revisionism have refused to do so suggests that aspirations of seeking 
system-wide positioning remains marginal to the existing centers of power within the 
various regions in the global system. This reluctance by economically powerful countries, 
such as Germany and Japan, or militarily powerful countries, such as United Kingdom 
and Russia, or highly populated countries such as India and China, is indicative of the 
fact that sub-system actors, even with the capacity to expand and exercise relative power, 
have refrained from engaging in such behavior, that is, they are refraining from 
functioning at the system-wide level. Important to note here, for example, is that Russia’s 
current conflict with Ukraine (as of 2014) does not suggest Russian positioning at the 
system-wide level, nor does it indicate Russia acting in a revisionist fashion. Rather, this 
is an attempt by Russia to maintain its sub-system status as regional hegemon, and to this 
end, it is only seeking to preserve what it considers to be its regional sphere of influence. 
Russia’s lack of global reach, and both its inability and lack of desire to function 
globally, demonstrates this point. Simply put, Russia is primarily concerned with its 
“backyard” and neighbors, that is, the infringement of what it considers inhospitable 
forces upon its regional interests.     
 Fourth, in relation to three of the assessments made above, the probabilistic 
outcomes of the post-American structure must also be considered within the conceptual 
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premise of fittidness, applied in a modified fashion and primarily borrowed from 
evolutionary theory of world politics (Modelski 1990; Thompson 2001). The 
evolutionary theory of world politics observes world political systems, or in the case of 
contemporary research, the Global Political System, as an evolving organism, a vast 
structure that develops, grows, and adjusts in relation to the development of its parts 
(state actors, institutions, structural shifts and developments, etc.). Thus, for example, 
whereas in ancient Greece the world political structure was defined by city-states, this 
structure evolved to empires, which, in turn, evolved to the nation-state of the post-
Westphalia global system. The underlying argument is that city-states lacked “fittedness” 
in the developing world system, and so the city-state had to evolve into an empire to 
coherently function and survive in the absorption and expansion of world political 
systems. As such, through the evolutionary historic process, empires became 
incompatible with the evolving world political systems, and as the Global Political 
System came into being, so did its systemic evolution, deeming certain modes of 
behavior, state formations, or structural characteristics no longer “fit” to survive in the 
new Global Political System. In this sense, nation-states, for example, were formulated in 
order to “fit,” as an evolutionary byproduct, of the new global macropolitical structure. 
So a system learns, innovates, and adapts by creating new forms/orders to supplement, 
alter, or replace an existing order or system that is not fit. This assessment is also 
consistent with considerations of unipolarity: for example, whereas system-wide 
hegemons like ancient Rome, medieval Mongols, Renaissance Spain and France, and 
post 16
th
 century England each behaved in highly warlike, zero-sum policies of 
colonization or conquest, the US (existing system-wide hegemon) cannot do the same 
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things that these hegemons did, for the process of historical evolution altered or created 
new “forms” or orders in the structure of the Global Political System that has placed 
severe limitations upon the system-wide hegemon. 
 Utilizing this overarching theoretical model, it is argued here that whereas in the 
past the Global Political System was compatible with considerations of multipolarity, 
bipolarity, and unipolarity, the current macropolitical structure, however, has evolved to 
such a new system where considerations of polarity, hegemonic struggle, and balance of 
power no longer “fit” the Global Political System. Namely, the post-American unipolar 
structure will have to be an outcome that finds fittidness within the existing global system 
which has come into being through a methodical, historical, and evolutionary process. 
Within this framework, as globalization, economic integration, institutional restraint, and 
intense interstate cooperation have become institutionalized and embedded in the existing 
global system, the system itself has evolved in such a fashion where traditional 
considerations of hegemonic power, modalities of polarity, and balance of power lack 
“fittedness” and are no longer coherent analytical units in the developing/evolving Global 
Political System. Consistent with this assessment, and hinged on the probabilistic 
considerations presented earlier, it may be contended that nonpolarity is more fit for the 
existing Global Political System as it undergoes a structural transition after American 
unipolarity. As argued in the first assessment above, the extraordinary high numbers of 
centers of power in the world are byproducts of a systemic evolutionary process where 
which state actors are either shirking, or seeking regional positioning. Within this 
perceived evolutionary development, none of the powerful sub-system hegemons are 
demonstrating behavior that suggests objectives of irredentism, expansionism, or system-
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wide positioning where preponderance may be exercised. The most telling factor, and the 
one that thoroughly challenges traditional studies of hegemony and polarity, is that even 
states with the potential capability to seek system-wide positioning or engage in 
revisionist endeavors are refraining from doing so. Consequently, it may perhaps be 
contended that being a system-wide hegemon does not fit the evolving Global Political 
System, and as a byproduct of this evolutionary process, states are refraining from 
engaging in such behavior, that is, they are engaging in behavior that reifies their 
fittidness. This being the case, nonpolarity, then, appears to be the polar structure that is 
more fitted to the evolving Global Political System than any of the other modes of 
polarity.  
 The relationship between unipolar periods and subsequent transitions to nonpolar 
structures may be better observed and understood by displaying the set of case studies 
culled from the body of historic evidence provided in this research. Figure 10.3 does this 
by presenting the data of unipolar periods that transitioned into nonpolar periods, where 
the system-wide hegemon’s decline was defined by increased diffusion of power to 
various centers of power throughout the system. Collectively, the findings demonstrate 
consistency with the probabilistic relationship between the polar structures and the 
analytical conclusion generated by this research. Important to consider, perhaps for future 
research, is the magnitude of power concentration for unipolar periods that transitioned 
into nonpolar structures and unipolar periods that transitioned into structures other than 
nonpolarity. A very general observation tentatively suggests that the level of power 
concentration was quite higher with unipolar structures that transitioned into nonpolarity,  
that is, intense concentration displays a tendency to give way to intense diffusion.  
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Figure 10.3 TRANSITIONS FROM UNIPOLAR TO NONPOLAR STRUCTURES 
UNIPOLAR STRUCTURE NONPOLAR 
TRANSITION 
MACROPOLTIICAL SYSTEM TRANSITION 
DATE 
CRETE  MEDITERRANEAN 1550 BC 
MYCENAE X MEDITERRANEAN 1100 BC 
CORINTH  MEDITERRANEAN 650 BC 
MACEDONIA X MEDITERRANEAN 320 BC 
ROME X MEDITERRANEAN 395 BC 
ACHAEMENID / 
KOSALA 
 INDIC 400 BC 
MAGADHA  INDIC 180 BC 
MAGADHA X INDIC 120 BC 
INDO-PARTHIANS  INDIC 30 BC 
GANDHARA  INDIC 150 AD 
GUPTA  INDIC 460 AD 
HUNAS X INDIC 540 AD 
CALUKYAS X INDIC 740 AD 
RASTRAKUTAS  INDIC 880 AD 
RASTRAKUTAS  INDIC 970 AD 
GHURID  INDIC 1220 AD 
DELHI X INDIC 1400 AD 
MUGHAL  INDIC 1725 AD 
CHOU X FAR EASTERN 780 BC 
CH’IN X FAR EASTERN 210 BC 
HUNS  FAR EASTERN 165 BC 
HAN  FAR EASTERN 160 AD 
WESTERN CHIN X FAR EASTERN 300 AD 
FIRST KHAGANATE  FAR EASTERN 675 AD 
YUAN  FAR EASTERN 1355 AD 
MING / CH’ING  FAR EASTERN 1850 AD 
AKKAD X NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN 2150 BC 
URUK  NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN 2010 BC 
ISIN  NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN 1800 BC 
BABYLON X NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN 1710 BC 
EGYPT  NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN 1345 BC 
ASSYRIA X NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN 1050 BC 
ASSYRIA X NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN 830 BC 
ASSYRIA  NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN 620 BC 
PERSIA  NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN 330 BC 
PORTUGAL / SPAIN  GLOBAL 1590 AD 
FRANCE  GLOBAL 1715 AD 
GREAT BRITAIN  GLOBAL 1890 AD 
UNITED STATES  GLOBAL CURRENT 
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Cursory assessments of system-wide hegemons such as Mycenae, Macedonia, Rome, 
Magadha, Ch’in, Babylon, and Assyria, for example, suggest consistency with such 
assessments. But at the same time, power concentration was also quite high with Gupta, 
Mughal, Yuan, Ming, Egyptian, and Persian unipolar periods, yet the system did not 
transition to a nonpolar structure. The ability to accurately operationalize and apply this 
dynamic might provide very important explanatory results that may be applied to both 
previous polar periods as well as for the post-unipolar transitions within the current 
Global Political System.        
Future Direction of Research 
 Utilization of econometrics to attain more robust, quantifiable findings may rely 
on inferential statistics to primarily substantiate conceptual models that attempt to gauge 
the magnitude of power dispersion in the Global Political System as formed after the 
overarching absorption of all of the world political systems into a single global structure. 
The Correlates of War index (Ray and Singer 1973), as suggested by Mansfield (1993), 
offers the most robust formula in calculating power concentration in relation to the 
number of system-wide hegemons in the system. Available statistical data for the subject 
matter at hand may also be attained from the Correlates of War database, which offers 
data from 1814 to the present. A time-series cross-sectional model will allow for the 
tracing of the diffusion of power, among global system-wide hegemonic actors, from 
1814 to the present. This will potentially allow for the establishment of much quantified, 
empirically support, attained through methods of econometrics, in addressing questions 
pertaining to the level of power diffusion after unipolar periods (such as comparing level 
of power concentration during British unipolarity in relation to level of power 
318 
 
concentration during American unipolarity), and whether an observable pattern of power 
diffusion is diagnosable where which the evolution of the Global Political System may be 
analyzed through.    
 There also remains great deal of room for research concerning the need to provide 
more specific observations on the structural characteristics and attributes of nonpolarity. 
This approach may be two-fold, the first relying on the work of Deutsch and Singer 
(1964), and the second on the work of Schweller (2010). Replicating the two models used 
by Deutsch and Singer (1964), an attempt can be made to observe if a nonpolar system is 
more stable and peaceful than other modes of polar structures. Quickly, in the first model, 
authors assert that the most obvious effect of an increase in the number of actors in a 
system is an increase in the number of possible pairs or dyads in the total system. A 
reduction in the number of possible dyadic relations produces, both for any actor and for 
the totality of those in the system, a corresponding diminution in the number of 
opportunities for interaction with other actors (393).  As stimuli in one particular 
direction increases, the system exhibits a decreasing response to those stimuli, and 
increasingly exhibits tendencies that counteract them. Thus, in any given bilateral 
relationship, a rather limited range of possible interactions is obtained, even if the 
relationship is highly symbiotic. But as additional actors are brought into the system, the 
range of possible interactions available to each actor increases, hence increasing the total 
possible interactions in the system. The objective, then, is to observe the degree to which 
each single increment or decrement affects the number of possible dyads, interaction 
opportunities, in the system. Thus, “in a purely bipolar system, only one dyad or pair is 
possible,” while a tripolar structure “produces three pairs, four actors produce six pairs, 
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five produce ten possible pairings, and so on” (394). Systemically, as new actors in the 
system increase, possibility/opportunity of interactive behavior between new actors and 
existing actors increases, thus potentially decreasing instability in the polar 
structure/system. Simply put, more interaction leads to increased stability. As actors in 
the system increase, so do interaction opportunities, and more than 5 actors/poles is the 
level where the stability-enhancing increment begins to rapidly grow (395). 
 While the authors limit their analysis to the relationship between bipolar and 
multipolar systems, this method may be applied to a nonpolar structure: as the number of 
actors increase in the Global Political System, so does the number of interactions between 
the actors. This increase in interaction is directly correlated with stability enhancement. 
So the more independent actors a system has, the more interactions it has, and as such, 
the more stable it is. With the nonpolar system requiring more than seven actors (above 
the 5 actor threshold), the stability-enhancing increment will exponentially increase. 
Hypothetically, for predictive purposes, if one presumes an increase of a minimum of 6 
global actors, as the post-US unipolar system would very likely have, the assumption is a 
nonpolar global system with numerically high sub-system hegemons/actors and 
numerically high interactions, with no single actor or actors dominating, and as such, 
decreasing instability and having high rate of interaction opportunities between states. 
Continuing with this hypothetical, in the contemporary globalizing world, with the 
declining unipolar system allowing for increased interactions among rising independent 
actors, the stability-enhancing capabilities of the potential nonpolar system is increased. 
 The second model, which may be labeled as the dispersion of resources 
framework, is conceptualized as followed. In a bipolar system, one actor applies its 
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attention (resource) to its opposing pole/other actor. Yet as actors increase in the system, 
the existing actor must divert attention/resources to this new actor(s) (assumption is that 
same level of resource/attention will not be diverted, yet nonetheless, there will be some 
diversion). As actors increase in the Global Political System, so do the diversion and 
diffusion of resources/attention of the actors within the system. Thus, whereas two actors 
applied attention to one another, now all actors must apply attention/resources to each 
other, although in different degrees (396-398). This relative dispersion of resources 
decreases the probability of conflict, for it is one thing to concentrate all resources toward 
one, two, or three actors, as opposed to having to concentrating resources, in complicated 
stratagem, to seven or more actors. Quantified results show that three power centers in 
the system sharply decrease probability of conflict, while five centers greatly decrease 
probability of instability. One may begin to presume how low the probability of 
instability would be with seven or more centers of power in a nonpolar system. In the 
absence of system-wide hegemons, the high numbers of actors apply their resources 
interchangeably to other actors in the global system. Whereas US-Soviet resource 
allocation was uni-dimensional, a hypothetical multipolar US-EU-China-Russia-India 
resource allocation structure will be multidimensional, while a nonpolar US-EU-China-
Russia-Brazil-Canada-India-Iran-Japan-etc resource allocation structure will be 
extremely diverse, with the distribution of resources that a state allocates to its 
relationship with other actors being very diffused and complex. This is consistent with 
Deustch and Singer’s contention of attention dispersion contributing to systemic stability 
enhancement. Coupled with the above-assessed notion of “interaction opportunities,” it 
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may tentatively be hypothesized and tested whether a nonpolar global system is more 
stable than bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or unipolar structures. 
 Utilizing Schweller’s (2010) treatment of entropy with respect to the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics, a different approach may be taken to assess how power diffusion 
can take place in a nonpolar system, and how the structure of the system will reinforce 
itself without the presence of system-wide hegemons/poles. The Second Law of 
Thermodynamics asserts that a system’s total energy consists of two separate parts: 
energy that is available for work (useful or free energy) and energy that is unavailable for 
work (useless or bound energy). Entropy measures the disorganization in a system. The 
extra resources that a pole/system-wide hegemon possesses are akin to what is called 
“useless energy” that is associated with entropy. The total entropy of any isolated 
thermodynamic system cannot decrease; it may only remain the same or increase; and so, 
by implication, the entropy of the universe tends to increase. Entropy is often associated 
with disorder and chaos because random configurations have larger probability of 
occurring than more ordered ones. Entropy measures change in the degree of systemic 
constraints on the units: as entropy increases, constraints weaken. When systemic 
constraints are high, the system will operate in a fairly predictable manner; when 
systemic constraints are low or nonexistent, the system will behave in a random and 
chaotic manner. This occurs because, as entropy increases, the macrostate is composed of 
more and more specific configurations, and so the former reveals less and less 
information about the latter. The logic is straightforward and mere commonsense: events 
of higher frequency appear more often than those of lower frequency. According to the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics, once the system attains maximum entropy, final 
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equilibrium, entropy cannot decrease, thus, the system remains as it is. Concomitantly, 
Schweller holds that once the Global Political System reaches maximum entropy, power 
capabilities will be diffused to other actors and none will have any incentive to move 
from this condition (147-150). In this sense, randomness can be found in virtually 
unlimited combinations of specific configurations (such as in a nonpolar system), 
whereas order implies a specific combination of a relatively small number of 
configurations (uni-, bi-, tri-, or multi polar systems). When maximum entropy is 
attained, order is replaced with randomness, disorder, and indeterminateness.  
 The absence of specific structural order in a nonpolar system presupposes 
randomness and inchoateness, hence being consistent with considerations of entropy in 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Disorder does not refer to incoherent and violent 
behavior among actors, but rather the structure of the system itself: there are no modes of 
order/polarity, no positional structure to demonstrate hierarchy or organization of power 
configurations. The unitary relationship of each actor to the overarching global structure 
is one of randomness and disorder, that is, there is the absence of polarity. Accordingly, 
entropy may provide much explanation and characteristic attributes with respect to a 
potential nonpolar Global Political System. For analytical purposes, then, entropy is 
applicable in gauging disorder and inchoateness with respect to units and their relation to 
the structure of the system. This unit-structure relationship provides important 
explanations with respect to the nonpolar system, that is, the nonpolar system is 
structurally disordered: it has no single order, or hierarchy, of powerful states.  
 Collectively, then, the application of these three overarching approaches would 
provide both the opportunity to pose more questions concerning the study of polarity, 
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while at the same time testing given questions and propositions. Concomitantly, 
employing such methodological concepts as interaction opportunities and dispersion of 
resources, considerations of stability, vis-à-vis state behavior, may be better observed and 
tested, thus providing potential answers to questions pertaining to the attributes of 
nonpolar structures and state actors. Finally, the application of entropy to system’s 
analysis will allow for a transition from using the conceptual tools of the social sciences 
to perhaps utilizing the conceptual tools of the hard sciences, through which systemic 
outcomes of nonpolar attributes may better be gauged and understood.  
 With respect to continuous future research, the finding and propositions produced 
in this work may perhaps offer important lessons to IR theory. Specifically, future 
scholarly work may utilize the following considerations: 1) application of the alleviation 
of the agent-structure problematique to theory development and paradigm-building; 2) 
criteria for evaluating and qualifying system-wide actors or superpowers in the study of 
global politics; 3) employing multi-tiered analysis that escapes theory 
incommensurability and allows for the formulation of theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks that coherently fluctuate between second and third level imagery; and 4) 
composing a methodological approach that confidently relies on an eclectic utilization of 
diverse paradigmatic tools, as opposed to being limited to paradigmatic myopism. In 
totality, then, future scholarly endeavors may rely on a more multifaceted and refined 
approach to IR theory-building.     
Conclusion 
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1985) eloquently argued that the scientific 
understanding of international relations requires explicit theorizing, grounded in 
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axiomatic logic, from which hypotheses with empirical referents may be extracted, 
“followed by rigorous empirical analysis (whether quantitative or not) in which 
assumptions and procedures are explicitly stated.” Furthermore, such research must 
manage to specify whether the “hypotheses stipulate necessary, sufficient, necessary and 
sufficient, or probabilistic relations among variables” (121). The research endeavor at 
hand undertook a concerted effort to abide by such scholarly considerations. Explicit 
theorizing is provided with respect to the formulation of the various conceptual and 
analytical tools utilized in this research, which, in turn, are grounded in axiomatic logic. 
Thus, the concepts of world political systems, system-wide hegemons, modes of polarity, 
and structural shifts and transitions remain the byproducts of explicit theorizing that is 
hinged on deductive and axiomatic logic. Consequently, the formulated hypotheses, 
which pertain to polar structruations and post-unipolar transitions, inherently presuppose 
empirical referents, that follow a three-tiered methodological approach through which 
rigorous empirical analysis has been utilized. Subsequently, the research design specifies 
that the propositions and puzzles being addressed by this project stipulate probabilistic 
relations among the variables being studied. In its totality, then, the theoretical model, 
conceptual tools, analytical frameworks, methodological approach, and the findings of 
this research project rest on strong foundations and demonstrate robust adherence to the 
general standards of philosophy of science.  
 Among the various observations and findings produced by this project, two 
overarching ones stand out, where which non-obvious facts were procured and 
knowledge-accumulations substantiated. First, nonpolarity has been demonstrated to be 
both an empirical reality and reified through an explicit theoretical framework allowing 
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for a coherent and applicable assessment of this mode of polarity. That 19 periods in the 
history of world political systems had nonpolar epochs is quite telling of the persistence 
and tendency of the macropolitical system to assume such a mode of polarity. The 
introduction and empirical validation of nonpolarity as both a tenable and verifiable polar 
structure offers the discipline new analytical tools and data that may be operationalized to 
develop better understanding of both polar structurations and state behavior vis-à-vis 
structural shifts and formations within the macropolitical system. Second, body of data 
has been procured through the historic evidence that has not been produced or qualified 
by previous research, that is, the criteria-oriented methodology of accumulating data for 
polar periods offers an expansion in both our knowledge and approach in studying 
polarity and the behavior of powerful, system-wide actors. As a result, non-obvious and 
original assessments have been produced with respect to polar transitions and 
probabilistic predictions of post-unipolar structures. That this research may offer 
calculated predictions of what the post-American unipolar structure would transition into, 
for example, and what the world may look like, that is, what the expected affect may be 
upon both systemic and unitary/state attributes in the Global Political System, is 
demonstrative of some degree of knowledge-accumulation.       
 For some 50 years of research undertaken in the scientific study of polarity, we 
have learned a lot, only to come to realize that, in fact, we have not learned much. 
Tautology, indeed, is a very dangerous trap: but not inescapable. The circular trap that 
scholars have confined themselves in, going from bipolarity to multipolarity, from 
arguing over stability and instability, determinism and non-determinism, causality and 
correlation, and of course, disputing whether any knowledge-accumulation has been 
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attained, smacks of an overarching trap of tautology that has overwhelmed the discipline: 
everyone says a lot, but in the end, no one is really saying anything. That one’s nothing is 
another’s something cannot be a tenable approach to the study of International Relations. 
The problem, then, as suggested earlier, appears to be one of scope: how much can a 
group of people study the same 500 year history (post-Westphalia system); how much 
can the same 200 hundred years of data be quantified and re-quantified, analyzed and re-
analyzed, with conflicting results and conclusions; and how long can controversy and 
disagreement define the inability to establish consensus in the fight over measurements, 
selection of variables, and research methodology? By becoming trapped in the 
ahistoricism and Eurocentrism that has come to define the study of power politics and 
polarity, scholars of International Relations have become academic cannibals: they keep 
fighting over the same meal, and when this does not work, they turn on each other. By 
broadening the scope, extending the universe of data and empirical referents to a much 
larger area of inquiry, and introducing methods of research, analytics, and scholarship 
that supplement and reify this expansion, perhaps paradigmatic and methodological 
myopism may be escaped. That is, perhaps more meals may be provided for the field of 
study, so that instead of engaging in academic cannibalism, scholars may perhaps 
actually engage in knowledge-accumulation. That Vasquez (1987) channels Kenneth 
Waltz’s lamentation should not be a surprise: “nothing seems to accumulate, not even 
criticism” (pg. 113).        
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